What to expect from talks in Riyadh and the ‘Baltic scenario’ proposed for Ukraine — Klimkin

In an interview with Radio NV, Pavlo Klimkin, Ukraine’s foreign minister from 2014 to 2019, explained what this approach might look like and what the United States could achieve through these talks.

What exactly is this shuttle diplomacy? How do you understand the upcoming talks in Saudi Arabia, and what’s their goal? Officially, they’re supposed to discuss extending the grain deal and various aspects of ending the war. But it sounds like there’s another track here — maybe discussions about a ceasefire? Or am I mistaken?

It’s hard for me to imagine Americans acting as a shuttle. I’m not sure how they see this working, but if it works, that’s good.

I think it’s difficult to say whether this will be strictly a format where the Americans act as mediators. In this context, “mediator” is a better term than “shuttle.”

Will there be direct meetings? Will there be separate meetings — for example, us with the Americans, the Americans with the Russians, and perhaps some dedicated to specific issues in other formats?

The Americans believe these talks are crucial for identifying issues where progress is possible — and where things are genuinely difficult. They understand that all these recent attacks — politically and in the media — demonstrate that any partial ceasefire won’t hold.

In other words, a ceasefire can’t be half-hearted. That’s been clear from the start — to the Americans and others.

Now, they’re using the current situation — the nighttime strikes we’ve all seen and Russia’s attacks on Odesa, among others — to frame the issue this way: “If the attacks continue, and no one can control them, then it’s either a full ceasefire as soon as possible or nothing at all.” It’s a difficult logic for us to accept — it’s a challenge.

You can see what’s happening after the phone calls between [US President Donald] Trump and [Russian dictator Vladimir] Putin. Putin is trying to hammer in his agenda — one that’s critical to him but isn’t about a ceasefire. Instead, it’s about advancing Russia’s goals in this war.

And those goals are essentially to limit our sovereignty and restrict our ability to defend ourselves or cooperate with the West — whether in security matters or other areas.

That’s why the talks in Saudi Arabia will be exhausting and difficult — possibly very emotional as well. But from what I understand, the Americans are almost certain they can push their logic through. And without the Americans, that logic simply won’t work.

As things stand now, how do you understand the American approach? Because I must admit, I’m feeling a bit lost.

I understand the Americans’ logic quite clearly — and that doesn’t mean we can’t get lost in the details. As they say, sometimes you can’t see the forest for the trees — and in this case, there’s barely a third tree standing, so you’re right.

The Americans want, first and foremost, a ceasefire — one that’s only possible with them and only achievable through their efforts, and as soon as possible. Perhaps around Easter; whether earlier or later isn’t critical.

They want a victory — personally for Trump and for themselves. They want to show they can achieve this victory, and that it’s only possible with their involvement. That’s how they see this potential achievement.

Second, they want to launch a separate process — what I’d describe as normalizing relations with Russia — independent of the Ukraine discussions. And that involves a lot of issues. This isn’t about hockey, though I’m not sure how serious they are about that, or who’s interested in playing. But these are serious matters tied to global and regional security, energy market distribution, and other key issues.

It’s crucial that they can’t normalize those relations without making progress on Ukraine’s agenda as well — the way we understand it. Right now, it’s critical for us that these issues aren’t separated by the Americans.

The Americans also know that if they fail to make any progress regarding Ukraine, they’ll immediately be accused of being weak — of failing to advance even a compromise agenda.

And third, the American logic is very simple: They want to say, “Yes, we’ve reached this agreement — or, better said, this deal. After that, it’s up to the Europeans to handle Ukraine’s financing and other issues. We’ll hold onto certain assets, prevent them from falling into Chinese hands or anyone else’s. That’s our interest. But after that, the Ukraine issue is for the Europeans to manage.”

That, in simple terms, is where the Americans stand today — if I break it down to the basics.

