Vladimir Putin is still the president of Russia, but he is no longer the undisputed leader of the group that seized power in the country. As his mistakes lead to a decline in his approval ratings, Putinism as a modern cult of personality will also decline. Therefore, the most far-sighted actors in the Kremlin have already begun to prepare the ground for the emergence of a new all-Russian ideology that should replace Putinism - the ideology of the "state-civilization."
Putinism, as the current Russian version of the cult of personality ("if there is Putin, there is Russia"), is disappearing from the political arena. On the one hand, it no longer meets public expectations. The “macho” image of the Russian president has seriously faded in the eyes of the public against the backdrop of last year's failures. While the collapse of the attempt to capture Kyiv in three days or the retreat from Kherson could still be somehow covered up by Bakhmut, the behavior during, and especially after, the Wagner PMC mutiny is no longer workable.
Putin's helplessness, if not cowardice, has opened the floodgates to criticism of his regime, even among the most stubborn imperialists. The recent crackdown on Igor Girkin-Strelkov and other "angry patriots" has only underscored Putin's sensitivity to attacks from ideological war supporters. Although there have been no relevant opinion polls in Russia for a long time, the drop in the presidential rating seems inevitable: due to failures in the war in some strata, mobilization in others, repression in others, and progressive impoverishment in others. And do not think the public support level is unimportant for Putin's tyranny. Yes, there is no hope for a popular uprising there, but prevalent sabotage can be no less destructive for the regime. The late USSR is the most striking example.
On the other hand, even if all these dangers do not materialize and Putin retains power for the rest of his life, the problem of this end will not disappear. Even if the Kremlin's medicine provides him Botox or baths of virgins' blood, Putin will die someday. This is the most serious challenge for the top of the ruling regime in all the 20 or 30 years of its existence: how to explain to the rest of the elites and the people why it should remain in power.
Putin's helplessness, if not cowardice, has opened the floodgates to criticism of his regime
It doesn't matter who replaces Putin: [Russian PM Mikhail] Mishustin, [Security Council Secretary Nikolai] Patrushev, or even Prigozhin; the charisma of the previous leader will not automatically transfer to the new one. Therefore, the heir apparent will have to prove his right to rule with all available tools-social populism, power games, forceful pressure, and, ultimately, ideology.
That is why it is so important to take a closer look at the course "Fundamentals of Russian Statehood," which has been taught in all specialties of all Russian universities since September 1. It reflects the essence of the ideology that is designed to preserve the current Russian regime forever.
The Foundations of Russian Statehood
What is the primary goal of the introduction of the ORD course? It is to make students aware of "the peculiarities of the historical path of the Russian state, the originality of its political organization," and to combine their "individual dignity and success" with "social progress and political stability of their homeland." Read: Russia is going its own way, and if you want to get ahead, don't rock the boat.
Just as "scientific communism" justified "the historical mission of the working class," the ORD course justifies "the continuous nature of national history and the multinational, civilizational vector of its development" and pride in belonging to "Russian civilization." Read: Russia hasn't changed for a thousand years; the government has always dominated its people, and they are proud of it.
The first section, "What is Russia" should reveal the country through the following key characteristics: "unprecedented territorial extent," "exceptional natural wealth," "federal and ethnic diversity," developed entrepreneurship (Yandex, Kaspersky, Gazprom, Lukoil, Russian Railways, Aeroflot, Almaz-Antey); "outstanding buildings" (Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, Lakhta Center, "Stalinist skyscrapers," the metro). This section presents Russia exclusively from a positive perspective. While modern problems and future challenges will be discussed further in the ORD course, coverage of Russia's historical failures and the activities of Russian villains is not foreseen in principle. Read: Russia is only good; it has nothing to be ashamed of.
The second chapter, "The Russian State-Civilization", provides a list of features that distinguish a state-civilization: "outwardness, naturalness of emergence and development, value stability, political influence, long history, the possibility of dynamic adaptation to different conditions of international relations and world politics," and "each of these elements can and should be given a relevant political sound." Read: civilization = empire = Russia.
The objectives of the section are: "to present national history as a gradual overcoming of fragmentation (not only feudal but also, more broadly, tribal) and the transition to an imperial-civilizational project, which later turned into a federal-civilizational project." Read: the history of Russia is a history of land acquisition and strengthening of the vertical.
