Can Russia expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast and launch a new border offensive?

Nation

20 September 2024, 10:34 AM

The Russian army likely received two ambitious and challenging tasks from the Kremlin for October: to push the AFU out of Kursk Oblast by mid-month and to advance into Ukraine’s border regions by the end of October. 

According to a new report from ISW, analysts highlighted a report from the Ukrainian agency RBC-Ukraine indicating that Russian authorities likely aim to expel the AFU from Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and create a “buffer zone” in the border areas of Ukraine along the international border with the Russian Federation in northeastern Ukraine by the end of the month.

ISW specialists describe these objectives as “significant commitments that the Russian armed forces are unlikely to achieve in such a short time frame.” RBC-Ukraine reports that Russia has currently concentrated up to 37,000 servicemen in Kursk Oblast. The agency’s sources also indicated that the Kremlin planned to assemble a force in Kursk Oblast that would have a 5:1 advantage in manpower over the AFU to initiate a counteroffensive operation against Ukrainian forces in Kursk. However, by the beginning of this “counteroffensive” on Sept. 10, Russians had not managed to form such a grouping.

In fact, Russian troops began counterattacks within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, but have not yet engaged in large-scale military operations that would indicate a coordinated counteroffensive aimed at completely expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk, ISW notes. Analysts add that continuous Russian counteroffensive operations in Kursk Oblast would require Russian forces to redeploy additional units from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast and/or direct newly formed forces from Russia to this area instead of sending them to the front line in Ukraine. While Ukrainian forces have not established control over all territories of their salient in Kursk Oblast, the AFU has “undoubtedly prepared positions in certain areas of the salient that will challenge any coordinated Russian counteroffensive efforts,” ISW emphasizes.

Regarding Moscow’s potential plans to create a “buffer zone” in the “border oblasts [of Ukraine] adjacent to Russia” by Oct. 30, ISW interprets this as a directive from the Kremlin for the Russian army to advance into Ukraine along the international border to push AFU fire capabilities further away from Russian territory.

ISW recalls that Russian forces had previously aimed to create a “buffer zone” in northern Kharkiv Oblast when they began their offensive operation in that area on May 10, 2024. However, since then, the occupiers have advanced only about 10 km into northern Kharkiv Oblast. Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast likely disrupted Russia’s planned offensive operations beyond the northern part of Kharkiv Oblast in the international border zone. Such Russian operations could have aimed to expand the combat zone across a broader front in northeastern Ukraine and further stretch Ukrainian forces along a longer front, ISW reminds.

Overall, a Russian counteroffensive operation to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast, followed by an invasion of Ukraine’s border oblasts (similar to Russia’s offensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast), would be a significant operational effort requiring substantial engagement of manpower and logistical resources from the Russian army, ISW stresses. However, the Russian military command has thus far demonstrated a priority to maintain the offensive operation in the Pokrovsk direction and secure it against operational pressure caused by Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast. While a Russian counteroffensive in Kursk and an offensive operation along the international border would undoubtedly create significant operational needs, this would further impact Russia’s already diminished ability to direct more manpower and other resources toward the offensive in Pokrovsk, ISW concludes.

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