You mentioned that part of the US logic is to push for an immediate ceasefire. After Trump and Putin’s phone call, it was officially stated that both sides agreed to stop attacks on energy infrastructure. Before that, Ukraine and the US had reportedly agreed in Saudi Arabia to pursue a full ceasefire, even though Ukraine initially proposed only a partial ceasefire. The US pushed for a complete ceasefire instead. But after Trump’s talks with Putin, statements from both sides suggested a partial ceasefire might be possible. Many concluded that Putin had outmaneuvered Trump during those negotiations. Do you agree with that assessment?

No. Both Trump and his team are experienced negotiators. They may not know much about us, about Ukraine — their understanding of Ukraine is quite general. Their view of the war and its causes, with constant references to NATO as the fundamental reason, reflects that.

I believe their understanding of Russia is also somewhat simplified. But that doesn’t mean they should be underestimated as negotiators. They know how to handle talks. They have the necessary experience. And Trump is someone who’s been negotiating non-stop for over 50 years. So, to put it bluntly, Putin won’t simply “trick” them — excuse my wording.

What is Putin’s strategy in this situation?

Putin knows full well that he won’t be able to force all his demands through. So, he’s playing with time and content. He’s stalling, trying to gradually insert more of his own demands — particularly those aimed at limiting Ukraine’s sovereignty — into the agenda. His goal is to make those demands seem unavoidable parts of the broader negotiation process so that no one can later refuse them.

In other words, he wants the ceasefire to come with conditions. He wants those conditions — and the need to address them — to become tied to the ceasefire itself.

Secondly, Putin will gradually and carefully introduce his demands. He understands that if he reveals all his objectives at once, everyone will reject them outright. Instead, he’ll start by saying things like, “Let’s talk about this,” or “Let’s create a list of critical issues,” or “What should we do here? What about there?”

He’ll tell the Americans, “If you want a faster ceasefire, let’s include these issues as essential points — let’s document them, let’s sign them.”

These kinds of traps will be set every 10 minutes at the talks — maybe every 20 minutes; I can’t say for sure.

Ukraine’s ambassador to the US, Oksana Markarova, announced that a bipartisan resolution has been introduced in Congress affirming US recognition of Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized 1991 borders. Given recent comments from US officials suggesting Ukraine may have to make territorial concessions, and Keith Kellogg openly stating that occupied Ukrainian territories could end up with a status similar to that of the Baltic states under Soviet occupation — what does this resolution signify? Should it be seen as symbolic, or does it carry real weight?

This resolution is important, and it’s something worth pushing forward. I was involved in shaping some of the key concepts behind it, along with a few close associates.

Will it succeed 100%? Probably not. We have to be honest about that.

How is this resolution in Congress supposed to work? Are you expecting a vote in Congress?

The resolution is important because it signals that Congress rejects any recognition — legal or political — of the occupied territories.

You can see what Putin is doing now. He’s tightening control over occupied territories. Just a few days ago, he introduced a new measure: if you don’t have Russian documents, you are essentially considered a non-person in those areas. This is a deliberate purge ahead of the negotiations.

Putin’s goal is to send a message: “There will be no talks about returning any territories. You’ll get nothing back, and I owe you nothing.” That’s his political signal.

This resolution is crucial because it asserts that legally and politically, the United States will recognize none of this.

We’ve talked about the so-called Baltic model — and this approach may emerge as a compromise solution.

What does that mean in practical terms?

Unfortunately, under this model, Putin gains some control over the occupied territories — not legally or politically, but in practical terms. These territories would function as if they were part of Russia’s political, legal, economic, and social space.

Historically, people in Tallinn, Vilnius, and Riga weren’t cut off from the outside world. There were cultural, economic, and other exchanges despite Soviet occupation.

Putin understands that achieving formal legal recognition for his control won’t succeed — though he’ll keep pushing for it and bargaining to the end. Instead, he’s working to legitimize his control — not in the legal sense, but through de facto control. At some point, he’ll present this as a fait accompli, claiming: “Look, this is a fact; it’s reality.”

Once he’s established that reality, he’ll push to normalize the situation — saying, “Let’s just accept things as they are.” Eventually, he’ll attempt to secure some form of legal or political recognition.

