DeepState's Pohorilyi explains Russia's 'controlled chaos' tactics near Kostiantynivka

7 July, 02:40 PM

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Ukrainian servicemen unload a military vehicle after arriving on a combat mission near Kostiantynivka (Photo: REUTERS/Anatolii Stepanov)

– What is the current situation in Kostiantynivka? We're turning to DeepState for verified information to understand what is happening in the city. At the same time, we're looking at the statement by Russia's Defense Ministry, which demanded a ceasefire in Kostiantynivka on July 6 from noon until 6 p.m. Ukraine rejected the proposal. How would you describe the situation and the state of Ukraine's defense in Kostiantynivka?

– First of all, it is important to understand that Kostiantynivka remains under the control of Ukraine's Defense Forces. However, the situation cannot be described as easy because Russian forces continue to infiltrate the city.

They have fully established positions on the outskirts. They have reached the settlements of Berestok and Lynivka and are now trying to push toward Novodmytrivka. From there, they are attempting to move directly into Kostiantynivka itself.

The videos they publish showing flags and claiming they have captured parts of the city or established control over certain districts do not reflect reality. Our strike-and-search drone operations are effectively nullifying those attempts. Russian troops are constantly moving around, infiltrating different areas, but most of these incursions are one-off operations.

The proposal for Ukraine to stop shelling Kostiantynivka was also part of that strategy. The real objective was to halt our drone search-and-strike operations so Russian forces could move deeper into the city and establish stronger positions. It was a deceptive plan and one that should never have been accepted.

– So they were essentially seeking a brief pause to reorganize, determine who was where, reinforce their positions and move deeper into the city to gain a firmer foothold in Kostiantynivka.

– Exactly. It was a deceptive and very calculated plan. It is good that Ukraine rejected the proposal, and I hope we do not fall for similar provocations in the future.

Practice has shown that these temporary ceasefires — whether around May 9, Easter or other occasions — simply do not work. They never do. Every time, the enemy uses the pause to rotate forces and improve its positions.

– If we are not talking about the city actually being captured, how would you characterize the current situation? People often describe battlefield conditions as "stable and under control," "difficult but under control," or "extremely difficult and no longer under control." Which description best fits Kostiantynivka?

– There are clear similarities with what happened in Pokrovsk because Russian forces are infiltrating the city. These infiltrations are no longer fully controllable, and they are managing to get inside.

You may remember we previously discussed Berestok and Lynivka.

– On the outskirts of Kostiantynivka.

– Exactly. Those two settlements lie directly on Kostiantynivka's administrative boundary. We said that if Russian forces managed to reach them and establish positions there, they would gradually build up their forces and begin infiltrating Kostiantynivka itself.

The same applies to the area around Novodmytrivka, another settlement northeast of Kostiantynivka. They are also trying to reach it and infiltrate the city from the direction of Stupochky.

As a result, Russian troops are now scattered throughout parts of the city in a chaotic manner. At the same time, much like what happened in Pokrovsk, Ukrainian units — particularly separate assault units — are conducting clearing operations that also appear somewhat chaotic because of a lack of coordination. We have spoken with servicemen, and they describe very poor coordination, for example between drone operators and infantry.

Reports come in that Russian troops have infiltrated an area. We saw the same pattern in Pokrovsk, and we are seeing it again now. The Russians understand where we are heading and where we plan to conduct clearing operations. They relocate and set up ambushes.

So there is a degree of chaos. But it is still controlled chaos because we are tracking them down and eliminating them. All of those Russian flag-raising videos are one-off events because most of those troops are either captured or killed.

Russia still has a numerical advantage, which allows it to sustain this pattern of infiltration and urban fighting while distorting the situation for information purposes.

It was particularly hypocritical for Russia to call on Ukraine to stop shelling Kostiantynivka because it is Russia that is destroying the city. Russian forces are constantly striking it with guided aerial bombs. They are attacking it with FPV drones, Lancet loitering munitions, Molniya drones and Shahed drones. If anyone should take the initiative to stop, it is Russia.

But Russia cannot be trusted when it proposes temporary ceasefires. Either there must be a permanent end to the fighting, or Russian forces must continue to be destroyed.

Russian troops are, in fact, being eliminated in Kostiantynivka. However, unless we regain control of the situation, we will not make progress. We need much better coordination and, most importantly, more personnel. We simply do not have enough people.

The same problem exists in other sectors. South of Lyman, on the Sloviansk axis, there is a catastrophic shortage of personnel — both drone operators and, even more critically, infantry holding the front-line positions.

That gives the enemy an advantage, and they are exploiting it. Of course, we will continue reporting on Ukrainian successes where they occur.

– In Kostiantynivka or elsewhere?

– Not in Kostiantynivka specifically, but across the front in general. There are sectors where Ukrainian forces are conducting successful operations, clearing territory and liberating it. But at the same time, we are losing Kostiantynivka.

