1️. Both NATO and the EU are ready to accept Ukraine. This reflects the general vision of European elites and radically changes the paradigm of the perception of Ukraine, which has been engraved in European history textbooks and stereotypes for centuries. It is difficult for us to assess these changes, but ten years ago (a very short time in human history), we were considered very close to Russian civilization and sometimes even confused with Russia. Now, no one ever confuses us. For example, no one confuses the English and the Irish, despite, among other things, their linguistic identity. Now, in the perception of Europeans, we are part of Western civilization, and they are ready to accept us at the political level. "This time it's serious," answered a very serious retired German politician when I asked.
2️. The problem with Ukraine's integration into the EU and NATO is that no one knows how and when. So far, the official position is "after the war." But some scenarios are being discussed internally. Most often, this is the option presented by Rasmussen (former NATO Secretary General), who suggested that NATO should provide security guarantees right now, but only for the territories controlled by Ukraine. Then, when Ukraine gains control of the 1991 borders, the whole country will receive guarantees. Something similar happened after the Cold War with Germany, which was divided after World War II. However, the following questions remain unresolved: first, whether the Alliance is ready to offer this officially; second, whether official Ukraine is prepared to listen to it (the first reaction to Rasmussen's proposal was very critical). The third element is what Russia will do (Moscow also reacted very critically to Rasmussen's proposal).
However, there are three unresolved issues
3️. No one fears an influx of Ukrainians after integration into the EU and NATO. This is also an important, though not always politically correct, aspect. Surprisingly enough, Ukrainian migrants and refugees have played a role, as they have quickly integrated into Western societies in a "test mode" and pose no threat to their political stability, unlike, for example, migrants from the Middle East. At the same time, the West is afraid of the consequences of war – crime and uncontrolled arms trafficking – based on the experience of the Balkan wars.
4️. It's unpleasant, but in the context of Ukraine, the future of Russia is also considered in the same way. Yes, we would all like this future to simply not exist. But the West is used to calculating everything. What should be done to avoid a new war? How can they guarantee the stability of the Russian Federation? What will happen if Russia (or part of it) falls under Chinese control? What can and cannot Russia do in an alliance with Iran? And with some countries of the global South? These questions confuse European minds as they calculate the war's end in Ukraine.
5️. Reforms and standards of democracy in Ukraine are not yet the primary concern of the Europeans. But after the end of hostilities, this will be discussed very seriously on all platforms. European experts also warn that we will face tough negotiations on entering European markets, especially the agricultural market. Complex negotiations are the fate of all newcomers to the EU, and we will need to demonstrate a very high level of professionalism and patience to implement them.
In general, the enlargement of the EU in Ukraine is perceived as perhaps one of the biggest challenges for NATO and EU institutions in history. If the West manages to integrate Ukraine, it can do almost anything.