That’s the real cost of this situation — Putin’s efforts to legitimize these occupied territories within Russia’s sphere.

One of the most critical issues in this context is the status of those occupied territories. Ensuring they are not formally recognized is vital for our security. It’s not about security guarantees — since any Russian presence on our soil undermines that — but about deterring further Russian aggression.

This is what the fiercest debates will focus on. And from what I understand, the Americans believe they are the only ones who can manage this situation.

That’s why the so-called Baltic scenario is being considered — particularly by the Americans — as one possible outcome.

I’ll add that Putin recently stated that by Sept. 10, all Ukrainian citizens in Russian-controlled areas — which he falsely refers to as part of Russia — must obtain legal status to remain there. In simple terms, they must get Russian passports or face deportation. Do you see this as part of his strategy to cement political, economic, and social control over these territories?

Exactly. This is Putin’s political message: “I won’t negotiate territory.”

And second, anyone who wants to remain in those areas must effectively become Russian — if not in spirit, then legally, by obtaining Russian documents and aligning themselves with Russia’s legal framework.

Putin’s goal is to occupy not only the land but also the people living there. That’s a crucial point to understand about what he’s doing now.

Let’s talk more about this Baltic model. Keith Kellogg suggested that the US stance on Ukraine’s occupied territories may resemble the Western position on the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states. If Moscow and Washington agree to this scenario — and who knows if Kyiv will have a say — what does that mean? Could we eventually see flights from Donetsk to Washington? Would tourists visit, business ties resume, and yet the West would still technically recognize these territories as Ukrainian?

Exactly. Under such a model, an American could visit occupied Crimea for vacation, start a business there, buy a hotel, or perform at an event.

In other words, normal interactions would occur — but legally, those territories wouldn’t be recognized as Russian. At the same time, no one would prevent communication with the Russian occupation authorities, and engaging in business or cultural events in these areas wouldn’t face penalties — not in the West or elsewhere.

So, while Western nations would still formally consider these territories part of Ukraine, there would be no legal or administrative consequences for those engaging with them.

Honestly, that sounds deeply troubling.

It’s more than just lifting sanctions on the occupied territories — it’s effectively their legitimization. It’s not legal recognition, but I would call it “legalization” — similar to how certain US-Russian contacts have been normalized.

This is a complex situation, and I believe Putin will push hard for this logic to prevail.

The fact that Kellogg brought this up — which I hadn’t heard before — says a lot. I’ve been warning about this as a possible direction for US policy for months now.

What can Europe do in this situation? If the US adopts this model, won’t Europe be forced to either follow or reject it?

The question is — what happens if Europe says “yes” or “no”? After all, Europe isn’t directly involved in these “shuttle diplomacy” talks in Saudi Arabia.

Sure, European leaders can be called — like [French President Emmanuel] Macron, or [UK Prime Minister Keir] Starmer, or [Friedrich] Merz, who may be Germany’s next chancellor.

But the real issue is what presence Europe will have in Ukraine. Would that require a UN Security Council resolution? If so, Russia and China would dictate the terms of such a deployment.

Or will Europe assert: “Perhaps there’s some UN involvement, but we will also have our own independent presence. We don’t need Russia’s permission to be in Ukraine, and our cooperation with Ukraine will continue.”

That’s crucial because Putin wants to block any security cooperation with the West. He’s pushing for zero arms supplies, zero training, zero logistics support — basically, for Ukraine to fend for itself.

Europe must make it clear — no matter what happens in these talks in Saudi Arabia or anywhere else — that security cooperation with Ukraine will continue as they see fit.

European leaders must assert that Ukraine’s security is part of Europe’s security. Ukraine is a key element in protecting Europe from potential threats from both the east and the south.

No matter what happens, Europe must retain the right to continue security cooperation with Ukraine on its own terms.

The US, in its talks with Russia, may decide what it will or won’t supply, and what actions it will or won’t take. They won’t completely cut support, but some limitations are a real possibility.