How the European Union can help Ukraine with weapons

11 February 2024, 11:35 AM

He proposes to stop exports to third countries and for these countries to postpone these orders themselves. Ukraine should receive the ammunition first. Borrell's proposal will be heard in the partner countries, but the European Union must contribute.

I will tell you a not-so-well-known fact. The first two IRIS-T missile systems were also already contracted by an African country, but I won't name it. But we managed to get them. It was a manifestation of political will and, ultimately, solidarity. I just know this story and how difficult these negotiations were. If it can be done for air defense, why can't it be done for ammunition?

This conversation has been going on for a long time. It is not something new. It is great that Josep Borrell is voicing it now, but countries must either compensate their companies for this or provide a certain premium. Not literally, but a premium for some countries to agree to wait. To do this, budgets need to be formed, and whether this story works legally for each country needs to be studied. In my opinion, this is where the European Union could pay these additional "waiting bonuses," as I would call them, from a special EU fund. If there is political will, the legal basis should work.

However, Borrell is being a bit disingenuous (I say this with all due respect; he is a true sympathizer and friend of Ukraine), because you can still overclock capacities, even in today's reality, and allocate additional money. You can give companies a perspective, not just money. And pay attention; there is one country I have yet to see much in our media - Finland. In this country, they have a mechanism in place. When companies that produce weapons or military equipment need additional logistics chains, they put in place the appropriate legislation and ensure this is done. The state takes care of this, and they have priority. This is a kind of military light economy. If such light options were introduced throughout the European Union, things would go much better and faster.

All countries should get involved

That is, there are reserves and finances for this. By the way, remember that not even all NATO countries have reached the 2% of GDP spending on defense. So, the discussion about 2% in today's reality is half shameful and half ridiculous. I don't know whether it is more ridiculous or more shameful. There should be a discussion about 3%+. In some countries, this position is already fluctuating around 3%+, for example, in the case of the Poles. But all countries should get involved.

The second point is that we must start developing new weapon types. The West has a testing ground here in Ukraine, and I say this without any cynicism. This is our common Western history. It is valuable. The West should learn from this war and produce better weapons. But it should also be grateful to Ukraine as a country and, in fact, to Ukrainians for this happening. And to launch the mechanisms mentioned above.

I repeat again: the discussion about 2% is ridiculous. There should be a discussion about ensuring strategic deterrence and strategic superiority of the West in the 21st century. This is how the issue is today. The memoranda between the United States and Israel contains a qualitative military advantage story, the so-called QMA. That is, the United States guarantees Israel that, no matter what kind of assistance it receives, it will always have a qualitative military advantage. What I miss (even though I am not a fan of the Israeli model for Ukraine and believe that it will not work) is that despite many different and good stories that are written in all documents on military and security assistance to us, there are no explicit guarantees that we should have a decent and sufficient level of strategic deterrence against today's Russia. We need to agree not on what we will do, but what level we will reach. This is not just a story about us. It should be a story about the entire West. We should not be talking about 2%, 3%, or 5% of defense spending by GDP, but about having a sufficient strategic deterrence against those who want to defeat us and make us disappear.

We are currently engaged in a series of negotiations with various countries on security guarantees. You and I understand that we are not talking about security guarantees. In this confusing world, no one can provide security guarantees to anyone. But these arrangements must take on at least some features of security guarantees. I have already said one thing. We need not talk about what can be provided and when, but what the West can do for us based on its understanding, political will, and capabilities. We need to define what is necessary for a sufficient level of deterrence of today's Russia and tomorrow's, because tomorrow will not change for the better. This must be a joint decision. It should not be only our definition or the Western one, but we must define it together. We have formats for this. We have created a new NATO-Ukraine Council. This will not be enough in the long run, but at least we have a starting point. And we have to agree on what Ukraine needs. This is the first point.

Secondly, these agreements/memorandums should specify that what is needed and jointly determined is what is provided. Let's be honest, no matter how much we say that security commitments are really not what we expect, this is what our Western partners are ready to give us today. This is not a bad thing, of course, because we still need weapons, intelligence, logistics, and all of this needs to be negotiated. But, we are well aware that we need security guarantees to exist as a nation. Without them, who will stay here? Who will invest here? A new conversation will arise if it is not a reliable logic of NATO security guarantees or if it is not through bilateral or multilateral systems of guarantees. What will this conversation be about? It will be about nuclear weapons. This discussion will definitely arise in society. This discussion will influence the general atmosphere of non-proliferation. At some point, this Pandora's box will open, and it will be difficult to close it. Do you remember how, in those Arabian tales, you open this bottle, the djinn flies out, and you must put it back in? You can't. That's why the risks here and the stakes are enormous. We have to talk about it as well. Of course, cautiously and responsibly, but we have to talk about it. The wager is our existence, nothing more and nothing less.

So, the leader of European diplomacy, Josep Borel, essentially asked our partners to give up their place in line to Ukraine to receive ammunition. From time to time, the EU governments are presented with analytical data that Russia may attack NATO countries at some point. Given such risks, the first reflex may be to keep weapons and ammunition for themselves. This is one of the considerations that exists there. In 2022, the risk assessment was higher. I talk to our friends in many EU countries. Now, they say that Russia's potential for an attack is insufficient. But we are well aware that the logic of decision-making in the Kremlin is not based on purely rational considerations and an understanding of modern warfare. They are not just raising the nuclear stakes for no reason. As of today, almost no one in Europe really believes in a Russian attack, with the exception of some Baltic and Central European states. This is not a story about faith.

Remember, there's a fairy tale about a shepherd who is tending his sheep and then cries out, "wolves, wolves," as a result, when the wolves come for the third time, no one runs to his aid. We talked a lot about security risks, Nord Stream 2, and some people listened attentively. Some people smiled as if they understood our emotions, and now they have stopped smiling. This is a somber story.

Will Russia attack the European Union today? As of today, more likely no than yes, to be honest. Will Russia or someone behind Russia at some point try to test Article 5 of the NATO treaty? I believe that there are definitely such plans. Whether they will do it militarily or in some other way, we have yet to determine. They will also try to figure out how to raise the stakes. I hear around Europe, and I observe that the rhetoric of the military, both those who are currently in office and those who have already retired but have their share of experience, has changed a lot. They understand the Russian threat differently, but perhaps not only the Russian threat. The world is changing rapidly. They have realized that using classical, conventional warfare, artificial intelligence, and new technologies can lead to new potentialities. They understand this better than politicians. So, the military in the West is beginning to wake up. They probably have already woken up. It's the kind of morning when they haven't had breakfast yet, but their hand is already reaching for coffee (and they should be reaching for a gun).

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