Why trust in the government is declining – It is just how Ukrainians think
One of the most discussed topics lately is the data from various sociological surveys on the decline in trust in government institutions. What is the reason for this trend?
When analyzing this situation, we must first consider that it is a manifestation of the traditional features of the political culture of Ukrainians: fundamental distrust of most state institutions and emotional swings towards the government and its representatives.
Under normal circumstances, most Ukrainians do not trust the state, including individual state institutions, state leaders, and political figures. Political parties and the parliament have always been the leaders of distrust. But it was (and still is) an abstract distrust. At the same time, certain segments of our fellow citizens fully trusted "their" parties and individual politicians.
Therefore, most Ukrainians had no problem voting for specific parties and candidates when it came time for elections. A few months later, they would say again that they did not trust the parliament they had just elected. Also, as a rule, most of our fellow citizens (approximately two-thirds) believed that the situation in Ukraine was developing in the wrong direction. These assessments have been almost unchanged since the 1990s and up until Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. By the way, the indicator of assessing the correctness/incorrectness of the situation in the country directly correlates with the level of trust in statesmen and politicians.
Therefore, it is no coincidence that in the early 2000s, Ukrainian sociologists called Ukrainians a "distrustful nation."
Military threats to Ukraine have not only not disappeared, they have intensified
But sometimes, there were situations when the level of trust increased dramatically, usually concerning the new president. However, after about a year in office (or even earlier), a significant number of Ukrainians (the majority in total) became disillusioned with the new leader.
Something similar happened after the great Maidans - the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. These are the same emotional swings that we regularly experience after every presidential election and change of government in the country. High expectations of the country's new leader were quickly followed by disappointment. This is an iron law of Ukrainian politics.
Unfortunately, this pattern is also manifested now in the context of war. 2022 was a period when we withstood the Russian attack and even achieved several military victories. This resulted in record and abnormally high ratings for President Zelenskyy and most state institutions, especially those directly related to the country's defense. Such high trust ratings have never been seen in Ukraine's state institutions or the president of Ukraine in the modern history of our country.
Naturally, the Armed Forces of Ukraine had the highest ratings, as our citizens perceive them as our foremost defenders. Zaluzhnyi is perceived as a symbol of the Armed Forces. Moreover, in 2022, he was somewhat mythologized in this role.
This phenomenon will probably still be the subject of research. I will also express my assumptions in this regard. People personify politics, and the same thing happened with the Armed Forces, especially in times of war. Zaluzhny's personal charisma (for those who met him personally) and, especially, the air of mystery around him had an effect. Paradoxically, the lack of information also played in Zaluzhnyi's favor. The country needed heroes, symbolic figures of our defenders. Do you remember the mythological figure of the "Ghost of Kyiv" who almost single-handedly defended Kyiv's skies from Russian air attacks? A similar mythologization took place with Zaluzhnyi. It was strengthened by the military successes of 2022. But in the case of Zaluzhnyi, it was a real person, and the head of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Last year, high and even record ratings of trust in the President of Ukraine and most state institutions, including the Parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers, reflected patriotic consolidation and military victories. At the beginning of 2023, high ratings reflected high and even exaggerated expectations of a quick victory. But for various reasons, there was no quick victory.
By the end of the year, it also became clear that the war was dragging on. And our emotional swing went down. Disappointment, dissatisfaction (including with real problems, especially corruption), and emotional fatigue began to manifest themselves. There was less mutual trust and more political and social conflict. We have gradually started to return (too soon, unfortunately) to our traditional "norm" in our attitude toward state institutions. Hence the "cooling" of President Zelenskyy's ratings, which have fallen below the peak and abnormal levels of last year and the beginning of this year but remain much higher than those of other politicians, as well as compared to Zelenskyy's pre-war ratings. And the government, parliament, and political parties have experienced a familiar (from pre-war politics) rating collapse. People hold them (and not always rightly so) primarily responsible for the current problems.
The ratings of the Armed Forces and Zaluzhnyi remain high precisely because of the war. This is the trust in our defenders and the personalized symbol of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The war is ongoing. And in times of war, this is not a political indicator but an existential attitude.
The problem, however, is that it is not enough only to trust the Armed Forces. We need to help them! Both directly at the front and at least as much as possible in the rear. Those who boast of distrusting other state institutions should understand that this is no excuse for withdrawing from joint efforts to defend their country. Military threats to Ukraine have not only not disappeared, they have intensified. And the country's future depends not only on Zaluzhnyi and Zelenskyy, and not only on the heroic actions of our soldiers at the front, but also on all other citizens of Ukraine.
The military war may be swinging in our favor, but the information war continues.
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