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Ukraine has funds to support troops only through August – MP Ivchenko

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25 July, 07:58 PM

Batkivshchyna lawmaker and parliamentary defense committee member Vadym Ivchenko discussed former Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov's alleged "blackmail" and his reforms on Radio NV on July 25.

— Vadym, in your view, has the political crisis been resolved? On the one hand, the president took a step back, or perhaps a step toward those who had demanded Oleksandr Syrskyi's dismissal. On the other hand, he is refusing — and that is entirely within his rights — to appoint Mykhailo Fedorov as defense minister. I see that active participants in the protests have announced that, starting today, they will begin an indefinite protest and intend, so to speak, to keep pressuring the president. In your view, have we overcome this political crisis, or is it only beginning?

— First, I support effective government, regardless of who is in power. Effectiveness begins with having support. As I have said, every minister should be sitting on a chair with four legs: support from parliament, support from the president, their own authority and reputation, and support from the sector they oversee.

In our case, no president could tolerate people being brought into the streets against him while his own ministers or members of his team effectively oppose him as the head of that team.

Within a team, there should always be a quiet negotiating process to demonstrate that you can be effective, that you can communicate with everyone, that you have support and that your bills will pass. There is every opportunity to resolve these issues within the team.

So, if we are talking about effectiveness, I think there has been a split within Zelenskyy's team. The question now is how much the president can trust Fedorov as a member of that team.

After Mykhailo Fedorov's latest statements that he wants to return only to the Defense Ministry, this is already beginning to look like blackmail and pressure. That is how I see it. And I do not think that will help his chances of being renominated to the Verkhovna Rada for another appointment as defense minister.

— I want to talk now about the idea of a contract-based military. People can have different views on it. I know that Fedorov's contracts were not received particularly enthusiastically in the military and that there was no rush to sign them. Still, some service members did sign them. I believe the figure mentioned was about 2,000. That is very few, but they exist. Do you think, or perhaps know, whether Fedorov's pilot contract program will continue? And even if we take those 2,000 people who signed the contracts, they may have done so hoping that after two years, or after six months depending on the position, they would receive a deferment. They were promised that. At the same time, the Verkhovna Rada has passed no legislation to provide for it. Will you complete this contract initiative?

— First point: the contracts were launched by Deputy Defense Minister Yevhen Moisiuk when Denys Shmyhal was defense minister. He was the first to gather faction leaders and committee chairs, among others, and all of this was proposed by Shmyhal's deputy minister.

— Vadym, but people began signing them under Mykhailo Fedorov.

— No. Second, the Verkhovna Rada then adopted a budget in which we essentially allocated funding to make it possible to increase service members' pay. And third, most importantly, Fedorov was supposed to submit legislation to the Verkhovna Rada.

You said the Verkhovna Rada did not adopt anything. No. The defense minister has to submit a bill to parliament and show how these contracts can actually be put on a legal footing through the Verkhovna Rada.

What was not done? What happened as a result? Our service members are receiving neither improved social benefits nor higher salaries. They are only receiving additional payments for certain aspects of military service. But that will not be reflected either in their social status or in higher base pay. And that is a problem. We talked about it.

Look, the entire opposition had been saying this since April, when the program was introduced: Please submit the bills. We need to put this into law so service members clearly receive higher salaries and higher tax contributions are made. No taxes are being paid on the payments currently made under these contracts. None.

What does that mean? If there are no tax contributions, there is no corresponding increase in pension credit or future pension benefits. Salaries are recorded only on the basis of 20,000 hryvnias.

So there are many issues and many problems. The pilot project was launched, and the Cabinet essentially adopted decisions on additional payments and certain other measures.

But again, without legislative changes, it is difficult to regard this, first, as an increase in military salaries and, second, as the type of contracts the Armed Forces of Ukraine actually need.

— But in any case, as I understand it, service members' pay was increased through additional payments, with 30,000 hryvnias as the minimum. You are not going to reverse that now and reduce those payments. Obviously, the task now is to formalize them in law. Are you now expecting the relevant bills from acting Defense Minister Yevhen Khmara?

— Vlasta, there is another problem that you are not mentioning. Did you know there is only enough money to fund service members through the end of August?

— Then where did Fedorov get the money when he launched this pilot project?

— Let me explain where Fedorov got the money. First, Fedorov gave weapons manufacturers 70% advance payments and spent the remaining 30% that had been sitting in the Treasury to fulfill contracts with all weapons manufacturers.

What did he do next? He took a European loan, and the first tranche of that loan was used to pay the remaining 30% to companies that had received contracts in January, February and so on.

In other words, when a contract is signed, the state assumes an obligation and sets aside 100% of the financing in the Treasury, and no one touches that money.

But there was a delay. Companies completed contracts in early June and could not receive payment. Why? Because they were waiting for the budget to be amended. We amended it in mid-June, then government resolutions had to be adopted, then contracts had to be amended. Each manufacturer had to have language added specifying that the remaining 30% could be paid from the European loan rather than from the state budget. Only after that did payments begin.

So you should understand what happened: Money intended for manufacturers was taken and spent on social payments. Then, when the European loan arrived and part of it was supposed to go toward new contracts, it was instead used to cover old contracts signed as far back as Jan. 14.

I could tell you many things, a great many things. But we need to distinguish between what was actually accomplished, what was launched only as a project and why the necessary legislation was not submitted to the Verkhovna Rada to formalize the corresponding steps and reforms.

