Ukraine brings tanks back into battle during offensive on Oleksandrivka axis
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A Ukrainian tank in the Oleksandrivka sector (Photo: A still from a video by Suspilne Dnipro)
After two years in which drones destroyed nearly every tank that approached the front line, Ukraine this summer managed to bring tanks back onto the battlefield, The Telegraph reported on Oct. 3.
Using a strategy of precision strikes by drone units and special operations forces, Ukraine pushed Russian troops back and cleared the way for heavy armor, the report said.
According to the newspaper, tanks — including British Challenger 2s — played a key role in a large counteroffensive in the Oleksandrivka sector that recaptured about 746 square kilometers of territory.
The Telegraph reported that moving tanks into that sector took eight months and began with strikes on Russian logistics up to 160 kilometers, or about 100 miles, from the front.
At the next stage, Ukraine’s Defense Forces conducted electronic intelligence operations, hacking Russian soldiers’ phones and using their messages to help direct artillery fire, the newspaper said. At the same time, drone teams hunted Russian crews, forcing them to withdraw.
Later, Ukrainian infantry moved on foot through Russian defensive lines, clearing the way for tanks that followed behind, while tank units reportedly fired on Russian positions and helped hold territory retaken by Ukraine.
The article said Ukraine’s forces used the same approach beyond the Oleksandrivka sector. This week, for example, Ukraine’s 475th Assault Regiment released a video showing two tanks attacking Russian positions in Vilkhuvatka in Kharkiv Oblast.
Heavy Vampire strike drones, FPV drones and reconnaissance drones took part in that attack alongside the tanks. During the assault, the tanks crossed light mine barriers, fired directly at buildings where Russian infantry were sheltering, and then withdrew under constant FPV drone attacks. According to the regiment, the tanks returned undamaged.
Analysts quoted by The Telegraph said the strategy confirmed the importance of heavy armor on the battlefield, provided logistics to the kill zone near the front line are disrupted.
The newspaper said Russian troops in the Oleksandrivka sector were caught by surprise and were operating almost blindly because of major internet disruptions caused by SpaceX’s blocking of unauthorized Starlink use by Russian forces. Even when Russian troops learned Ukrainian forces were nearing their positions, they were afraid to report it to commanders, the article said.
At the same time, Ukrainian units struck Russian logistics at distances of about 16 kilometers, or 10 miles, from the front, hindering deliveries of new drones and batteries to Russian drone operators. Strikes at 32 to 40 kilometers, or about 20 to 25 miles, deprived Russian artillery of needed resources, while strikes at nearly 100 kilometers, or about 62 miles, disabled fixed-wing reconnaissance drones used to direct Russian rocket fire, the report said.
According to The Telegraph, Ukrainian forces carried out more than 200 strikes on Russian logistics vehicles in May alone at distances up to 160 kilometers from the front line.
Robert Tollast, a researcher with the land warfare group at the Royal United Services Institute, described the strikes as “the destruction of the ability to sustain combat effectiveness” of Russian troops.
After that, Ukraine began hunting Russian drone units. Eventually, Russian crews withdrew to avoid being killed, taking valuable electronic warfare equipment with them. As a result, the kill zone shifted deeper into Russian positions.
Sam Cranny-Evans, an armored warfare expert at RUSI, said the kill zone did not disappear entirely, but Ukrainians were able to “move somewhat more safely through ground where that had previously been a problem.”
Experts told the newspaper that Ukrainian forces may have been able to hack the messaging apps used by Russian troops by using drones equipped with gear that imitates mobile phone towers. Phones nearby would connect to them and transmit data.
“In electronic warfare there is a rule: find the source of the emission, and you find the target. The moment you switch on a mobile phone, you have to understand that you are glowing like a Christmas tree,” said Dr. Thomas Withington, an expert on electronic warfare, radar and military communications.
Once the kill zone had shifted, Ukrainian air assault troops and assault units advanced, infiltrating in small groups through gaps in Russian defensive lines and pushing deep into the enemy rear while bypassing heavily fortified positions, the newspaper said.
Soldiers had to walk as far as 19 kilometers, or about 12 miles, to reach combat areas. Often, because tree lines had been destroyed or mined, they moved across open ground. During the offensive, Ukrainian troops also had to cross rivers, including the Vovcha, where Russia destroyed temporary crossings. In some cases, soldiers swam across, and drones delivered dry clothes once they reached the opposite bank, the report said.
Tanks were committed only after terrain had been seized, and their main role was to hold positions captured by infantry, the article said. Analysts told the paper that Russia tends to launch heavy counterattacks to retake lost ground and often keeps sending troops into battle even during failed offensives rather than pulling back. Heavy armor gave Ukraine a way to blunt those attacks.
Tanks “take up positions in shelters ... and fire at the Russians,” Cranny-Evans said. “They are not being used in those large, sweeping offensive operations that everyone is used to thinking about.”
The brigades leading the offensive used a mixed fleet of Western and Soviet-era armor, the article said. Not all of the tanks survived. In early February, Ukraine lost at least one U.S.-made Abrams tank, and Russian battlefield videos showed hits on Ukrainian equipment.
Still, according to Tollast, Western tanks have shown they can withstand strikes by small drones and continue operating. Ukraine has also added extra armor to many of them.
Ukraine has not returned to the kind of tank warfare seen in 2022, but it may have shown something more important: armored vehicles can move again if battlefield conditions are first changed through drones, electronic warfare, infantry operations and long-range strikes, the article concluded.
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