The third chapter entitled "Russian Worldview and Values of Russian Civilization" states that students are to discuss the contemporary Russian worldview "presented through the prism of reliable sociological measurements and political research." Read: 146% of Russians support Putin. Under the current circumstances, it is unlikely that it will even be possible to correctly point out Russia's problems, let alone discuss them. The current Kremlin policy of silencing and relativizing ("not everything is so clear") state crimes, as well as criminal punishment for "rehabilitating Nazism" and "discrediting the army," makes it impossible to have a free exchange of views.
Chapter Four, "The Political System of Russia," describes the state system with "a correct historical overview and presentation of the complex nature of Russian political life." Students will be introduced to "such important aspects of the Russian Federation as the federal and republican nature of its organization, democratic principles and the principle of the 'welfare state.'" It also emphasizes "the incompatibility of 'nationalist' concepts with the existing architecture of the Russian state." Read: Russia is the freest and fairest country in the world. There is a demand to characterize the three Russian presidents in a political rather than personalized way while maintaining a "human" line - "this will allow students to form a less sacralized view of the presidential institution." Read: Putin is the leader, but there is one thing.
Chapter Five, "Future Challenges and Country Development," summarizes and sets the framework for the future. It provides a list of global problems relevant to Russia: natural (climate change, water, and food shortages), artificial (AI, digital inequality), and political (populism, failure of multiculturalism). The author emphasizes Russia's exceptional role in overcoming each of them. Most importantly, "Russia's civilizational development has once again put it in a potentially much more advantageous and promising position with respect to these negative trends" than the rest of the world. Read: Russia is the best of all; all else can die - it will remain.
It also contains a description of the values allegedly "adopted by the state and people of Russia. And these values best characterize the ideology of the ORD: "stability as a key result of the previous decades of consolidation of the Russian political system (read: the regime is eternal); mission as a modern stage of protection of national interests and Russian civilization (read: Russia is a medieval empire with expansionism and messianism); responsibility as a necessary future stage of improvement of civic identity and political life in the country (read: people must be obedient to the authorities); justice as the most important strategic task and value" (read: we will lie all the time.
What does it all mean?
The ORD represents a new step in the development of Russia's ideology of great power per the requirements of the times, but both "legs" rely on the previous platforms - the imperial and Soviet ones.
The imperial triad of "Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality" is two-thirds of the new ideology. Under the guise of conservatism, nationality is contained in the principles of harmony and cooperation (read: community/unity), love and responsibility (read: traditional values), creation and development. Autocracy is overtly reflected in the value of stability (read: regime stability) and the principle of sovereignty (read: unpunished imperialism). Only Orthodoxy occupies its place in Russia, not being formally included in the new ideology (as is Islam).
The value of justice (read: lies about justice, because Russia is one of the least fair countries in the world in terms of wealth and power distribution) and the principle of unity of diversity (read: lies about diversity against the background of total Russification of the country) were transferred from communism to the new ideology.
Instead, the value of the mission has been universal to any Russian ideology since the 16th century. Although not included in any list, patriotism is declared the goal of the entire course.
The combination of characteristics, principles, and values allows us to draw a picture of the ideal Russia as seen by its leaders:
1. Since Russia is a separate state-civilization, it has the right to demand an appropriate place among other world civilizations. Russia's global mission is not only to protect its interests, but also global justice (the right to develop according to non-Western standards, traditional values, etc.).
2. Russia is organized on the basis of its own historically grounded versions of democracy and federalism, but with the primacy of the presidency and without "nationalist concepts." The Russian state system and political regime are traditional and optimal for the country. Speaking out against the government means speaking out against Russia.
3. Russians' worldview is based on pride in their country, based on positive examples from the past and present. Discussions of "cultural" or "historical traumas" should be based on Russian sociology data. Recognition of criminal or even shameful pages of the past is not envisaged at all.
If we reduce each point to a single word, the well-known triad of almost any Russian ideology will be revealed: imperialism – authoritarianism – chauvinism. It is in the direction of strengthening each of these elements that the Russian authorities will be directed in the near future. This means, in particular, that there is no hope for ending the war against Ukraine under this government.
Finally, introducing a single state ideology in universities marks the Russian regime's transition from personal authoritarianism to collective totalitarianism. Ideologically grounded Soviet-style totalitarianism is the only way for the current Russian elite to retain power after Putin's death/retirement/removal.