Three layers of the Putin’s logic of death

Opinion

1 March 2024, 12:45 PM

Ihar Tyshkevich

Foreign policy expert at the Ukrainian Institute of the Future

Putin is changing the concept of government from an autocratic president to an "autocrat." Seemingly minor but fundamental differences can be described by three groups of theses.

Recently, rumors began to spread about the possible death of Igor Strelkov/Girkin. There is no confirmation. But, in my opinion, it is too early for the relatives and friends of this terrorist to relax. Here's why:

Putin is changing the concept of government from an autocratic president to an "autocrat." Seemingly minor but fundamental differences can be described by three groups of theses.

1. Relations with elites. The autocratic president in Russia played the role of an arbitrator-moderator in the war between clans. An arbitrator can listen to the parties' arguments and find some kind of compromise in disputes between the Kremlin Towers. The moderator is the one who stimulates the war so that no clan gets a full set of resources sufficient to seize and maintain power. The Kremlin's "towers" can fight to strengthen their positions, but in any case, they can turn to a mediator to end the conflict, taking into account their interests. The format of the autocrat is different. The "Kremlin Towers" no longer turn to an intermediary, but ask for a favor/protection from someone above the clash. There may be no compromise here - instead, there will be the "will of the king."

2. The requirement of elite loyalty. This goes both for whole groups and their individual representatives. After all, an autocrat can execute and pardon. The latter is possible only if there is loyalty, controllability, and gratitude. A typical example of mercy could be seen in the case of Yavlinsky. The oppositionist asked, "whether it was possible to run for election and criticize the tsar." He received a "no" answer and said, "Thank you."

Violating the balance of loyalty — controllability — gratitude can lead to death. Let's take Prigozhin. He was loyal to Putin to the end (let me remind you that the march on Moscow was not against Putin), but he became unmanageable and died.

Navalny was already under control (relatively) but not loyal. He died.

The tsar has already tried on the crown and is waiting for the coronation

Blogger "Murz" (one of the most talented Russian propagandists and a successful "volunteer" for the other side). Loyal to Putin, but not controlled (his channel survived the "third war for Telegram" when the Kremlin was putting "military commanders" under control) and only relatively controlled. He died.

The same goes for those whom the tsar considers "traitors." That is, people who publicly demonstrate their disloyalty and set an example for others. The case of the Russian pilot killed in Spain fits in quite logically.

3. Citizens or subjects — fear or love. Concerning the population, the scheme has also changed. Previously, Putin wanted to be loved first and feared second. The series of deaths changes the schema. Russian citizens will, of course, claim that each of the victims "died alone" or "it was an accident." But alone with themselves, while drinking vodka in the kitchen, they will whisper "murdered." And be afraid. Afraid of being disloyal. Simply put, for Putin, fear, not love, comes first in communication with the population. However, paradoxically, in Russia, fear creates love. Let's recall the Russian sayings, "If you hit, you love," and "If you're afraid, you respect," and so on.

In addition, the autocrat fears the future. After all, the tsar usually goes only to the grave. The reason can be either a palace coup (and here, the execution of disloyal people from the inner circle is a good demonstration of "strength") or a "Russian revolt."

But a strong personality is an essential symbol for a "Russian revolt" (not to mention a revolution). Nemtsov's death (remember, it was a long time ago) showed that "a dead symbol will not work." Logically, Prigozhin's death was next. After all, he is also a symbol — a symbol of "victory" against the backdrop of the army's failures. Then Navalny. Albeit without structures or influence (as demonstrated by his negligible performances even abroad, where Russian emigrants are certainly not in danger). But still a possible symbol.

Merz, an effective Russian volunteer and propagandist — committed suicide (?). But he was also a symbol. A symbol of the "military commanders" who did not fall to the Kremlin during the "third war for Telegram" at the end of 2023. By the way, the Russian pilot killed in Spain could also become a symbol. To choose the right side and get out of the cesspool called Russia. This is not a political symbol, but an example at the grassroots level. And he, too, is gone.

Finally, Strelkov. Another symbol. The so-called "Great Russian patriot." This is dangerous because Strelkov's audience (and support) are radicals with combat experience. Putin should be afraid of them.

Against this background, there were rumors about the death of the said terrorist. He may be alive. But he will have little choice: either Yavlinsky's case or a conditional noose.

Thus, the tsar has already tried on the crown and is waiting for the coronation. The Russian tsar is capable of any savagery since there was no tradition of "chivalry" in the Russian dynasty. More precisely, those who tried to demonstrate this ended up in trouble.

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