Serhiy Prytula on drone development in Ukraine – interview
Ukrainian volunteer activist and politician Serhiy Prytula explained in an interview with NV Radio on Sept. 21 how Ukrainian business and the state are investing in the production of UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] and how these investments have “paid off” after a series of attacks on Russian territory.
NV: How is the nature of warfare changing now, even in terms of requests you get from the military? If we talk about the evolution of combat drones, the topic is extremely relevant.
Part of them goes through your foundation, through your hands. What conclusion can you draw? Which way are things going?
Prytula: We should talk not only about drones because the global trend is that it’s happening everywhere where it’s possible to replace manpower with automated systems, with unmanned systems. Because the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian manufacturers in the realm of miltech [military technology] are not solely focused on UAVs. We’re talking about ground-based automated, robotic systems, because our foundation also procured mobile platforms for conducting remote fire. That is, when the platform has a turret for, let’s say, a Browning [machine gun] and a soldier can fire at the enemy from a distance of 500 meters, while remaining in cover.
In addition, we’re talking about the Sea Babies [naval drones] that are bothering the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the pylons of the Crimean Bridge. This is also a domestic breakthrough. In addition, there are still certain developments that cannot be discussed yet. Let’s talk, I hope, after their successful use. But our engineers, bright minds in Ukraine don’t sit idle. Speaking directly about drones, a huge evolution has taken place in the last nine and a half years. Let’s be honest: in 2014, what is a drone or UAV? It was something like wow, could it be? Then it slowly got going.
I remember these Phantoms [UAVs] we used to buy. If Mavic [UAV] is even called a wedding drone, the Phantom is a super wedding drone. Later they faded into obscurity as drones also evolved. They became more resistant to electronic countermeasures [jamming]. And then we already see the evolution of both drones and UAVs in Ukraine. There are actually quite a few of manufacturers now. Not all of them have switched to assembly line or serial production. Many do it in “garage conditions.” But thanks to Ukrainian volunteers who buy [drones] and give them to the military, or the manufacturer gives it to the military for free, the soldiers test the equipment in combat conditions.
If they say OK, the volunteers start buying. It’s evolving. This is reconnaissance, this is artillery fire control, their frequent use with [bomb] releases. These are FPV drones that are just taking a step now [being produced] in Ukraine, I would like to say with leaps and bounds, but, unfortunately, not yet. But the situation is definitely evolving. Artisanal production is also taking place simultaneously, when boys and girls order parts on AliExpress [Amazon-like Chinese online retailer] and cobble together a dozen or two makeshift [UAVs]. And there are companies that have already put it on the assembly line. I recently had the opportunity to visit a facility that currently assembles 300 FPV drones a day. They aim at [producing] 10,000 UAVs per month.
NV: Of course, we’re concerned about the fact that the Russians are also increasing the production of various types of UAVs. And they use Iranian technologies. What do you think Ukraine needs to at least maintain parity with the Russians and not lose this aerial contest?
Prytula: Money. If they have money, they will have everything else. And it’s desirable that funds are allocated by the state. Because the communication of weapons manufacturers and businesses that can invest, or large investment funds that can pour money into miltech, of course, this dialogue exists. But, unfortunately, a practice of being afraid to attract additional investments in expanding its production due to raiding, etc. has been developed in Ukraine for years. Business is very often afraid of attracting external funds, especially if Ukrainians are behind them. In contrast, the state can provide some guarantees here.
And the state should pour funds into manufacturers, preferably in geometric progression, every month or every year. The market doesn’t stand still. The market is developing and quite rapidly. In October 2022, our foundation together with [Ukrainian blogger] Serhiy Sternenko announced a “revenge” fundraiser aimed at purchasing 50 Ukrainian-made RAM-2 UAVs to hit enemy equipment. The operator can see the picture, but the distance is up to 30 kilometers. And in fact, it was almost the only offer on the kamikaze UAV market at that time.
Although, of course, some developments were taking place, but so that we already bought something that had a practice of successful use, it was actually the only offer. We had to wait about another month and a half for the rest of the funds that we raised, because we raised UAH 100 million ($2.7 million), but people gave UAH 352 million ($9.6 million). So, for what remained, for UAH 251 million ($6.8 million), we waited for an offer from two domestic UAV manufacturers with different technical characteristics to appear on the market, but with the same goal, namely, to hit targets from a very long distance.
And then, step by step, our military got the hang of using these UAVs and combating enemy layered air defense. Using various tricks, they calculated where their radio-electronic and air defense equipment was located, how to get around it all. That is, it’s also the evolution of our military in terms of use. Combined, complex usage: false targets are launched simultaneously, various types of UAVs are launched, combined with the launch of missiles. They show fantastic work.
And it seems to me that August in general was a peak month in terms of evolution of drone usage. Because not only expensive, for example, Triumph S-400 systems were hit in occupied Crimea, but also attacks were carried out by unknown drones on airfields in Perm and Kursk [in Russia]. And I can tell you the return on investment with these attacks was staggering, given the cost and threat of disabled or completely destroyed Russian aircraft.
