Proposed Witkoff peace plan would help Russia gear up for another strike and repeats its 2022 demands — ISW

Analysts noted that, according to the overwhelming majority of reports in Western media, the “peace deal” reportedly proposed by Steve Witkoff would require Ukraine to:

• withdraw its forces from the non-occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts;
• reduce the Ukrainian Armed Forces to 50% of their current size;
• give up “key categories of weapons.”

In return, Ukraine would reportedly receive unspecified “security guarantees” from the United States.

Some Western outlets also reported that the deal could:

• ban the deployment of foreign troops in Ukraine;
• prohibit Kyiv from receiving long-range foreign weapons capable of striking deep into Russian territory;
• force Ukraine to make Russian an official state language;
• force Ukraine to grant official status to the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate — “a Kremlin-controlled organization and a known tool of Russia’s hybrid warfare,” ISW noted.

Commenting on these “proposals,” ISW stressed that handing over to Russia the still-unoccupied parts of Donetsk Oblast and freezing the front line in southern Ukraine would “disproportionately” benefit Russia. Analysts noted that the Ukrainian-controlled territory of Donetsk Oblast includes areas vital to Ukraine’s economy as well as the Donbas “fortress belt” [Druzhkivka, Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk], which has served as the region’s main defensive line since 2014 and is critical for defense, industry and logistics. ISW added that Russia has been unsuccessfully trying to seize this “fortress belt” for more than a decade and would likely need several more years to capture these cities at current rates of advance.

“The stated peace plan would hand Russia these critical lands — apparently without any concrete compromise in return — saving Russia the time, effort and manpower it would otherwise have to expend elsewhere in Ukraine when renewing its aggression,” ISW warned. Analysts recalled earlier statements by Kremlin officials that a Ukrainian withdrawal from Donbas would be only a “starting point,” not the result of a cease-fire or peace negotiations — meaning Moscow would offer no guarantees of peace even if Ukraine withdrew. Russia has shown no signs of being ready to consider peace talks or a settlement before Ukraine withdraws from the non-occupied parts of Donbas, ISW stressed.

Moreover, pulling Ukrainian troops out of Donetsk Oblast would also give Russian forces more favorable positions for launching new offensives into southern Kharkiv Oblast and further into the eastern parts of Zaporizhzhya and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. It would also enable Russian advances across the Oskil River in eastern Kharkiv Oblast. After that, Russian forces would likely try to threaten Kharkiv from multiple directions.

Freezing the front line in southern Ukraine would also allow Russian forces to rest and refit for future offensives toward Kherson or Zaporizhzhya — both of which the Kremlin and Russian officials have repeatedly named as objectives, ISW noted. Thus, Russia would be able to choose from several mutually reinforcing offensive operations if Ukraine ceded Donetsk Oblast and agreed to freeze the front in the south — especially if this occurred without effective security guarantees and if Ukraine accepted Russia’s demand to reduce the size and capabilities of its military.

The proposed “peace plan” is virtually identical to Russia’s demands during the Istanbul talks in spring 2022, when battlefield conditions were far more favorable to Moscow. Russia presented the same demands in the first two months of the war, when its forces were threatening Kyiv from the north and northwest. But frontline dynamics have changed dramatically since 2022, while Russia’s demands have not, ISW noted. Ukraine not only pushed Russian troops out of the north but also liberated large areas of Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts. Overall, Ukraine has liberated more than 50% of the territory seized by Russia since 2022 and forced Russian forces into grinding offensives moving at a walking pace, ISW said.

ISW also recalled that Russia’s 2022 Istanbul demands would have amounted to Ukraine’s complete capitulation — permanently banning NATO membership, imposing severe constraints on the Ukrainian military, and prohibiting Ukraine from receiving Western aid — all without any limits on the size or capabilities of Russian forces. These same conditions are now being repeated in the 28-point “peace plan.” The Kremlin has consistently demonstrated and openly stated that it remains committed to achieving its original war aims, and Russian narratives since the new “peace plan” emerged continue to reinforce Moscow’s initial objectives.

Analysts stressed that these long-standing Russian demands rest on the false premise that Russia’s victory on the battlefield is inevitable. Vladimir Putin has repeatedly outlined his “theory of victory,” based on the assumption that Russia’s military and economy can outlast and overcome Western support for Ukraine, as well as Ukraine’s own ability to defend itself. And although Russian forces are currently making tactically significant gains near Pokrovsk and stepping up operations elsewhere, they are not advancing rapidly or making major breakthroughs proportional to their heavy losses, ISW stressed.

Ukrainian forces have also shown their ability to limit Russia’s mechanized advances across the theater — particularly when well-equipped — ISW said. Throughout 2023–24, Ukraine prevented Russia from making operationally significant gains and limited areas where Russia achieved even tactical progress.

Ukrainian forces are currently resisting Russian attempts to advance toward Kupyansk — the first successful effort to halt a Russian attempt to seize a major city in recent years.

ISW continues to assess that timely and sufficient Western military aid, as well as arms sales to Ukraine combined with firm economic measures by the U.S. and other Western countries against Russia, could allow Ukraine to inflict even greater losses on Russian forces and thus undermine Putin’s “theory of victory,” analysts concluded.