A complex trajectory. What tactics did Russia use during the most massive shelling of Ukraine?

9 January 2024, 10:00 PM

The recent attacks on the night of January 2-3rd demonstrated a persistent desire by Russia to hit something in the capital. Ten Kinzhals at one time is too many. Although the Russians have accumulated large stockpiles, they have launched 10% of all Kinzhals. It's a one-time thing. There is still a whole year ahead, and according to the GUR, their production is at most four missiles per month.

Second, the massive launch of the Shaheds. They were launched in such a way as to either break through air defense or deplete the stocks of anti-aircraft missiles on the launchers. They came from two directions. Traditionally, they came from the south – they are launched from Crimea. But they were coming from both sides to attack Kyiv.

Then came the cruise missiles. The cruise missiles performed a rather complicated maneuver. They came from the Russian border with Sumy oblast, went through the Poltava oblast, then Kirovohrad oblast, then entered the Vinnytsia region, and from Vinnytsia, headed north to Zhytomyr.

They made another sharp turn from the Zhytomyr region and entered Kyiv from the west. The Russians believed that the air defense there would not catch them because it was aimed at the southeast, in an arc. But it turned out that our air defense works 360 degrees. These tricks did not help much.

This time, the ballistic missiles were intercepted at a higher rate than last time, with 100% of them being destroyed. The story is different with the guided missiles. The Shaheds and others have exhausted our air defense system. Here, we had a lower percentage of shootdowns, but in general, it was still a considerable percentage. The only pity is the frontline cities that get hit by aerial ballistics - X-22s, X-32s with S-300s, S-400s. We can do nothing there because conventional systems cannot shoot down aerial ballistics. We need Patriot systems for that, and we only have two.

It will end up with our allies receiving a Russian missile at some object

A hundred missiles were fired at us. One missile fell on a Russian village in the Voronezh region. Ninety-nine crossed the border of Ukraine. I am impressed with the work of our air defense forces. On December 29, the Polish air defense missed a single missile; although they were also on the alert, they did not even have time to orient and shoot down this single missile that came in. Almost a hundred were flying at us. We don't have airborne radar, and we don't have such a density of air defense. Polish air defense is now replenished with the most modern British missiles and radio systems. They have airborne radars. Having no airborne radars, we are showing such results with ground-based means and mostly old Soviet equipment.

To continue with this topic, we saw that Poland was putting two F-16s in the air during this missile attack. Last time, I said that if the Poles, Slovaks, and Romanians don't want missiles to fly into their territory, then air defense always works up to the country's borders. Do you remember last year's "air defense of the Bryansk People's Republic" in early May? We shot down their planes over Russia that were flying to bomb us. Accordingly, we would gladly permit these countries to operate their air defense deep in our territory.

That is, if Russian missiles were approaching their borders, they had every right to shoot them down over our territory. Because this would strengthen our air defense, and, for example, Uzhhorod, Lviv, and Ivano-Frankivsk would be covered not only by our means but also by the means of our allies. The allies could present this as self-defense. After all, there were repeated arrivals in Moldova, and they flew into Romania from the south when they attacked the ports on the Danube. It will end up with our allies, these neighboring countries, receiving a Russian missile at some object. Why bring it to that point? We need to take action in advance. They give us intelligence information on arrivals, but it's complicated when there is a direct threat, such as when a missile is flying perpendicular to their border. Then, we need to shoot it down with their means.

Now, about the tactics used by the Russian occupiers during this missile attack. Here are the routes of the Shaheds so that they can make several turns, and a cruise missile can make dozens of turns on the course. This very complex trajectory requires more time to program the flight of cruise missiles. Why: The entire route must be recorded in the missile's computer memory as scans of the area below it. This way, if there is no GPS signal, the missile is always guided by what is below it. Just like a pilot of a light aircraft can look out the window to see if the route is the same. The missile does the same thing so that it does not depend on GPS signals. Because we can block GPS in some areas, and missiles would then be shot down. A basic guidance system compares scans under the route and under the missile, and stores them in its memory. This requires longer programming time, allowing it to fly more reliably to hit the target. There is no improvisation here; the Russians know exactly where they want to target with these missiles.

Military journalists from Defense Express are already publishing information that Russia recently hit Kyiv with an X-101 missile that was manufactured in the fourth quarter of 2023. I held the computer of this missile in my hands - there were solid Western markings on all the elements. There is nothing Russian about it. The Russians have learned how to circumvent Western sanctions, and quite successfully. They just changed it. Here, they blocked Armenia and another country, and there are some agreements with the Arab Emirates. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have joined. That is, the Russians have developed a network of suppliers. Unfortunately, our allies cannot radically resolve this issue and say that all deliveries should only have an end-user certificate. Texas Instruments is the largest supplier of components. So if, for example, Texas Instruments components are supplied to Armenia, then Armenia has to show that these components will not go anywhere. If you put them in washing machines, show in the report that you made exactly as many washing machines as you received components for.

Unfortunately, the tracking of the implementation of sanctions was not set up at the proper level. Now, two Russian businessmen who were involved in this have been arrested in the United States. But what are two businessmen for hundreds of companies? As far as I've seen reports from international organizations, massive amounts of supplies go through dozens of companies and almost directly to Rostec. Rostec is an association that includes virtually the entire Russian military electronics industry.

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