Challenges in countering Russia’s reconnaissance drones — expert interview

In combination with cruise and ballistic missiles and cheap kamikaze drones, the have become a major challenge for Ukraine.

NV turned to Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military and political observer for the Information Resistance project, asking him to outline the scope of the problem and the most sensible approaches to resolving it.

NV: How do the enemy reconnaissance drones manage to penetrate so deep beyond the frontline?

Kovalenko: It is very simple: we have a shortage of air defense assets. However, Russian reconnaissance drones flew deep into Ukraine’s territory even in 2022. But they were not crucial at that time, as Russia used long-range radar detection and control aircraft A-50, Il-22, Su-24MR and even Su-34 with reconnaissance equipment.

However, two [Russian] A-50 aircraft were destroyed in early 2024, so the Russians had to resume using UAVs to gather intelligence in Ukraine’s rear.

Of course, these reconnaissance drones cannot fully compensate for the capabilities of A-50 aircraft. Nevertheless, they make it possible to carry out an operator-controlled flights deep into our territory at a distance of 100-150 km, with up to 400-600 km deep in autonomous mode. Although the latter makes these sorties one-way flights.

Another feature is their altitude: 5-6 km. That’s high enough to prevent Ukrainian mobile counter-drone units (used to hunt Shahed-136 kamikaze drones) from being able to detect and intercept them. Even some dedicated man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) cannot shoot down targets at those altitudes.

NV: In that case, how could we deal with these drones?

Kovalenko: We need short- and medium-range anti-air systems to completely cover Ukrainian airspace. We have a critical shortage of them. Thus, the first problem is an acute shortage of short- and medium-range air defense systems.

Another option is to use light aircraft to intercept the drones. For example, a Yak-52 training aircraft is used in Odesa Oblast to combat enemy drones. This technique has proven itself to be quite effective in Odesa, but for some reason it’s not widely adopted across the rest of the country.

What prevents us from scaling this approach? Are we short on pilots? No, we have pilots, and especially for such simple aircraft. Do we have a shortage of planes? No, we have enough Yak-52 aircraft. At any rate, they are quite cheap and plentiful in Europe: thousands of training aircraft are available, with an average price of about $25,000-30,000.

It should even be easy enough to raise funds to purchase the planes from the public. When it comes to more or less prosperous regions, I think, local authorities can do it. But for some reason it’s not implemented. Here, the problem is either at the local level or at some other level, I don’t know.

Another way to counter drones is through classic electronic warfare (EW) systems. But Ukraine also has a shortage of them, even when it comes to outfitting brigades deployed at the frontline.

NV: Even Shaheds remain a problem, regularly reaching Kyiv and even cities in western Ukraine.

Kovalenko: Their flight altitudes are also gradually increasing. Previously they would fly at an altitude of 500-700 m, now climb to over 1 km. For now, they remain within the range of our ground-based mobile interception units. But if this trend continues, we’ll face a shortage of firepower, and mobile groups will have to switch to MANPADS en masse. Eventually, even MANPADS could become ineffective at higher altitudes.

By the way, another option for combating reconnaissance UAVs is to use small kamikaze drones to intercept them. Several deigns of such UAVs have already been shown to the public. Their development started in 2023, but these projects are not yet scaled enough to allow us to use them widely.

NV: Can our air defense systems even detect Russian reconnaissance drones?

Kovalenko: In general—yes, they see them. Of course, not all air defense systems, but they can be upgraded. For example, our military has Soviet-era Strela-10 air defense systems, which cannot detect small targets out-of-the-box. But if they are slightly upgraded and equipped with, let’s say, Valli electro-optical sights, even Strela-10 would be quite effective against surveillance drones.

NV: Is it better to try and intercept enemy drones close to the border, or try and saturate areas around potential targets with air defense and shoot them down deeper in Ukrainian territory?

Kovalenko: The thing is that enemy drones manage to cover such distances because they fly along routes where we don’t have air defense systems. The enemy knows about these gaps.

For example, if we look at the map of the trajectories of Russian cruise missiles during the massive attack on Kyiv on July 8, we can see that the missiles flew over almost the entire territory of Ukraine. And this isn’t the first time that the Russians attack Ukraine with cruise missiles, which, by the way, the Ukrainian air defense systems shoot down quite effectively. In this case, like knife through butter, they flew over almost the country’s entire territory. Of course, some of the missiles were shot down during the flight, but most of them, if we’re talking about the capital, were shot down over Kyiv Oblast and the city itself. But even Kyiv’s air defense it has gaps through which missiles can get through, which they did on that occasion. 

As for the rest of Ukraine’s territory, the enemy knows how to plot the course to avoid our air defenses. Russian intelligence is aware of where our anti-air assets are deployed. Of course, we constantly redeploy them, but nevertheless, the enemy also quickly finds out about these movements. Waves of kamikaze drones are often used to force our air defenses to expose their location.

Back to your question—of course it’s best to down enemy drones even before they cross the border. But it’s extremely difficult because our short- and medium-range systems would be deployed very close to Russian territory. That, in turn, would put them in range of Russian artillery.

Therefore, we have no choice but to shoot down enemy drones over Ukrainian territory. And the best option is to do it as early as possible, before enemy UAVs can gather intelligence and enable accurate attacks with Iskander ballistic missiles.

NV: What else do the trajectories enemy drones flying over Ukraine indicate?

Kovalenko: As I said, kamikaze drones are used not only to attack, but also to reveal the location of Ukrainian air defenses.

Therefore, when we see a massive drone attack, we can make a guess about the approaches enemy cruise missiles would use in future attacks.

If a wave of Shahed UAVs flies from the Black Sea through Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts, bypassing Odesa, we can assume they’re charting a course for Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles.

If Shaheds enter through Sumy Oblast and fly north towards western Ukraine or Kyiv, this might suggest that a future attack would send air-launched cruise missiles in their wake.