Pokrovsk fight: Russia applies improved infantry strategy

— From what you see, can you describe how the enemy is behaving in Pokrovsk and its districts? There are reports of enemy infiltration into the city and claims of control over some areas. Overall, how different is the enemy’s behavior there now?

— I would start with what the commander in chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi, said — and his words are confirmed: there is no full encirclement in Myrnohrad or Pokrovsk. Yes, sadly, fighting continues in both places. The enemy is present and is entering — in fairly large groups. We are actively destroying them, but over the past few days the weather has been very poor. At times you can’t see anything. Despite rain and fog, we try to find, detect and destroy them.

They are taking advantage of that. The enemy has become much smarter and more resourceful. I would even say he is no longer simply throwing away his manpower — his infantry “meat” — but is using it more skilfully.

If you remember 2022, 2023 and 2024, they used to recklessly throw large amounts of equipment and infantry at positions to seize a strongpoint, a height or a village. Now they operate much more cautiously.

Unfortunately, in Pokrovsk they are honing these new skills in battlefield tactics, and we are beginning to adapt. We used to see the enemy adapt to us; now, sadly, we must adapt to his tactics and find ways to counter them.

— What about the quality of training of these personnel? These are small groups that our troops inevitably encounter. Some say they are inexperienced recruits carrying only water and minimal protection. What do you see, specifically regarding their training?

— Based on information from prisoners we’ve taken, about 80% are ordinary, frontline infantry with almost no experience. They signed contracts, received a minimal payment and were sent straight to the front.

You mentioned that HUR units and other Ukrainian forces have been brought in. They face similar circumstances. Yes, those seasoned units are present in much smaller numbers, but when it comes to leading these infantry masses directly on the battlefield — in the city or on its approaches — there are units that know how to fight, and we see them fighting competently. They are few, but they exist.

So it’s not correct to say the enemy is entirely composed of untrained line units. There are fewer of the skilled units, but unfortunately they are there.

— It has also become normal that the line of contact is blurred by enemy infiltration. You no longer have a clear front where you know roughly the distance to the enemy and where your rear begins. That has changed, and it’s hard to grasp how difficult that is. When enemy forces get into the rear, I don’t fully understand the tasks they’re assigned. Sometimes they stumble upon one of our defenders and engage; other times they seem to lie low, gather strength and only then carry out missions. When they get into the rear, do they wait for orders? What is their function?

— Previously they acted differently; now they are refining their combat tactics. Imagine you’re a soldier who needs to move to a known position along a route you’ve used before. You move cautiously — watching your step for mines, for an ambush in the undergrowth. You listen for FPV drone sounds or check detectors if you have them.

Now they might lie in wait somewhere along your route, open fire on some group — not necessarily yours — and suddenly a logistical route you planned to use becomes dangerous. They may no longer be present at that point by the time you arrive, but then you must assemble a clearing group, sweep the route and search. That takes time.

You might have been able to reach a position in a day or two and carry out your task — reconnaissance, a strike, occupying a defensive or assault position — but you lose that time while you clear and check. During that delay, they bring in new units to reinforce pressure on our sector.

— I’ve seen several comments from journalists who talk to fighters in that sector saying it’s often mortar crews or drone operators, not just infantry, who engage in close combat after enemy infiltrations. Has your unit had such contact because of enemy penetration?

— Unfortunately, yes. And the only real solution is to have enough fighters. As you know — and I don’t think this is a secret — we lack regular infantry units. There simply aren’t enough. Even a mortar crew or a drone team can operate fully only when it’s entirely focused on its task.

When you spend 50 percent of your time or more just monitoring your area of responsibility — not flying a drone, but personally setting markers, tripwires, watching even local movements — that becomes a huge problem in Pokrovsk. Sadly, these are no longer isolated but increasingly common cases where we end up fighting. Those engaged include drone operators, infantry, mortar crews and artillery teams.

— You mentioned captured fighters and what they report about their missions. Is there anything else you can share about what the Russians say when they are captured?

— I could tell you more, but unfortunately I don’t have the authority to do so.