NV: Tell us, if businesses are afraid to invest, they’re simply afraid that their business will be taken away, even during the war, the problem of raiding [exists], despite the work of the judicial system. Do you think it’s some kind of our peculiarity that we couldn’t overcome it even during the war? Or is it a lack of political will?
Prytula: Let’s put it this way. I won’t say that this is such a total tendency. All the same, investments are attracted. And even in this office, where we are now, I personally had the honor of bringing together UAV manufacturers and businesses that would like to invest. People came to us with a clear goal, namely for expertise where they can direct funds in UAVs and in developing communication systems. Because a UAV without communication systems is just a toy with wings, a tail and a motor. Therefore, such contacts are taking place. In addition, let’s not forget that the Brave1 platform was set up on the initiative of [Digital Transformation Minister] Mykhailo Fedorov and his associates half a year ago.
This is an important thing in the progress of communications between the state as a regulator, the state as a buyer, producers who need investment, foundations that want to buy what you produce, and businesses that want to invest. This platform has greatly benefited the processes. And the fact that we have some faults from the pre-war period during the war is, unfortunately, just how things are. However, I don’t think that there is no progress here. And even though we meet with Western diplomats, politicians who come here from time to time, people who are responsible for some European integration processes, we talk not only about Ukraine’s problems.
We talk about Ukraine’s progress. And if they don’t see it, we point towards it. And when they talk about reforms in Ukraine, we ask them to give an example of successful reforms in any country during a total war like ours. If you show us such, OK, we’re ready to admit that we may have been wrong somewhere. But they have no examples of countries that made successful reforms while being attacked with missiles and drones every night. That’s why we say that, listen, of course you can blame us for not making any progress, but Ukrainian civil society is still doing everything it can to put some soft pressure on the authorities.
NV: As for reforms during the war. The UK developed its military industry during the [Second World] War. They lacked a lot. <...> I won’t ask a general question whether we’ll succeed in this. But if we’re talking about reforms, even bringing order to the Defense Ministry will already be a very positive signal.
The change of the Defense Ministry’s leadership is currently taking place. The minister has been replaced, and obviously the entire team of his deputies is being replaced. Will it affect the civilian segment of society that helps the military?
Prytula: It’s very interesting that you mentioned the UK’s example. There was a volunteer component in the UK in what you’ve just said. Because the Spitfire [single-seat fighter aircraft], for example, some of them were bought with the funds of British citizens. It was a pure volunteer campaign. The British donated money and about 20,000 pieces of these aircraft were built with their money during the war. You’ve just hit the bull’s eye. To compare Great Britain during WWII and us now is not entirely correct, because Britain, let’s not forget, was an empire [at that time].
And the countries, as they are now called member states of the Commonwealth of Nations, weren’t yet so united at that time, but were dependent and had to share their minerals, resources, and also fight for Great Britain. The changes that are taking place in the Defense Ministry have obviously been brewing for a very long time, given certain corruption scandals that have been associated with the [former] team, which has now been partially or completely removed. Because at the time of our conversation, we still don’t know which of the deputies would be reappointed or not.
NV: Would you go to work at the Defense Ministry?
Prytula: Right now, I’d rather say no than yes. Because the experience of working as a person who manages the foundation or directs it in some areas of work is one thing, and working for a state body is another.
NV: You know, perhaps it’s better to enter without such experience, given how often, unfortunately, state institutions work in our country.
Prytula: In fact, I have no doubts about my capabilities or those of my team. And what’s more, I know for sure that the state in one way or another recognizes our skills, our capabilities, our managerial capacities. This is expressed both in state awards for some people from the team, and certain offers to people from the team, which may soon become good news. However, returning to those changes in the Defense Ministry, I don’t know whether [Defense Minister] Rustem [Umerov] has a sufficient number of people to fill all the positions that should be strengthened or to take the steps that will make it impossible to engage in corruption.
But I hope he’ll have enough strength. I know him since the 2019 [electoral] campaign. He is a strong character. That is, it will be very difficult for anyone, regardless of surname, to influence him. Although I think that it will be a little easier for a person with the surname Zelenskyy than others. But Rustem always demands decision-making autonomy if he’s entrusted with some kind of work. And it’s clear that it’s very difficult to tempt him with something illegal. He reacts very harshly to such things.
NV: To tempt, maybe, yes. But as a manager, you understand that there’s still a problem of control, when the manager may not even understand what’s happening behind his back.
Prytula: Yes, unfortunately, we cannot rule this out. In peacetime, of course, we would talk about strengthening the system of public control. We would talk about strengthening parliamentary control. But in war, there are many things that are related to the centralization of power. They’re not only when we talk about the country’s political leadership. We talk about the relevant ministry in the same way. There is a constant balance to maintain. If there are any questions about the inflated purchase prices of eggs, potatoes or tomatoes, we will always have such a dilemma.
The defense minister, according to his position, is either engaged in trying to get Leopard tanks, Patriot air defense systems for Ukraine, or he spends this time to see how much the ministry is paying for eggs. It’s probably extremely difficult to combine both at the same time. Therefore, of course, people delegate their authority over these purchases. And when someone messes up there, whether you like it or not, you’re also responsible.
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