Mathernová warns Ukraine’s EU path hinges on reforms, corruption fight — interview
Katarína Mathernová is an unconventional diplomat. She is easy to recognize by her manner of speaking, which is rare for a diplomat of her rank. She does not hide behind vague diplomatic formulas and is quite direct. (Photo: Oleksandr Medvedev)
EU Ambassador to Ukraine Katarína Mathernová acknowledges
that Ukraine’s further European integration will be neither simple nor quick,
speaks candidly about Mindichgate, assesses the country’s energy risks ahead of
next winter and explains what she admires about Ukrainians — and what she finds
hard to accept.
The facade of the European Union Delegation building in
central Kyiv is scarred by shrapnel, and two of its many windows are veined with
spiderweb cracks. They are the remnants of Russia’s attack on the delegation in
August 2025, when a Russian missile landed nearby and badly damaged the
building’s interior. The building has since been restored, but the two windows
were left in place as evidence — and as a reminder of Russia’s crimes.
Mathernová tells NV this during a brief tour of her office.
Since her appointment in 2023, she has lived and worked in Ukraine, traveled
frequently to the regions and endured blackouts and Russian attacks alongside
Ukrainians. The August strike was no exception.
Mathernová is an unusual diplomat. Her way of speaking, rare
for someone of her rank, is easy to recognize. She does not hide behind
polished diplomatic formulas and is unusually direct. When she needs to say
that trust in Ukraine’s authorities after Mindichgate has been “damaged but not
destroyed,” she says exactly that.
At the European Commission, Mathernová rose from expert to
deputy director-general of the Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement
Negotiations, giving her deep professional knowledge of the EU enlargement
process. She is also Slovak by origin, and Slovakia joined the EU in 2004. That
gives her a clear understanding of what it means to be a candidate country with
a difficult post-communist past — and she speaks from that experience.
— Ukraine is pursuing European integration, and two
tracks can be identified on that path. The first is political, the second
procedural. Speaking about the political track, after the reelection of
Hungary’s government, can we be more optimistic about the start of cluster
negotiations for Ukraine and its progress toward the EU?
— Accession to the European Union has always been, and
remains, a contentious issue in every round of enlargement. EU enlargement was
not on the agenda before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
At that time, it was not an active policy. Only the
full-scale invasion, and Ukraine’s decision to apply to join the European Union
four days later, created a decisive moment to which we responded positively.
Ukraine, and later Georgia and Moldova, submitted applications. That created an
entirely new momentum for enlargement that had not existed before. I stress
this because I often encounter the view that this path has been so long because
we started in 2014.
From a European perspective, the momentum for enlargement
began in February 2022. Since then, the process has moved forward, and we have
been working on integration.
Ukraine is an integral part of this process and is leading
it. And it is true that under the previous Hungarian government, there was a
temporary delay, which we filled with an informal process of comparative
analysis of individual laws, procedures and so on. So we did not lose time. But
I believe the new Hungarian government creates new momentum for moving toward
the formal opening of clusters, and that is the goal by the end of the current
Cypriot presidency of the Council of the EU. I think that is their big goal —
for us to be able to start opening clusters. So yes, I think there is new
momentum now, and let’s make sure it is used in June.
— There are also domestic political factors. How does the
new stage of Mindichgate affect Europe’s perception of Ukraine as a partner?
— It is very important to keep reminding people that this is
no longer a country defined by corruption. This is a country where corruption
exists, and the system is fighting it. Mindichgate itself also means that your
anti-corruption institutions are working, that there are people being
prosecuted for corruption, and that is important, too. What is not emphasized
enough is that we need to work not only on the punitive side of prosecuting
corruption, which is extremely important, but also on preventing corruption
from arising in the first place.
That is why I find it very encouraging that after
Mindichgate emerged in the state energy sector, we were able to reorganize the
management of the five largest energy companies with the participation of
international observers, one of whom is me. We also revised the charters of
these companies. We now have very good supervisory boards at Energoatom,
Ukrenergo, Naftogaz, Gas Distribution Networks of Ukraine and Ukrhydroenergo,
and this was done in three and a half to four months.
— So for the EU, what matters is not only the scandal
itself, but also how the Ukrainian government responds to it?
— Of course. Let’s be honest: There are hardly any countries
where corruption can be eradicated overnight. So I think the most important
question is whether you have institutions, whether you have processes to fight
corrupt behavior and also — importantly, and I think this is very clear in
Ukraine’s case — whether there is public demand for it, because that creates
pressure on the authorities. And if you look at public opinion polls in
Ukraine, corruption is the No. 2 problem for Ukraine. So that creates public
demand, and that is an important democratic impulse for the authorities.
— When I talk to my friends who are EU experts here in
Ukraine, they always joke that Ukraine will either join the EU all at once,
because of the EU’s own political and security reasons, or it will never happen
because we will get stuck in a bureaucratic swamp. What do you think?
— I hope we will find a way out of this bureaucratic
process, and I believe Ukraine is in a unique situation because it is truly
defending all of us. But there are certain aspects of a country’s basic
functioning — including economic indicators, rule-of-law indicators, the
foundations of the fight against corruption and institutional foundations —
that have to be in place. Otherwise, it will be very difficult to hold the EU
together, because we are not a state. Sometimes people judge us by our
decision-making processes and say: Oh, they are slow, they hesitate. Let’s
remember that we are not one state.
