'Elites will say Putin can be eaten': Feygin on Russia's war and talks

28 July, 11:15 AM

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Russian opposition politician, lawyer, and YouTube blogger Mark Feygin, who currently lives in Europe. (Photo: DR)

"We saw and heard every drone, and there were dozens of them," the family of an entrepreneur who lives near Koledino outside Moscow and makes phone cases under the Twoss.case brand told Russian outlet Cherta, describing the night of the attack on a warehouse operated by Russian online marketplace Wildberries. The entrepreneur and his wife said their greatest fear was for their children, who were at home with them.

Within a single week, Ukrainian drones reached Wildberries warehouses in Kotovsk, Elektrostal, Krasnodar and Nevinnomyssk. Overnight into July 24, logistics hubs caught fire in Shushary and Novosaratovka near St. Petersburg, as well as in Russian-occupied Simferopol. The combined losses suffered by sellers and manufacturers could reach 150 billion rubles, according to estimates cited by Meduza.

Notably, Russian entrepreneurs do not mention either the Ukrainian Armed Forces or the war in their video appeals. Instead, they address customers, asking them to place more orders so they can continue paying salaries and rent. The family from Koledino went only so far as to say that there was one thing the state could do to help: finally end all of this and give its citizens peaceful skies.

These events are unfolding against the backdrop of the Cardboard Maidan protests in Kyiv and major personnel changes in Ukraine's political and military establishment. Mykhailo Fedorov was removed from the Defense Ministry, triggering the protests, while Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi was later dismissed and replaced by Mykhailo Drapatyi.

NV discussed how these developments look from the Russian side with Mark Feygin, a Russian opposition politician and lawyer, former State Duma lawmaker and former attorney for Pussy Riot and Nadiya Savchenko. Feygin was stripped of his legal status in Russia and convicted in absentia. He now lives in Europe and runs the Feygin Live YouTube channel.

— For a quarter of a century, Russians have been told that Ukraine is a dictatorship. Then suddenly young people carrying cardboard signs take to the streets and effectively bring about the replacement of a key military figure in the country. What does that look like to a Russian?

— This is not the first myth to collapse. The same thing happened with the previous Cardboard Maidan outside the President's Office [protests in the summer of 2025 against a law restricting the independence of NABU and SAPO]. The authorities listened to public opinion and backed down. Despite all its flaws, the government in Ukraine derives its authority from society. The people are the source of its legitimacy, and there is no doubt about that.

There is another powerful myth — that Ukraine has no agency of its own and is supposedly controlled by its "masters in Washington," by the West. Trump's term has shown that this is not the case, and that myth has been shattered once and for all. Even Kremlin propaganda had to change its rhetoric: "How dare Zelenskyy do this? Trump tells him after Anchorage [the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska in August 2025] to sign, and he tells him to get lost."

— And how do Russians view this?

— Most of them remain in a zombie-like state. I would like to say that Russians saw this and began assessing the situation more soberly, but unfortunately, I cannot say that. Real life and the realities of the war do not break through the brainwashing and "programming" the Kremlin has subjected Russians to for a quarter of a century.

Let me add one thing: If people in Russia took to the streets like that, they would be met with machine guns. Make no mistake about it. Whether literally or figuratively does not matter.

Even before the war, it should have been clear that power in Ukraine changes hands. No one except Leonid Kuchma served two presidential terms. Presidents changed, and each time an opponent of the incumbent government came to power. That is unthinkable in Russia, where every government has always been an extension of the previous one, whether through succession or preservation of the system. Boris Yeltsin opposed Gorbachev and the Communist Party, but he still remained part of that system and preserved it.

Yet Russians, for the most part, keep repeating like woodpeckers that Ukraine is a dictatorship and that Zelenskyy has "overstayed" his term in office. The events in Kyiv have changed nothing in that regard.

— Has Russian propaganda already reacted to the personnel changes?

— Look how quickly it shifted. First, with Fedorov, it was: "Hooray, hooray, no Fedorov means no more Wildberries attacks." But we understand that this does not depend on any one person — not Fedorov or even Zelenskyy. It is a strategy chosen by the entire military and political leadership to put pressure on Moscow and bring about an end to the war. The details may change when an official is replaced, but the strategy itself does not. And it reflects the mood of Ukrainian society.

Then, when Drapatyi was appointed, the hatred and mockery began. The Ukrainian trolling with the coordinates of Red Square ahead of May 9 was clever, very much in the style of Kvartal 95. The Kremlin does not even understand how primitive its own humor is.

— I have been watching appeals from Russian entrepreneurs who lost goods in Wildberries warehouses. Only occasionally does someone ask when the so-called "special military operation" will end. Yet a significant part of the Russian opposition is outraged, asking: "Why are you striking Wildberries?"

— It is very simple. First, regarding the entrepreneurs. They can blame everything on fear: "Excuse us, we live here. Maybe that is what we think, but we will not say it because we could be punished for it. We have already suffered losses and have no money, and if we also blame Putin's government, we could end up in prison."

