Two conflicting orders make rotation impossible – Air Assault Forces representative

1 May, 04:55 PM

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Ukrainian soldiers fire a self-propelled howitzer at Russian military positions on the front lines near the town of Pokrovsk on March 30, 2026 (Photo: REUTERS/Stringer)

NV: I’ll get straight to the main news of the day, which concerns the sector of the front defended by the 7th Assault Corps — the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad axis. No matter what happens elsewhere, this sector continues to appear in the General Staff’s reports as the most active and intense area in terms of the number and ferocity of combat engagements. Today, Commander-in-Chief Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi issued an order stating that troops on the line of contact must be rotated no later than after two months of continuous duty. When I look at the Pokrovsk front sector, there are areas that are extremely difficult to hold. For example, the northern outskirts of Myrnohrad, which remains in the “gray zone” but is effectively already semi-encircled. So the question arises: what should be done in such situations? Is it even possible to rotate personnel there in order to comply with the commander-in-chief’s directive? Please tell us more about this sector in general.

Volodymyr Polevyi: Vasyl, let me start with a broader operational context. When we talk about the Pokrovsk direction, I should clarify that in the General Staff’s reports it covers a wider area than just Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad themselves. But you are correct: in the area of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, particularly on the northern outskirts that we still hold and control, the situation at the tactical level is extremely difficult.

I completely agree with you that rotation is simply not feasible on these particular sections. It is already very hard to bring people in, and even logistics — including by air — are extraordinarily complicated. Trying to deliver a large cargo drone makes it a sizable target, and the Russians immediately engage it with their air defense assets. Or FPV drones ram the delivery drones, and they can even be shot down with small arms fire.

The idea of freely rotating troops there has been off the table for a long time. Even extracting our soldiers from those positions would be an extremely difficult and complex operation that would require specific conditions to align — including favorable weather.

Turning back to today’s news: we have seen the commander-in-chief’s directive. Right now, as often happens in war and in the army, we have two orders that directly contradict each other in our specific situation.

On one hand, there is a clear instruction to rotate units every two months. And we do have subunits whose personnel have already been on position for more than two months — particularly on the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. On the other hand, we have an order to hold these positions. If we try to carry out a rotation and pull these people out in literal compliance with the first order, there is a 99% chance that under the current weather and tactical conditions we will not be able to bring new units in to replace them. In any case, one of the two orders will not be fulfilled.

What happens in practice? This is not something that can be hidden. There is constant contact with the commander-in-chief and the General Staff leadership; a report has been submitted. Obviously, a decision will be made based on the results. Some decision will be taken specifically for our Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad sector of defense.

I hope that decision will include a strong emphasis on preserving the lives of our soldiers. Because from a purely tactical standpoint, holding those positions is simply unrealistic.

Let me clarify, Volodymyr. Am I correct in understanding that we face a situation where, on one side, there is a need — which the commander-in-chief has repeatedly stressed — to hold positions in the Pokrovsk area because they prevent the enemy from advancing more aggressively toward Kostiantynivka, which in turn protects the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. At the same time, there is value in grinding down enemy resources near Pokrovsk, something we have seen happen quite effectively before. Yet there is also this new order requiring rotations. These tasks appear mutually exclusive in the Pokrovsk sector.

To clarify, returning to the broader operational picture: the 7th Corps, together with our neighboring brothers-in-arms from the 1st Azov Corps, is tasked with preventing the enemy from advancing toward Dobropillia, from where they could threaten the highway and create dangers for Kostiantynivka or push toward Kramatorsk and Slovyansk from the south.

Let me rephrase: to stop the enemy in this direction, it is not necessary at this moment to hold the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. The main axis of the enemy’s effort runs toward Dobropillia — specifically through Rodynske, not the northern outskirts of Myrnohrad. The second axis of effort runs through Hryshyne toward Krutoyarivka, which is already in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, thereby cutting through defensive lines that have been prepared deeper in our defense.

I want to stress that behind the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad there are also convenient defensive lines — at least more convenient and farther away from Russian drone launch points. For example, the line from Novooleksandrivka toward Rodynske, where troops can be withdrawn to. We would still be fulfilling the mission of stopping the enemy from advancing on Dobropillia or through Hryshyne.

Then why not withdraw from those inconvenient areas that we can see on the DeepState map are completely in the gray zone and surrounded by the enemy on almost all sides? Why not pull back and occupy the next defensive lines — if only to comply with the orders on rotating personnel on the front line? I understand this question may not be directed at the right person, and I’m not even sure whether you can answer it properly. Let’s talk instead about what the Russians are doing right now in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. A few weeks ago there were reports that they were beginning to concentrate artillery on the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk. Is that accurate?

