Cobweb architect details how Ukraine’s drone strike began as a Moscow mission — interview

The interview also covered high-tech mobilization and what needs to happen for the concept to work.

— Mr. Borovyk, is it difficult to scale operations like Cobweb?

— Preparing this operation was a major undertaking that began a year and a half before it was carried out. Representatives of the security services contacted us and said they had evaluated many drone manufacturers and decided to work with us. That was because our Osa drone was unique. It had technological solutions that others did not have. So we began the work.

The main difference between Cobweb and the usual operations conducted on our territory was that the equipment had to be brought onto enemy territory, then integrated, checked and tested.

Operations like this can be scaled. I am sure there will be more of them. But it is unlikely this one can be repeated. New operations will definitely be different, especially since the enemy has already had a painful experience. That is what makes our operation unique and historic: It shows a new type of resistance by a smaller country with limited resources but a better technological approach and creativity against a much larger enemy.

— As I understand it, you did not know the full details of the operation. You were given the technical requirements the unmanned systems had to meet, correct?

— We were being prepared for an operation in Moscow. We had to train the Security Service’s pilots to fly out of narrow window openings, out of windows — and strike decision-making centers inside the enemy’s own lair. So the initial focus was on control in dense urban areas, so the drone could carefully fly out of a small space and operate there. Accordingly, there had to be fairly serious preparation to protect the communications used to control the drone.

We prepared several versions of the technical solution. In fact, we spent a year making these drones because they differed from the standard Osa drone. We called the project Osa LTE. It was based on technologies we had previously tested in Kherson Oblast, where I commanded a special strike drone unit. Technologies that allow you to control your drone using enemy SIM cards had proven effective. I joked that it was a flying cellphone with propellers and a warhead.

In all, we prepared 150 drones, of which 117, I believe, hit their targets. Remember, one truck self-destructed because the driver saw that something was wrong? All the other drones worked and disabled $7 billion worth of equipment. I learned about this operation a year ago while sitting with my family in Chornomorka, I remember it clearly. I saw the report and thought: Wow, not Moscow, but what a great operation, superb! Then I looked more closely and thought: Wait, those seem to be our drones. I called the pilot, Oleksii, and he said: “I’ve already seen it. Looks like it, yes!”

Later, when photos of the drones from below began to appear ... We have a special grille there, and no one else made it that way. Then Defense Express published an analysis saying these were Osa drones from First Contact. I did not publicly confirm that for some time because it was not within my authority. But when even CNN and The Wall Street Journal called, they told me: You can confirm it or not, but we have learned from several sources, from the security services and other agencies, that your technologies and your drones were indeed used, and now it can be discussed.

— You and I simply have to reassure our audience, because of course we will now hear: Guys, why are you talking about this?

— We are basically talking about what is already known. I am only giving details, certain nuances that no longer affect secrecy. We are even considering developing a film script based on this operation. Many details have already been disclosed, for example about the couple who built those hunting cabins under cover and how they later transported them. We are very careful with secrets. I do not think the things we are discussing will give the enemy anything.

— A year has passed. How much progress have we made technologically since then? Please assess how ready we are to do something like this again — something that would seriously confuse and surprise our enemy, and hurt badly.

— Of course, our security services are preparing serious things, and Russians should be ready for stings from our Osa drone. At any time and anywhere in their swamps, including both of their capitals. I think such operations will continue until they leave our land. I can probably predict that we will see something good in the next six months. Delivery methods may change, the execution technique may change, the targets may change. But I think something will definitely happen.

As for how much technology has developed since then ... After the operation, I held a meeting and congratulated everyone involved in logistics, pilot training, testing and so on. And I said: Listen, let’s scale this operation. At the time, we decided to make small flyboxes, with four to six drones each, so they could operate on the front line. But back then, communications and control technologies did not yet fully allow drones to be controlled from hundreds or thousands of kilometers away. Today, that is possible.

In my article for Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, I describe the concept of remote drone operation. Our team prepared that vision based on an idea I had voiced back then. I spoke with Lazar, the Air Force deputy commander, Pavlo Yelizarov, who is responsible for air defense, and with commanders of other military branches about the fact that elements of the concept are already being implemented. Drones are being transported on unmanned ground platforms. They take off, and the pilots remain protected. Remote control of turrets and surface drones, and soon control of underwater drones — all of this is gradually developing, but it needs to become widespread.

And this will be a strong component of a new type of mobilization. I would call it high-tech mobilization. That means we will be able to involve people in defending the country while they remain at home or at work and remotely control drones on the front line. They could even work from abroad. We will not move overnight from a war fought by people to a war fought by drones, even though we are discussing it. But we must gradually move away from cannon fodder. We must pull soldiers back from the front line and use technological solutions to change the very concept of future warfare.

In other words, this is a new approach that will allow us to bring more people into the Defense Forces, make mobilization more attractive and generally change society’s attitude toward the war. We need to change our approaches now, based on the Cobweb operation, based on what is already working and can work, and scale it across the entire contact line.

— In line with what you just said: A Shahed has already been shot down from 2,000 kilometers away, lawmaker Marian Zablotsky reported. A Russian submarine in a closed bay has already been seriously damaged by an underwater drone. And as far as I know, civilians who can shoot down Russian Shaheds are now being actively brought into small air defense units. But it is clear that new technologies cannot immediately replace a person. How capable are we of breaking out of the battlefield deadlock we often hear about and changing the situation in our favor in the near future?

— That depends on decisions by the leadership of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff. It depends on the position of the commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces. And it is very important that he is already talking about a contract-based model. OK, let’s make that contract model attractive and based on trust. It has to be a two-way street.

Technologically, everything is possible. Underwater drones, surface drones, unmanned ground platforms and turrets can be controlled remotely. Interceptors shoot things down. Kamikaze drones work, and so on. But all of this needs to be united into a single battlefield system. I do not mean a situational awareness system such as Delta or Palantir. Those systems should be pieces of a larger, highly integrated system that combines all means of strike and reconnaissance, including the space segment that I hope Ukraine will have. So this has to be a large, serious solution, with remote control under cryptographic protection and backup systems. For example, if one system fails or is compromised by enemy agents, another system can replace it.

To do this, I repeat, strategic decisions are needed, along with a state policy of openness and an understanding that the time for forcing people who do not want to fight, or are afraid to fight, must end. We have to create a system in which people themselves want to defend the country and see it as an honor.

My comrades and I dropped everything in 2022 and went to fight. One day we were businessmen, artists and so on, and the next day we were already near Hostomel with rifles. But not everyone is like that. We need to change the psychology, not divide Ukrainians into good and bad, but understand everyone and give people a chance to prove themselves not with a rifle in a trench, but with a joystick and VR goggles. Give them a chance to attack cruisers, tanks or enemy troops while sitting in normal conditions. If technology allows it, then this must be introduced as quickly as possible into the legal framework, into programs and concepts that must be worked through at the level of the National Security and Defense Council, the Defense Ministry, the security services, HUR, the Special Operations Forces, the SBU and so on. Everyone should submit their proposals, but nothing should stop this concept from effectively beginning to be implemented now, even with the mobilized personnel already available and ready to be trained.