We are a collective of 27 countries, so the decision-making
process is more complicated than, for example, in a federal state such as the
United States. If we were compared with the United Nations, perhaps the picture
would look different. So I think we need to find a way to combine political and
geopolitical reasons with the bureaucratic process. And there are people in
Brussels who are actively working to simplify some processes. But fundamental
requirements will always remain a necessary condition before any accession.
— Ukraine is ready to accept a long transition period in
exchange for faster accession. Is the EU thinking about a special Ukrainian
accession model?
— There are many different views on this now, but transition
periods have existed during every previous accession. For example, during the
“Big Bang” enlargement of 2004, when 10 countries joined the EU, most member
states — not all, but most — introduced a seven-year transition period for the
movement of workers.
So Latvia was already in the EU, but a Latvian could not go
to the Netherlands to work. They had to go through the same approval procedures
as before enlargement. So this is an example of a fairly long transition period
for such a fundamental EU right as the free movement of workers.
— Let’s talk about the procedures in the first accession
cluster. Key issues there are achieving the rule of law, reforming the Constitutional
Court and repealing the “Lozovyi amendments,” a series of changes to Ukraine’s
Criminal Procedure Code adopted in 2017 that negatively affected the
effectiveness of pretrial investigations. In your view, does the Ukrainian
parliament have enough reformers to handle this?
— I believe so. We are working very actively with both the
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Verkhovna Rada, including
individual committees and the Rada leadership, to find the best possible
compromise.
— What criteria do you use to assess the quality of this
solution? Sometimes we tend to make cosmetic changes to please partners rather
than carry out real reforms.
— So you are asking me whether we can tell the difference
between cosmetic changes and real ones? (Laughs.) I believe we can, and we
will.
— Ukraine is entering the next winter in a very
vulnerable energy situation. Russia has increased its production of ballistic
missiles, and the conflict in the Middle East has caused a shortage of
interceptors. What could EU assistance look like to help Ukraine survive this
difficult winter? Would earlier-than-planned integration of the Ukrainian and
EU energy markets help in this situation?
— Energy is one of the largest areas of EU support, and we
were extremely active this winter. Our support now stands at about 3.5 billion
euros (about $4.1 billion) since the start of the full-scale invasion.
In 2022, we created the Energy Support Fund at the Energy
Community Secretariat in Vienna, which all donors now actively use.
We organized all logistics and transport for the equipment
coming here. There are many things that are not always visible. In addition, we
provided about 1 billion euros (about $1.2 billion) to support emergency gas
purchases. We support large state-owned companies such as Ukrenergo through
investments.
The EU also provides daily import capacity of 2.1 GW of
electricity, because we connected Ukraine’s power grid to the EU grid in the
first weeks of the full-scale invasion.
However, it is important to note that electricity can be
imported only through western Ukraine. The cynicism and tactical sophistication
of Russia’s energy attacks lie in cutting transmission links between western
and eastern Ukraine. Kyiv is especially vulnerable because it has no power
generation capacity of its own. So I am not sure that simply expanding market
integration would necessarily guarantee electricity supplies to Kyiv or eastern
cities.
It is important that we support physical protection for
energy infrastructure, which is now being developed. It is important to
preserve the integrity of the energy system, as Ukraine managed to do last
winter. But there is no doubt that this winter will be difficult, because
Russia has attacked every source of electricity generation across Ukraine except
nuclear power plants.
Still, I believe many facilities will be restored. In that
sense, Ukraine, in my view, is a global leader in recovery, and this is an area
we strongly support — both repair work and the development of physical
protection systems.
— Ukraine’s financing gap for 2026–2027 is estimated at
10 billion to 15 billion euros (about $11.7 billion to $17.5 billion). The 90
billion euros (about $104.9 billion) from the EU do not cover it. How do you
see Ukraine’s options for raising those additional funds if Russia’s frozen
assets in the EU are not available to us?
— We are providing a 90 billion euro loan to support
Ukraine, which, in my view, is a very clear and generous gesture by the
European Union. This gap will definitely be covered in 2026. Yes, in 2027, part
of it remains uncovered, but I very much hope that Ukraine’s other partners
will also join in and help cover it.
— You have lived in Ukraine for almost three years during
the war and have seen this war not in the news, but with your own eyes. How has
that changed your view of Ukraine as a diplomat?
— I think my respect for the country and for every
individual person has grown. Because I travel quite a lot and am not only in
Kyiv, that feeling only grows stronger. I also see projects supported by the EU
that are vital for people’s lives and that we perhaps do not promote well
enough. But what I find most moving, and also reassuring, is the sense of
community, the sense of solidarity among people.
For example, I recently visited a cafe in Lutsk opened by
two women with children who have Down syndrome. They built an entire community
around it and raise money for the military. So even people who are themselves
in difficult circumstances still find the strength to support Ukraine’s Armed
Forces. This determination and whole-of-society effort that emerges during the
war is hard to understand from reports or television segments. That is what
gives me enormous respect and also hope.
— We are talking about what inspires you in Ukraine, but
what do you find difficult to accept in Ukraine and Ukrainians? Apart from
Russian aggression, of course.
— Russian aggression, harsh winters and sometimes an
attitude that someone owes someone something — as if we owe you something. Yes,
we all owe Ukraine admiration and gratitude because, as I said, it is defending
all of us. But sometimes that attitude can go too far. Still, these are very
small things compared with the enormous heroism and suffering Ukraine is going
through.
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