The other day, I talked to the guys from Avdiivka, and I think it is much more likely that we will be forced to withdraw from there than that we will hold the city. I would even venture to guess that we will most likely have to make the decision to withdraw from Avdiivka before the New Year.
In all other areas, the Russians have made very little progress.
Strangely enough, for some reason, it has completely disappeared from the media field. However, in the area of Verbove and Robotyne, there is still a "seesaw" – either they are advancing, or we are still continuing some offensive actions. To summarize, our offensive actions and theirs are practically offset there.
Let me remind you of our bridgehead in the Left Bank Kherson region. There, we are, by and large, still on the offensive. Of course, the farther away from the Dnipro bank, the harder it is to advance, the harder it is to occupy something new, especially to gain a foothold. Their attempt to go on the offensive there has so far resulted in the withdrawal of one Russian airborne division. We'll see what happens next. Let's say it is so critical for them to take this foothold that after Avdiivka, they will concentrate all the forces they have left there.
This is the general picture on the front. Of course, this picture is strongly influenced by two things.
First, we ran out of steam during a long offensive campaign. Unfortunately, this is inevitable if a mobilization campaign does not accompany an offensive campaign. That is, when you have assembled even a very decent-sized army for the spring and summer, and set quite ambitious tasks for this army, and this army has largely fulfilled these tasks, despite everything. Remember that our military has done things over the summer that even General Ben Hodges, the former commander of the US forces in Europe, considered impossible. He directly said that his army would not have been able to cope with the resources we had.
We have again started accounting for each shell
But, one way or another, an advancing army suffers losses, gets tired, and is exhausted. If the mobilization campaign is not going on all this time, which should at least compensate for all these losses (by losses, I mean not only the killed and wounded, but also compensation for those units that need to be sent on rotation to rest), the army gets tired and loses its offensive potential. And if the replacement is not ready, they cannot provide that potential. This is a crucial problem.
Please note that the Russians were able to launch a really serious offensive only in this last month. So in this last month, to the problems with personnel, a second problem has been added, which is not our fault (but it doesn't make it any easier for us) – the problem with shells. It appeared on the horizon as soon as the war in Gaza began. After all, there were two consumers for American shells now, not just one. It became critical when the swings in the US Congress began. The Republicans acted similarly to Hamas, which takes women and children hostage and then begins to set political conditions. The Republicans took us hostage to set conditions for Biden. From that moment on, it became clear that it was not known when the financial package for 2024 would be voted on. Therefore, we need to stretch the remaining balances in the 2023 financing.
The latest aid packages have become exclusively ammunition, but they are getting smaller with each tranche. That is, they are trying to stretch what is left for longer. And as a result, unfortunately, we are back to the mode of saving ammunition at the front. This was not the case, for example, in August-September, when we finally allowed ourselves to shoot as much as we needed. But still, we never got fat, as they say. We never had as much ammunition as our enemies. But, at least, given the difference in the quality of our weapons and the training of our gunners, we received enough ammunition. Now, again, we are not. Now, we are getting very little, and that's why we have again started accounting for each shell, and the economic regime itself has been reintroduced. Of course, the fact that the mode of saving shells at the very moment when the Russians have finally caught their breath and will try to counterattack is, to put it mildly, a bad combination.
October 1 marks the end of the US fiscal year and the beginning of a new one. That is, starting from October 1 – October, November, and now December is ending – we are living on the remnants of last year's funding. That's why, of course, everything was coming in normally in October, and, accordingly, since November, less and less.
With the Europeans, it's a different story. The issue there is not about funding. They contracted for 1 million shells long ago, but not even half of this million has arrived yet. They were paid long ago, but European factories cannot cope with this order. They simply do not have time to produce so many, because they have not done this for 30 years. They hope to reach half of the million they have already paid for around the New Year.