— Sonik, can you describe the weapons the enemy is using in the city? Apart from infantry infiltration, what are they employing in Pokrovsk now?

— If you compare the last month with the previous six months, the use of guided aerial bombs on our sector has probably increased 800 to 900 times. There are very many of them now and they’re more heavily modified.

They cause us serious problems. New systems such as “Molniya” have been added — they use them a lot. And their top drone units, like Rubicon, are very active. They’ve likely got huge funding, and they make a big difference on the battlefield.

We used to be able to create a 20–30 kilometer kill zone and they had major logistics problems. Those elite units have learned from our experience, and we face that now — it’s very hard. With leaves falling and cover disappearing, concealment is getting worse. It will be terrible and difficult, but we will keep looking for solutions.

— When you operate, are you mostly engaging enemy personnel now, or do you still encounter equipment as well?

— There’s far less equipment. It seems they are holding back vehicles for offensive actions. The priority is infantry.

Our biggest need is to keep supplies flowing to our infantry, mortar crews and drone teams, because our logistics are in serious trouble. Not only have they destroyed many vehicles, but we also employ Ground Robotic Systems — which, if used correctly, are excellent for sustaining logistics. The enemy has learned to target and destroy those too. They’ve grown adept at anticipating them.

Recently, three of us were moving and a loitering kamikaze UAV was nearby. Its pilot ignored us — his primary task was to destroy the Ground Robotic Systems. That shows how much smarter they’ve become. In the past they would just throw troops at a position; now they target our logistics — Ground Robotic Systems, large bombers and support assets.

— Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad are almost adjacent on the map, so it makes sense to talk about them together. Do you feel a threat of encirclement?

— The threat of a blockade obviously exists. The infantry units stationed here — our brigade and neighboring units — are good at holding defenses and neutralizing the enemy. But urban combat is a different beast. It’s not like fighting in the cover of fields. You need trained men who understand how to operate in towns.

The units that have entered recently are more experienced and specialized — those that have cleared urban areas before. I hope that will help improve the situation. Right now everything is being done to prevent a collapse. Despite what Russian media paint, there has been no encirclement.

Does the risk exist? Yes. We don’t know all the enemy’s hidden cards. But we are doing everything to stop it.

— Some say losing Pokrovsk or Myrnohrad is only a matter of time. Do you agree?

— Military people tend to argue their positions: whether loss will happen and why. There are discussions about tactical withdrawals — pulling back from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, or falling back to a defensive line along the railway, or focusing on preparing positions to stop further advances. There are many options.

I believe we have a good chance to hold Pokrovsk and retake the small areas the enemy has entered — but we need resources. As a friend once said during the early years of the war: “War isn’t just hard or terrifying — it’s expensive. Whoever has more money wins.”

— What are your greatest needs?

— Our biggest needs have been the same for about two months: vehicles and Ground Robotic Systems. Recently we lost a new vehicle and a new loitering system because it didn’t reach the point where we were moving on foot and the enemy struck it. We appreciate any help — even one hryvnia helps. I know people are tired of war, but the guys here are tired too. We will be very grateful for any assistance.

— About the Ground Robotic Systems: increasing their numbers would be very helpful, yes?

— Absolutely. Ground Robotic Systems are a new trend in our forces. They are going through the same development stages we saw earlier with FPV drones. Losing a Mavic used to be a big deal — now the scale is larger.

— They followed it and risked their lives.

— Yes. They moved through minefields, 50, 100, 200 meters from enemy positions. Over time, brigade, corps and battalion commanders — even the commander in chief — came to treat it like any other bullet. It’s simply a weapon that can be lost at any second.

The Ground Robotic Systems are the same. The main thing is to use them correctly. They’re very important, but early on we made plenty of mistakes. Now we have clear, written rules: how the drone should travel, which route to take, what it should carry, what observation is required, how the pilot should behave, and how the person moving ahead of or behind the drone should act. We’ve minimized losses as much as possible.

They still occur, constantly. So yes, it’s a great tool, but it’s going through the phase where people understand it’s expendable.