Flash: Ukraine can scale jet-drone interceptors fast once combat model proves reliable

24 September, 04:16 PM

Interview

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Footage of the launch of one of Ukraine’s new interceptor drones designed to counter jet-powered Shahed drones (Photo: Ukraine’s SBU Security Service / Volodymyr Zelenskyy)

Interceptor drones for jet-powered Shaheds will become widespread once any air defense crew can operate them, after which production can be scaled up quickly.

Serhii Beskrestnov (Flash), adviser to the president on developing defense technology, expressed that view in an interview with NV.

Russia has recently shifted its focus in the air war to jet-powered drones. They fly faster and higher than conventional drones, putting them beyond the reach of previously developed interceptor drones and the machine guns used by mobile fire groups. They therefore have to be shot down mainly with missiles and aircraft. The results so far are not particularly high: 60% of jet-powered drones are destroyed, compared with 90% of their internal-combustion-engine counterparts.

Prime Minister Serhiy Koretskyi said Russia launched more than 2,800 jet-powered drones at Ukraine in August and another 2,100 in the first three weeks of September. They have become a scourge, destroying retail warehouses, gas stations and industrial facilities.

The losses are enormous and are even affecting national GDP. Economy Minister Oleksandr Kravchenko has estimated that real economic growth this year will fall below the current 1.6% forecast because of intensified Russian attacks, with a possible scenario of about 0.5% growth also under consideration.

Although President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently reported successful combat tests of interceptors for jet-powered Shaheds from two companies, mass production has yet to begin.

NV spoke with Beskrestnov about why Russia switched to jet-powered drones, what China supplies for them, why interceptors that manufacturers said were ready last winter had to be refined in combat, and what is needed to produce them at scale.

— This summer, jet-powered Shaheds began attacking Kyiv and other cities in large numbers. You had warned about this scenario for a long time. What pushed Russia to switch to jet-powered drones?

— I had been warning about this for probably a year, writing about it constantly. There are plenty of examples. Then I even started a countdown: I gave it six months and counted how much time was left. I knew this would happen because the percentage of enemy drones successfully shot down by our interceptors kept rising: 60%, 70%, 80%.

Even our enemy, which does not count money and whose math is often unclear to us, can see what works and what does not. When the rate reached 95%–98%, it became clear that launching conventional attack Shaheds against our interceptors was absurd. The Russians had to look for something else, and they did not have many options — speed was the only one left.

They tried different things: fitting Shaheds with evasive systems, electronic warfare and other measures, but none had much effect. So their only option was to switch to jet engines. We all understood this was coming and warned all the manufacturers. There was no secret here and nothing new.

— According to HUR, Russia was testing the jet-powered Geran-4 until January and has been using it in combat since May. How did it manage to adapt so quickly?

— The transition took longer than it seems. At first, alongside conventional Shaheds, the Russians began using the Geran-3. It is the same Shahed, just with a jet engine — the simplest modification — and they made it quickly.

And that created a problem. We and all the manufacturers had been working from the Geran-3’s speed, which tops out at 280–320 km/h. When our manufacturers were determining what the interceptor should be like and running tests, they used those specifications.

But the enemy quickly realized that we would be able to shoot down all the Geran-3s and developed a separate Geran-4. It is a completely different system: a powerful engine, different speed, a different warhead and a different range. The Russians switched to it and began producing it. They continue to manufacture conventional gasoline-powered Gerans in roughly the same quantities as the jet-powered versions.

— So that means 2,000–3,000 jet-powered drones a month?

— Around 3,000, even more.

— So Russia saw how many Geran-3s were being shot down, developed a new model, and Ukrainian manufacturers were late with their response?

— It is difficult for me to say. Journalists constantly ask me what happened and who is to blame. I cannot say who is to blame: I am an adviser. My responsibilities are to identify threats and risks, warn about them and provide analysis, but I do not influence business processes in the state.

And when I try to explain or comment on something, for some reason people think I am making excuses, as though it were my responsibility. Lately I do not want to comment on this story at all, because it turns into this: whoever comments is the one to blame.

— In May, HUR dismantled a Geran-4 and found Chinese Telefly turbojet engines inside. What else does Russia receive from China for its jet-powered Shaheds?

— China plays an important role. It supplies CRPA antennas, mesh modems used for online control, jet engines, servos and much more. The cameras are Chinese too, and online control and targeting are impossible without them. All of this is China.

CRPA antennas protect satellite navigation from jamming, while mesh modems are radio modems that link drones into a single network.

But we see that the Russians have developed their own jet engine and are already actively installing it on Banderols. It is a copy of a Chinese engine, but it is now being produced in Russia. I think they will next try to manufacture such engines domestically for Shaheds as well, including the Geran-4.

Banderols are S8000 cruise missiles made by Russia’s Kronstadt company.

— Russia produces thousands of jet-powered drones a month, and every one needs an engine. Can it establish that level of engine production domestically?

— The Russians will buy from China as long as that is more economically and financially advantageous. Let me give you an example. There is a Shahed produced in Alabuga using Chinese components. And there is a Shahed produced in Izhevsk at the Kupol plant. This gasoline-powered Shahed is made with as many Russian components as possible. Why did the Russians do this?