That is how they will make excuses. But the overwhelming majority actually believe something else: Give me money, compensate me and protect us from Ukrainian missiles and drones. Whether the war continues or not does not concern us. That is the basic logic.

Because what proportion of these entrepreneurs support the "special military operation," go there themselves or pay taxes?

Second, the Russian opposition is a separate issue. A fierce, almost hysterical debate has erupted there: "Oh no, this is also a war crime. You cannot strike civilian facilities."

You would think these are sophisticated people living in exile, where they can speak freely without fearing Kremlin persecution. But even there, there is a segment that believes it must appeal to ordinary Russians, that it must go out of its way to prove that it represents the interests of grassroots Russian society: "Strike Putin, we do not care about him, but marketplaces are ordinary Russian people."

They are still thinking in terms of elections and trying to win favor, but there is nothing remotely like that happening, not even the slightest sign of it. To ordinary Russians, who have had this drilled into their heads by the authorities, these opposition figures will forever remain enemies, Judases and traitors.

The average Russian follows the pro-Kremlin mindset: They side with the authorities, not against them. They are not going to say, "What a wonderful Russian restaurateur Yevgeny Chichvarkin is [he spoke out against strikes on Russian warehouses]. He is defending us."

Chichvarkin does not fully understand that. Some of what he believes is sincere, and some of it may be calculated. I do not condemn him — he opposes Putin and the war — but this position simply does not sell.

And the main thing I would tell them is this: You cannot impose this agenda on Ukraine while it is defending itself. Why did these facilities start getting hit in the first place? It is Ukraine's agenda that matters here.

What are you trying to do, shame Ukraine into not defending itself at all? You can take that logic very far: Do not strike Wildberries, feel sorry for the poor Russian soldiers — they did not go voluntarily, poverty forced them to sign a little contract and travel to another country to kill Ukrainians.

— Did the same mechanism work after the strike on Starobilsk?

— Yes, that is a specific example [overnight into May 22, 2026, Ukraine's Defense Forces struck buildings of a former teachers college in Russian-occupied Starobilsk; the General Staff said the headquarters of Russia's Rubikon special unit was located there, while Russia insisted a college dormitory had been hit]. Do you remember the hysteria that followed? They said it was a dormitory and that students had been killed. People were shouting before they knew the details or whether there had been a training center there. And then they will tell you: It does not matter whether there was a training center, students were killed.

By the same logic, they now say it does not matter whether Wildberries warehouses contained dual-use or military goods — Ukraine had no right to strike them. Why not? Who decided that? Did Moscow allow an independent commission to inspect the site? Were international observers working there?

Another example is Olenivka [an explosion at a prison in Russian-occupied Olenivka in July 2022 killed at least 50 Ukrainian prisoners of war, most of them Azov fighters; international inspectors were never allowed to visit the site]. We are adults and understand perfectly well how this works: They simply decided to kill them so they would not have to exchange them, hand them over or spare them punishment. Then they wink and say, "See, the Ukrainians shelled their own people."

But neither there nor at other such sites did they ever allow international inspectors in, even though they had specifically asked to visit Olenivka.

So why not let an international commission work at the ruins of the Wildberries warehouses now? Were drones stored there? Were they being sold through the marketplace? Personally, I am convinced they were.

— You probably saw the reaction from Muscovites when the war reached them as well: "Russia is one thing, but why Moscow?" We Ukrainians have been living in this reality for five years, while they are only now discovering it. What effect will that have, even at the level of public consciousness?

— There will certainly be an effect, but it will be cumulative rather than immediate. If Russians start living through the war the way Ukrainians do, it will suddenly become clear that they are far less resilient and far less adapted to it.

Ukraine had four and a half years to get used to apartment entrances in Kyiv burning from the sixth through ninth floors and 30 people being killed at a time. Russians have no such experience. They are only beginning to accumulate it now.

For it to sink in and for them to want to change anything, time is needed, along with the continuation of this strategy. Because if it all ends quickly for them, they will never understand anything.

From the first day of the war, I said this would happen. Anyone who follows my broadcasts knows that. It was inevitable and unavoidable. Why? Because that is the logic of war.

— Ukrainians have a reason to endure: We understand that otherwise we will simply be killed. Do Russians have any motivation to endure strikes?

— I always say Ukrainians have no choice. Their homes are being attacked, and the war is being fought on Ukrainian territory.

Russians, however, do have a choice: not to participate in this war. Nothing is happening on your territory except the strikes. If the war ends, the strikes will stop as well. But you continue to support this war morally by accepting the government's decision, precisely because the war did not affect you personally.

— First, it became known that Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich had traveled to Kyiv, and then Putin effectively acknowledged that he had approved the trip. Why him again? And does this suggest that people around Putin are dissatisfied with his policies and at least want to adjust them?

