Three conclusions after Russia's missile attack on Ukraine on January 8

One of the factors that influenced the January 8 missile attack was the sharp drop in temperature throughout Ukraine. It is clear that for Russians (remembering the experience of last year), the lower the temperature, the worse the consequences of such attacks. The destruction of the heating system in one place then leads to a cascading effect. In Russia, this happens even without shelling, and they would be thrilled to spark this in Ukraine because, among other things, the Russian public likes it very much. It takes attention away from their own problems.

The second thing I would point out is that Monday’s attack was unexpectedly smaller than the previous two. Again, it's too early to draw conclusions, but it may be a sign that Russia's ability to conduct such attacks, as we saw in late December and early January, is limited. But, again, that would be an overly optimistic conclusion.

One more thing that I think is important to remember when assessing the goals of the attacks is that terror is still the primary motive for Russia.

Why did the Russians start to use Kinzhals actively?

On the one hand, they are indeed more active, but on the other hand, they are also analyzing the effectiveness of these missiles. That is, if they assessed that the 10 Kinzhals launched last time did not achieve their goal, then obviously, this time, they at least refrained from throwing them at places where there are Patriot SAMs or other systems that are likely to destroy ballistic missiles. This is also a risk for the Russians as arms manufacturers and distributors. There are already several criminal cases against them. This may be one of the reasons.

We cannot allow a situation where Ukraine will have nothing to shoot down ballistic missiles with

Recently, the New York Times suggested that the United States will not be able to provide Ukraine with ammunition for the Patriot for long. Air Force spokesman Yuriy Ihnat has already denied this information, but he also noted that the shortage of missiles is a permanent phenomenon.

I will say this. For the majority of Ukrainian citizens who have no way of influencing this situation, it is first and foremost important not to react emotionally to every such report, even in very reputable publications. We cannot do anything about it. For those who are supposed to respond to and communicate this, one thing is that we cannot allow a situation where Ukraine will have nothing to shoot down ballistic missiles with. Regarding the Patriot, we must do everything possible actively and proactively. In addition to the objective reasons why supplies are limited, there are many subjective ones. That is, the situation is not as hopeless as it may sometimes seem.

Recently, the United States has stated that Russia is likely to use North Korean missiles to fire at Ukraine. There has already been a statement from the spokesman for the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office, Dmytro Chubenko, about the similarity between the elements of the missile that the Russians launched at Kharkiv and those of North Korea. The Air Force has yet to confirm this information officially. In this case, the primary consideration is that when evidence is provided that these missiles originated from North Korea, this data should not be questioned. The stakes of the issue are severe. If Russia has purchased missiles from North Korea, which is almost apparent today, then this violates the UN Security Council sanctions that Russia itself voted for.

That is, the evidence must be absolutely indisputable. Evidence, facts, not just photos, but parts of these missiles. If Russia can question this (and if we give them grounds to do so), it will be even harder to prove Russia's involvement in sanctions violations in the following cases.