I will still make a remark about your rather rhetorical question. Why are we still in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad? Because there is an order to hold these positions, so we remain there.

As for your entirely rational idea about why not withdraw — it really does make sense both tactically and even operationally. There is no point in clinging to tactically disadvantageous positions.

It is possible that considerations here go beyond the operational level and reach the strategic or even political level. Pokrovsk was at one point specifically highlighted in international negotiations, including obviously with American partners. Perhaps the answer lies there. One has to look for the reason why we continue to receive the order to hold Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.

Regarding your question about whether the Russians are really massing forces, entering Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, and bringing in artillery, I will answer this way: they certainly have that capability. Why? Because they have secured the high ground and positions within the urban area.

They effectively control these cities, dominate the key heights, and have established observation posts, electronic warfare systems, signals intelligence, and ground control stations for their drones there.

Our radio horizon for radio-controlled drones is unfavorable. The southern part of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad lies in a lowland — a blind spot that has significantly reduced the effectiveness of our unmanned systems.

We do have some means to reach them, of course — fiber-optic drones, guided systems, or strikes from our “senior” assets such as rocket artillery and HIMARS. But the truth is that the Russians (as things work in the forward zone) are able to bring their units into Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk almost freely and are using the industrial zone.

They are using workshops, concrete shelters, and basements of apartment buildings to accumulate personnel. This creates certain threats and preconditions for their further advance. Wherever we see it and have the capability, we strike them. There is confirmed evidence that the enemy is suffering quite significant losses, yet they continue to build up forces.

In your opinion, how much of a propaganda win would it be for the Russians if we abandoned those positions — positions that no longer make sense to hold but for which there is an order? If we leave, would it give the enemy a significant morale and information boost? Would they finally be able to raise their flag and declare that they have captured Pokrovsk and achieved a major victory? How do you assess that possibility?

 From an information standpoint, the Russians have already announced six times — six times — that they have taken Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. For the Russian audience, Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad have long been under Russian control.

This is partially true. Russian flags are already flying over the central administrative buildings. Nothing at all will change in the Russian information space because they sincerely believe they have taken Kupyansk and fully control Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. At most, some military experts might note that “the Ukrainians have finally abandoned their last positions, which had no decisive influence…”

It is important to understand clearly that this is not a bridgehead from which it would be convenient for us to launch attacks. Crossing the kill zone to enter Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad would mean assaulting concrete fortifications head-on from open fields — which is impossible and makes no sense. So in the information field, nothing significant would happen.

The Russians still consider Donetsk Oblast their strategic goal and are concentrating their main effort there. Recently, a deputy head of military intelligence stated that the Russians have transferred 20,000 strategic reserves to Donetsk Oblast. Given that, is it fair to assume that as long as the enemy has not fully pushed through the Pokrovsk direction defenses and advanced further, any talk of their further progress across Donetsk Oblast remains wishful thinking? And secondly, where might these 20,000 troops be used, according to the intelligence information?

Twenty thousand is a serious force — the equivalent of several full brigades. Of course, the enemy cannot concentrate them all in one spot, but they could have an impact on our sector or to the north or south of it.

The enemy will choose, and they consistently follow the tactic of trying to attack in several directions simultaneously. If they achieve tactical success somewhere, they then introduce reserves there and build [on that success]. They thicken the line, bringing in a new brigade or even a division — for example, an air assault division — and gradually increase their efforts.

The objective reality of this war is that this cannot be done unnoticed or quickly. To do it quickly, they would need to mount infantry on armored vehicles, make a rapid dash, and burst forward on armor.

This is roughly the tactic used by our own assault troops from the Skelya or Air Assault Forces: we dash to the line of contact on armor, the vehicles provide fire support, the troops dismount and assault the positions. That is the ideal picture.

The Russians cannot do this anywhere right now — at least we have not seen such cases recently, and not for a very long time. Their armor is used essentially as taxis to bring infantry as close as possible, but it does not provide direct fire support to the troops. For the same purpose, the Russians use various buggies and motorcycles — simply to cross the kill zone faster.

The kill zone is enormous and wide. Throughout it, we engage the enemy. It is hard to imagine 20,000 or even 10,000 soldiers advancing along a single road — that would be an ideal target. It would be a shooting gallery for all Defense Forces units in the sector, because everything would be working on them: tactical aviation, rocket artillery, regular artillery, remote mining, and drones of all types and ranges.

A 10,000-strong column would look like the column that once stretched from Chornobyl toward Kyiv — and it would all be burning.

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