— The oligarchs would like to end this entire story — Abramovich and the other billionaires. They are losing money and suffering both financially and legally because of the war. Their real lives are not in Russia but in the West. They never really lived Russian lives. They became accustomed to luxury and hedonistic pleasures that they enjoyed there.

Russia, for them, is more like rotational work: You come, entertain yourself because your business is there, and then leave. So they would like sanctions and all kinds of restrictions against them to be lifted.

The other issue is that Abramovich's activity is authorized by Putin. The only question is what mission Putin gave him: "Abramovich, go and buy Zelenskyy. Offer him 10 'watermelons' [slang for 10 billion rubles] so that he agrees to give up Donetsk Oblast."

Do you understand how their logic works? We offered money. That is how they always solved problems, including with Ukrainian governments, with people like Yanukovych.

But the Ukrainian government no longer responds to that. That is why they are irritated that the war continues and there is nothing they can do about it.

— Could that dissatisfaction reach the point where Putin loses the confidence of the oligarchs?

— That sentiment exists. I am sure they would like to get rid of Putin painlessly and through someone else's hands. But they are cowardly and would never take that kind of responsibility themselves.

They would like some unfortunate missile to come from nowhere and for Putin to disappear. But that is not going to happen. The conditions for it do not exist.

So there is no point expecting these people to take a decisive step or actions that would destroy Putin's personal rule.

— People in Russia have started talking about mobilization suspiciously early, in my view. Logically, that would worsen the situation both in the economy and in every other respect. Will Putin go through with it or not? How would you model his thinking?

— I am among the skeptical experts who do not believe Putin is prepared to launch mobilization right now. Let me explain why.

First, the conditions are extremely unfavorable. Mobilization works well when you can say: Guys, let's push a little harder, one more week and we will enter Kyiv.

You can do it then, as a final weight on the scale. Mobilization is a step toward the endgame. But right now there is no end in sight, the situation is bad and there are no prospects for improvement. What prospects are there?

Second, if Putin could throw 500,000, or even 350,000, mobilized troops onto the front line, why has he not done so already? The General Staff has been asking for it for a long time.

Why has he constantly tried to avoid mobilization? Probably because there are fears that nothing will work. What if the mass of people sent to the front revolts, deserts, refuses orders or starts rioting?

Third, fine, suppose you gather those 500,000. They will have no effect in winter. They have to be trained, equipped, organized into units and sent to the same front line.

And what if there is no effect? Imagine you take Druzhkivka, maybe something else in addition to Kostiantynivka, and then fail to advance any farther. Meanwhile, you have lost people. The kill zone [an area of intensive drone strikes on both sides of the front line] has expanded, while casualties have not fallen.

Then why did you do it? For Druzhkivka and, I don't know, Kramatorsk? Even if you imagine that you manage to break through the front, overwhelm it with manpower, seize some areas and move another five kilometers toward Zaporizhzhia — are you really ready to throw 500,000 people into the furnace for that?

I would ask the opposite, rhetorical question: Can those 500,000 get you to Kyiv? In my view, no. Then why do you need them?

So you do not look like someone who has suffered a crushing defeat. So it does not look as if you are helpless. That is the only reason.

And one more thing: They do not fully understand public sentiment. No one really knows what these people think or what they want.

— There is a rule we have seen proved a thousand times: As soon as the situation worsens, the Kremlin sends signals through Bloomberg and Reuters saying, essentially, that there will be no agreements and that they are going to Kyiv. Is that a sign of panic?

— I am sure it is.

— Then the question that follows is: How bad does the situation have to become before Putin finally agrees to negotiations?

— That will happen when two factors change that he currently considers constants.

The first is Trump's position: "That's it. I am giving Ukraine Tomahawks. You have pushed me too far. I tried, and you refused. Now we will help Ukraine fully and irrevocably, in a way that hurts."

The second is when the war affects the situation inside Russia so deeply that Putin loses influence and becomes weaker, to the point where people can move against him without fearing him to the very end.

In other words, the mood among the elite at the top must change first. They will say: "Listen, Putin can be taken down now. He is not what he used to be."

If those two factors come together, Putin will agree to a deal. He will say: Fine, we cannot win here, so let's at least extract a ceasefire along the current front line and some parallel arrangements regarding Ukraine's NATO membership.

Although even those issues are far from clear now. Fine, suppose you secure a promise that Ukraine will not join NATO. Ukrainians could create a new military alliance in Europe. What have you gained then?

Ending the war would lead to the deployment of a British-French contingent in Ukraine. Then Ukraine could simply declare itself a nuclear state. What would you do then?

That would be the end of it. The rest of Ukraine, taking into account the roughly 20% occupied, would never be yours again. And Putin understands that perfectly well.

— But are we moving in that direction?

— I think so. And I am convinced it could have happened much faster and more effectively.

Even last year, when people talked about peace through strength, it could have been achieved. But unfortunately, everything is moving slowly. Trump's drift in the right direction, the mood among the elite and public sentiment in Russia are changing only under the pressure of the war and the consequences of sanctions.

Slowly, but there is movement.

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