— I have no doubt you could say a great deal. But based on what you have said, I would conclude that perhaps Fedorov had some kind of vision: take money from one place, obtain more at the end of the year from somewhere else, cover one gap with another and ultimately deliver what he had promised.

I do not know, and I do not want to act as his advocate, but he was given only six months to work. Naturally, he had only begun rolling out some initiatives. He left behind many questions, but he also accomplished a lot.

Now we are sitting here wondering what comes next. Given all that, perhaps it would still make sense to bring him back and let him finish what he started. Then the responsibility would be his.

— Vlasta, you are now talking about national security. What responsibility are we talking about if there is no money?

My question is this: If we fail to find the money, who will be responsible? Who? I understand that Fedorov would bear political responsibility. But tell me, how is the entire country supposed to look service members and their families in the eye when there is simply no money?

How could money allocated for support and salaries be spent to make advance payments on new contracts or finance other projects when you do not have enough money? You cannot experiment with funds that have already been approved in the budget. You need to understand that.

You say "perhaps," but what if it does not work? Even if there is only a 1% chance something fails, families could be left without salaries and soldiers without payments. How is that acceptable?

At this point, we do not clearly understand where the money will come from. And believe me, it is not one minister who secures funding. The entire government does — the president, the prime minister and the minister — because the prime minister is carrying out other reforms as well.

We need to understand clearly what we can do, where the money can be found and, most importantly, when it will arrive so that we do not end up with soldiers going without salaries in certain months.

So when we raise issues of national security, let us talk about specific facts and specific things. I think a lot has been exaggerated when it comes to the reforms that were carried out.

Yes, new approaches to weapons procurement were introduced. But I have a question: How many companies in Ukraine manufacture weapons? Why was all the money given only to the top 10? The top 10 received 80% of the funding. What about the other companies? Do they not exist? Should we not be creating competition? Why were there no tenders?

— As I understand it, Mykhailo Fedorov built the following weapons procurement system: The military itself determined what worked and what did not. The process was digitized as much as possible, and service members themselves ordered the weapons they needed based on their effectiveness rather than being given a predetermined list.

That is what service members themselves say. And this is exactly what Fedorov has been praised for — for breaking up the old schemes and the dirty, opaque tender system that had existed.

— Look, we have procurement through DOT-Chain, where the military orders what it needs directly. DOT-Chain was already operating under Shmyhal. DOT-Chain was developed by Arsen Zhumadilov, head of the Defense Procurement Agency, and he proposed all of this. It was operating before January this year.

And yes, the military did take what it needed. No one disputes that this system works.

But then there is a second issue: centralized procurement. Centralized procurement was based on certain e-points. A company might rank seventh by e-points, for example. It may show good results in the Delta system. Then they look at something else and say the company is simply young and has been producing its product for only four months. Then they apply other coefficients, and suddenly the company is ranked 22nd and does not make the list.

But those rankings are subjective. Why have you decided that this product cannot make the top 10 if it ranks in the top 10 by e-points and in Delta based on successful strikes? There are many different factors, and they are subjective.

If you say the process was digitized, then I have another question: How can a new product be purchased through centralized procurement under this e-points system? And who decides that a product should be purchased?

We can discuss many things, but I repeatedly said at the committee that allocating 80% of the funding to only 10 companies was wrong.

We have more than 50 companies producing fiber-optic systems. Why do only the top 10 receive all the contracts while the other companies receive nothing? Are they not manufacturers? Do they not have production capacity?

The market has simply been monopolized by the large top 10, while others in the same category are not given an opportunity to develop. That is a fact, and it is true.

— That is your assertion, and you are a member of the parliamentary defense committee. Perhaps you have information that I do not. Of course, it would be useful to have a discussion with a group of lawmakers from the defense committee who could provide a broader picture. But all right, let us move on.

— I agree with your suggestion that we hold a joint discussion. But believe me, all lawmakers who sit on the defense committee understand the situation very clearly. And believe me, right now no one would dispute what I am saying.

— Moving on. The president has appointed Yevhen Khmara as acting defense minister. In your view, is he effectively the permanent minister now? Or is this also very, very temporary, until Aug. 18? When you return to the parliamentary chamber, will you perhaps vote on an appointment? Or, more precisely, will you wait for the president to nominate someone else?

— Look, I voted for Fedorov as minister. Second, I did not vote to dismiss Fedorov. And third, when the president submits a nominee for defense minister, the Batkivshchyna faction and I personally will make our decision.

I support fairness. If you ask me whether Mykhailo was more effective than another defense minister, I would say yes, he was more effective.

But if you start attaching all these labels to him regarding reforms and so on, I can debunk many of them because, excuse me, cutting Crimea off through deep strikes is not within the Defense Ministry's area of responsibility at all.

And the contract-based military initiative began before Mykhailo. The fact that the necessary laws do not exist is also a fact.

I value fairness and facts. So, logically, of course, it would make sense for Mykhailo to continue and demonstrate over the next six months something that could then be assessed clearly: whether he succeeded or failed. That would be fair.

But on the other hand, we need an effective defense minister. An effective defense minister can sit only on a chair with four legs. Two of those legs are support from parliament and support from the president.

If the president nominates Mykhailo and I see that there are no behind-the-scenes games and that he has the president's support, then he will also have support in parliament.

If the president does not nominate Mykhailo, then another defense minister will receive the support of both the president and parliament.

And believe me, whoever the president nominates will certainly be better for the country because that is about effective management of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

I have basically given you all the points that, from the heart, I believe are fair.

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