If Kostiantynivka is lost, it will fundamentally worsen the situation across the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban area. The entire course of the fighting will change dramatically. That is why the situation there must be brought under control.

Our military command often tends to focus on one particular sector while neglecting others. That is how situations like this develop.

– Speaking of successes, I recently saw comments from people following the war saying that Ukrainian forces — particularly the Air Assault Forces — have long been conducting operations on the Huliaipole axis. Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi recently said that nearly half of the assault operations reported by the General Staff each day are taking place there. There are also claims that Ukraine has made gains on the Huliaipole axis and the neighboring Novopavlivka axis, but DeepState's map has not reflected those advances for several weeks. Why is that?

– That's actually quite amusing. First of all, I'm not sure what operations near Huliaipole people are referring to. We have a habit of stretching geography quite a bit.

– The Huliaipole axis is a broad area, not just the town itself.

– It is broader, yes. But even so, the operations being conducted and the successes of Ukraine's Defense Forces are not taking place around Huliaipole itself.

Near Huliaipole, we have very serious problems. We have completely lost one settlement there. The enemy is concentrating forces in the area. It redeployed additional troops there earlier and continues to apply pressure.

So I have no idea what successful operations people are talking about, although this narrative has been circulating for quite some time. We all remember the claims about 470 square kilometers. Where are they now? Everyone discussed it, celebrated it and then forgot about it.

If we are talking about another sector...

– In a recent interview with TSN, Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said Ukrainian forces had liberated 670 square kilometers (259 square miles) of territory since the beginning of the year.

– I can't really comment on that. If we're talking about the Oleksandrivsk direction, then yes, there have been successes, but we are not showing them because operations are still ongoing. Ukrainian law prohibits disclosing such information before the military or the country's senior political and military leadership announces it.

First and foremost, we have to think about the safety of our servicemen. While operations are underway, we need to wait until those gains have been secured. When they are officially announced, we will report on them and may even provide additional background information. For now, people simply need to be patient and let the military do its job. If someone cannot wait, they are welcome to join the Armed Forces, help improve the results and see everything firsthand.

We only mark what has already been confirmed or what can be made public when it comes to Ukrainian advances and successes. That has always been our approach.

– Recently, the Pokrovsk axis has not been the only sector leading in the number of Russian attacks. The Huliaipole, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk sectors have also appeared at the top of the General Staff's daily reports, with the Lyman sector sometimes joining them. Some people might see this as confirmation of Vladimir Putin's claim that Russian forces are advancing along the entire front line with equal intensity. Of course, the real question is how successful those offensives actually are. How would you explain these recent changes in the General Staff's statistics, which make it seem as though Russia is constantly shifting the direction of its main offensive?

– A lot of different processes are happening at once. On the one hand, we are talking about potentially losing Kostiantynivka. Russian forces continue launching assaults there and still have considerable resources, especially manpower. But this is also where the issue of quality comes into play. Kostiantynivka has been a long-standing problem, and now that problem is simply becoming more visible.

It is also important to understand that Russia is relying primarily on numbers. Yes, many Russian soldiers are being killed and they still have not achieved a decisive breakthrough, but they keep applying pressure, gradually, and from time to time they manage to make some progress.

At the same time, we are beginning to see a different trend. We are starting to change the course of the fighting because Russia's offensive momentum is weakening. For the second consecutive month, Russian forces have been unable to conduct successful large-scale advances. The quality of their infantry has declined significantly. We are increasing the number of successful strikes and the number of Russian casualties.

It is still too early to say we have overtaken them, but we are catching up and approaching parity in this technological war.

For example, Russia developed its deep-strike capabilities long before we did, and that created serious problems for us. Now we are catching up, achieving good results and moving toward a point where, if we maintain this pace, we could eventually surpass them.

As for the claim that Russia is constantly changing the direction of its main offensive, I don't think that is actually happening. Huliaipole has long been one of their objectives. So have Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. What has changed is not the direction but the quality of their operations and their available resources in those sectors.

Kostiantynivka has also been one of Russia's priorities for a long time. Even when Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad were under the greatest pressure, we were already saying that Kostiantynivka would become the next major objective.

The same applies to the Sloviansk sector, specifically south of Lyman. I am not referring to Lyman itself, because Russia has achieved no success there. There have been isolated infiltrations by small groups, but they have all ended the same way, and Russia has gained nothing.

Instead, Russian forces shifted farther south because they identified a weak point. Even there, however, they have not concentrated significant additional forces or made it a primary objective. They simply found a vulnerability and began exploiting it. We recognize that weakness ourselves, which is why it may appear they have made it a priority, even though their overall strategy has not changed.

As a result, it sometimes looks as though Russia is achieving success, while in reality the picture is far more mixed.