Alabuga is a special economic zone in Tatarstan that houses the main Shahed factory. The Kupol plant is the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant, which produces Tor air defense systems and Harpy drones. According to Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry, as of October 2025, the Izhevsk version contained 112 imported components, compared with 294 in the Alabuga version.

I have a theory, and it is logical. The Russians want to show China: if necessary, we will build everything ourselves — it will cost more, but we can do it. That is how they demonstrate that they are not dependent on China, because otherwise China could impose its views and its rules of the game on them.

The Russians will do the same with their own jet engines. But here, everything comes down to the numbers. They will make engines to show that they can, but if buying them from China is cheaper, they will keep buying from China.

— A conventional Shahed flies at up to 200 km/h, while jet-powered drones fly at 300–600 km/h and can climb as high as 7 kilometers. At those speeds, the interceptor itself is harder to control. Does it have to be faster than the target?

— Yes, absolutely. Right now our guys intercept them by coming in from behind and attacking. And to attack from behind, the interceptor absolutely has to be faster. The Geran-3 flew at 320 km/h; the Geran-4 now flies at around 450–500 km/h. So the interceptor needs greater speed and enough flight time to search for the target and remain on station in the air. It has to reach the same altitudes as the jet-powered Shaheds and carry enough fuel to stay there and search for them.

— In a video from Ukrainian manufacturer Wild Hornets, its Sting S interceptor catches even a Geran-5, whose speed HUR estimates at 450–600 km/h. Is the Geran-5’s actual speed lower than stated? Or are interceptors catching it before it accelerates for its dive toward the target?

— Not exactly. When I study the trajectories and movement of Shaheds, I see that they do not really have a cruising speed: they travel some sections at 300 km/h and others at 500. Why? The Russians analyze where our electronic warfare systems are operating, where our air defenses are, where other systems are, and adjust the speed accordingly.

Some sections have to be covered quickly, others more slowly. In some places they need to attack quickly, while elsewhere they need to slow down so the camera can work and the operator can see where the drone is going. It varies in every case. You cannot say that a jet-powered Shahed travels its entire route at either maximum or minimum speed.

We need interceptors capable of shooting down Shaheds at any point along their route. It is no good if we can do it here at one speed but cannot do it somewhere else. The interceptor has to be versatile.

— To catch a target like that, an interceptor needs a powerful engine. Are engines the main challenge for Ukrainian manufacturers?

— Engines can actually be bought; there are plenty available abroad. And it is not difficult to build a little aircraft that simply flies fast in a straight line. The difficult part is making it maneuverable enough to follow a Shahed.

We understand that once we have interceptors, the Shaheds will start evading them — changing altitude and performing other maneuvers in flight. And jet-powered Shaheds are much more maneuverable than conventional ones. So the interceptor needs speed, maneuverability and a control link, because radio control over long distances presents other challenges.

And what matters here is the target acquisition and terminal guidance system. The speeds are high, the operator’s margin of error can be large, and it is difficult to work at those speeds. We need automatic target acquisition using machine vision and automatic terminal guidance.

— During attacks on Kyiv, monitoring channels track jet-powered drones down to individual city districts. Is target detection working properly?

— We have different radar networks. Some provide an approximate picture, while modern radars can locate a target to within just a few meters. We track everything, we see everything. That part is working well.

The problem is what I was talking about. I understand the manufacturers. They built the aircraft and tested them at proving grounds: the aircraft fly, the speed is sufficient, control works at the proving ground, and all that remains is to add the warhead. But once they started testing in combat conditions, questions started piling up: how maneuverable is it, how do you control it, how do you launch it, how do you acquire the target, how much fuel is needed, what else is required? Building something that simply flies fast is the easiest part.

I have already explained why this happened. Back in the winter, I attended a meeting convened by Fedorov.

Beskrestnov was referring to Mykhailo Fedorov, who was defense minister at the time.

All the country’s interceptor manufacturers were there. We started asking what stage their systems were at, and all eight companies said: everything is ready, we have a solution, it flies, we have tested it, the speed is sufficient, everything will be fine. Perhaps that was a mistake. Those companies should have been brought together and checked every week: How is it going? What is happening? Show us. They said everything was fine, everything worked, they could even demonstrate it. But there were still too few jet-powered Shaheds at the time to demonstrate in practice how everything would work. At the proving ground, they showed that it flew. That was the problem.

— In late August, Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara said interceptors for jet-powered drones need to be produced by the thousands. What prevents Ukraine from ordering enough for the entire country right away?

— We cannot simply order as many as we need to cover the entire country with interceptors. First we need final combat testing. We have to be 100% certain that the solution we are proposing will work for any crew — whether SBU specialists or a territorial defense soldier. Interceptor crews exist across the different services and agencies. And the same people who now operate conventional interceptors across the country will also operate the jet-powered ones.

And we need a product that is easy to use and reliable — something that can be maintained, launched and controlled. That is the task. Before pouring millions into it, we need a system that genuinely works. Showing in tests that some specialized crew managed to do something is only part of the job.

— The president said Ukraine will mass-produce high-speed interceptors. When, in your view, will there be a model that consistently delivers results?

— We can scale up quickly; there will be no problem with that. Any manufacturer can ramp up production — it is a question of funding. If there is a working model that we are 100% confident in, finding and ordering the components would not take long. The whole country understands how important this is.

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