“The Budapest Memorandum has thick layers of mythology around it,” Kyslytsya said.
“First, even the texts of this document in different languages say different things. The Ukrainian translation of the memorandum does not match the English text. The English text does not use the word 'guarantees.' In the English title the document uses 'assurances.' Throughout the text there is not even language about 'assurances' in places; it talks about 'commitments.' But the official Ukrainian text refers to 'guarantees."
Kyslytsya said the differences reflect how Ukraine and Western partners wanted to promote the agreement to their own publics in 1994.
“These layers of mythology around the memorandum appeared because every side needed to advertise the document: the Ukrainian government for Ukrainians and the West for other needs," he said.
He noted recently declassified correspondence between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin ahead of the 1994 Budapest summit that, in his view, shows Ukraine was a secondary issue and that the U.S. side insisted the language be about assurances, not guarantees. He added the memorandum was never meant to be ratified by the U.S. Congress.
When Ukraine became independent, it had the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal. After signing the Budapest Memorandum in 1994, Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons, and the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom (later joined by China and France) provided Kyiv assurances of its sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange.
In February 2025, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the
full-scale Russian invasion of 2022 would not have happened if Ukraine had not
relinquished its nuclear arsenal under the memorandum. He has said the war is
the result of violations of international obligations and a failure to uphold
global security principles.