One thing is actually beneficial for us: Russian commanders continue lying. How did they convince their senior command that they had captured Kostiantynivka? By showing videos of soldiers briefly raising flags before those same soldiers were killed. They are systematically misleading their own leadership without realizing how badly that could backfire.

So let them continue. If they want to "capture" Kostiantynivka in that way, or "capture" Kupiansk in the same way, let them do it. These imaginary victories actually work in our favor.

Meanwhile, we will continue doing our job.

– Roman, I think you've seen comparisons between the Russian General Staff's operational map and the DeepState map, which reflects the current situation on the battlefield. In some areas, the differences amount to dozens of kilometers. Russia includes virtually the entire so-called gray zone on its map. Any place where a single infantryman manages to plant a flag is immediately marked as captured territory. But you say this will ultimately backfire on Russia. How exactly?

– I'd like to add something about those maps. You're right — Russia portrays areas where it has merely infiltrated as fully captured territory.

The best example is the Zaporizhzhia sector. Russian forces claimed they had reached the Konka River. They recorded a few videos with Russian flags there and reported to senior command that they had secured the line. As a result, Russia's top military leadership announced the start of an offensive toward Zaporizhzhia. Now, however, Ukrainian forces are clearing them out near Prymorske. They have suffered enormous losses there and squandered much of their combat potential.

To some extent, we have faced similar problems ourselves. Sometimes commanders reported that everything was going well in a sector, which reduced attention and the allocation of additional resources because the perception was that everything was under control and attention could shift elsewhere. The same thing is happening on the Russian side.

What are the consequences? If Russian casualties continue to rise while commanders insist they control an area, they simply send more troops there. Every day, one, two or three assault groups are sent forward. By the end of the day, that translates into more than 1,000 Russian troops killed. Over a month, that is more than 30,000 casualties. They just keep dying.

Yes, Russia still has accumulated manpower reserves. But if the trend continues and the number of soldiers they can mobilize falls below the number they lose, they will eventually face a serious problem. They are already experiencing declining troop quality, increasing refusals to fight and growing numbers of soldiers abandoning their units. We have also largely eliminated much of their heavy equipment. They no longer use it on the same scale. So what options do they have left?

– I am always surprised when I see the General Staff reporting that several Russian vehicles, armored vehicles and tanks have been destroyed. I always wonder where they are still finding them.

– When I say we have effectively eliminated their heavy equipment, I mean that by the standards of the Russian military, the numbers they are using now are insignificant.

Whatever equipment they still manage to field comes from what remains. They often recover damaged vehicles, repair them, collect abandoned equipment from occupied territory, assemble "Frankenstein" vehicles from spare parts and send them back into battle.

Why they keep doing this, I honestly don't know. But it works to our advantage because they simply don't know how to wage war effectively.

A recent video illustrates this perfectly. It showed a Russian assault soldier walking past nearly 30 dead Russian troops lying along the route. He saw all the bodies but kept going anyway, apparently believing that once he reached the end of that path, everything would be safe. Instead, he stepped on a mine and was killed as well.

They just keep advancing. They see the bodies of their own soldiers lying everywhere, yet they continue moving forward. Why? Because they are ordered to. They are told, "Our troops are already there. The area is under control. You saw the flag — now move forward." Or they are forced to advance at gunpoint, which is often how things work in the Russian military.

Kupiansk is another example. Russia lost much of its combat potential there because commanders reported to senior leadership that everything was under control and that they held their positions. In reality, they did not have enough resources even to maintain those positions, and they eventually lost them.

So let them continue. If this trend does not change, it will ultimately work in our favor.

– You previously wrote that "lies will destroy us." So what is the situation with that problem on the Ukrainian side today?

– We should always remember that lies can destroy us in every aspect of our lives. We've been warning about this for a long time because, unfortunately, the problem has not disappeared completely. There are still sectors where information is not fully reported, where problems are tolerated or simply ignored.

But today's problem is different. Previously, this culture of misinformation was widespread and systematic. Today, we cannot even address it properly because people have stopped paying attention to it.

Why worry about problems in Pokrovsk, for example, when everyone is focused on offensives and battlefield successes in the Oleksandrivsk direction? The problem itself has changed.

Overall, the trend is improving. Most commanders today are more professional and are trying to address these issues internally. But the remaining problems are like an untreated illness. If you do not fully cure a disease, it eventually returns. That is exactly what has happened. The problem remains, but people have largely stopped paying attention to it.

I remember that after the battles for Avdiivka, Prohres and Ocheretyne, whenever these issues became public, the commander-in-chief at least visited those sectors, tried to understand what was happening, commissions were sent there and the problems received attention.

Now the situation is different. Everyone knows these problems exist, but they receive attention only once they become critical. By then, we have either already lost the position or the issue is quietly pushed aside and overshadowed by reports of successes elsewhere.

Before, the situation was more straightforward — there were false reports, there were real problems and people were trying to conceal them. Today, everyone knows about the problems, but public attention has simply shifted elsewhere.

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