Analyst Reiterovych outlines two possible scenarios for peace talks and the key question that will decide their future

If you look at the latest statements, for example from [special representative] Keith Kellogg, we are almost at the finish line. However, he pointed to two key issues. He essentially said we are in the final stage, with only two unresolved questions remaining, and that “the last 10 meters are the hardest.” That was the logic.

What we know, for instance, from the conversation between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and [Trump’s son-in-law Jared] Kushner and [Trump’s special envoy Steve] Witkoff — which U.S. media have partially reported — is that the key issue there as well is the question of territories.

I think there are actually two possible scenarios for what happens next, and that answers the question of where we are now. Everything could drag on for an indefinite period, or it could be resolved very quickly if a compromise is found — one acceptable to Ukraine and one Russia is willing to agree to.

The problem, however, is that I do not yet see what kind of compromise Ukraine could realistically accept in this situation, how one could even discuss withdrawing troops or ceding any territory that Russia does not currently control at all.

So that is the key issue today. But as we see, the outcome could be either very fast or, essentially, we could return to where we started — facing a very long path again with no clear sense of when it might end.

What is the main question here? It is clear that the Russian side has given the Americans some options. The Americans are now trying to piece together something that could be — let’s call things by their names — sold to Ukraine so that Ukraine would agree to it and it would be perceived as a reasonable, acceptable step.

There is also a third issue, often forgotten but fundamental, and it is the one Europe is particularly focused on — the question of guarantees. If we imagine that all disagreements are resolved and the full-scale phase of the war ends, at least in terms of active fighting, then the question of guarantees immediately comes to the forefront.

Where is the assurance that Russia will not start this again in six months or a year, once it regroups and partially recovers from sanctions? The logic is that some sanctions may be lifted, and then Russia, with renewed strength, might again try to pressure Ukraine, exploiting our economic situation, possible political divisions and similar vulnerabilities.