This was the toughest winter since the full-scale invasion began. Russia systematically and deliberately attacked Ukraine's energy infrastructure in advance — thermal power plants (TPPs), hydroelectric power stations (HPPs), and distributed generation. National gas production also suffered significant damage. However, despite these challenges, the energy system held up — thanks to rapid responses, emergency repairs, and the ability to import electricity from the EU, a collapse was avoided.
This winter, peak consumption reached 16.5 GW — lower than the forecasted 18 GW, and it was covered without critical deficits. As usual, nuclear power plants carried the majority of the load (45−50% of the total balance). The share of thermal power plants (TPPs) and combined heat and power plants (CHPPs) remained at 25−30%, the same as before the full-scale invasion.
Hydropower operated under conditions of limited resources — its share in covering peak demand was 15-17%. Distributed generation also played an important role in ensuring stability — solar power plants, diesel and gas units, which partially relieved the load on the grid. At the same time, renewable energy sources (RES) still had limited impact on covering evening peaks due to the significant share of solar generation: during the day, under favorable conditions, the share of RES could reach 15-20%, but in the evening, its impact was minimal.
Electricity imports from the EU during peak hours became an additional stabilizing factor. Although the allowed volume reached 2.1 GW, it was only partially used — for the most part, demand was covered by domestic generation. Even with an increase in imports compared to last year, its share during peak hours did not exceed 8%.
After Russian attacks, domestic gas production volumes decreased, and reserves in underground storage dropped to 1 billion cubic meters in March. On an annual basis, Ukraine needs about 20 billion cubic meters of gas, while domestic production is only 12 billion. To cover the deficit in 2025, at least 4 billion cubic meters will need to be imported. This does not threaten the stability of the EU market (it is only 1.5% of their imports), but it requires active measures from us.
It is important to sign long-term contracts for two years, as short-term contracts turn out to be 10-15% more expensive. In the future, the goal should be to conclude agreements for 3-5 years. Adhering to the procurement schedule to accumulate 13 billion cubic meters of gas by the 2025-2026 heating season is a key element of the strategy.
To increase gas supply security, Ukraine should collaborate more actively with the EU through the AggregateEU mechanism, which will reduce the financial pressure on Naftogaz and help build reserves.
In addition, it is necessary to strengthen the protection of key gas infrastructure facilities, implement early warning systems, and introduce measures to reduce consumption — modernization, transition to alternative fuels, and more efficient resource use.
DiXi Group’s report conclusion: preparations for the next winter need to begin now. We need support for distributed generation, which already has many facilities, but they are not connected to the unified grid, as well as the renewal of the production base and expansion of partnerships with EU countries.