Sixteen years a satellite: scrutinizing Hungary–Russia relations under Viktor Orban

Hungary under the government of Viktor Orban has pursued policies geared towards supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine, closer economic ties with Russia, and allowing Russian secret services free reign within Hungary. This stance has radicalized, resulting in a more general anti-Ukrainian campaign conducted by state and around-state media in Hungary, led by the PM himself. The result has been Hungary’s increased reliance on Russia on the international scene and in the economic sphere such that present day Hungary can be described as a Russian satellite.

Misaligned EU member

Virtually since the start of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Orban has pursued an avidly pro-Russian foreign policy, focusing on his attempting to block military and financial aid to Kyiv. Orban has visited Moscow to meet with Russia’s dictator Vladimir Putin twice since 2022: in July 2024 and in November 2025. Orban’s Foreign Minister, Peter Szijjárto, visited Russia on at least 15 occasions during the same period. Szijjárto repeatedly briefed Moscow about discussions at closed-door EU meetings, on one occasion even placing a call to his Russian counterpart during recess at a European Council meeting.

Although he initially condemned Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, Orban has since adopted a pro-Russian position. He has refused to provide any military or financial aid to the neighboring country. Crucially, Orban has consistently and repeatedly exploited every tool at his disposal to block EU aid to Kyiv.

In November 2025, Orban addressed a letter to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in which he opposed “sending any further financial assistance to Ukraine in any form”, instead promoting the 28-point “peace plan” drafted by U.S. and Russian negotiators, which would have amounted to a Ukrainian capitulation.

Most recently, Budapest has blocked a EUR90 billion ($104 billion) EU loan package for Ukraine and the 20th package of sanctions against Russia. Orban initially signed off on the principal Council resolution authorizing the program, only to do a U-turn and veto disbursement of funds months later.

Hungary’s consistent attempts to stall EU aid to Ukraine have been welcomed by Putin. On March 3, 2026, Putin telephoned Orban and “noted the principled position of the Hungarian leadership.”

Anti-Ukraine propaganda campaigns

But Orban’s alignment with Moscow extends into information policy, at times even going beyond the Kremlin’s imperialist proclamations. In September 2025, Orban said: “Ukraine is not an independent country. Ukraine is not a sovereign country.”

Orban’s political party FIDESZ, which he controls completely according to an informed business source based in Budapest, has built its election campaign in late 2025 and early 2026 largely on anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, together with his usual anti-Brussels message.

Apart from personal attacks on the opposition leader Petr Magyar (which have largely fallen flat, according to one European expert), FIDESZ’s campaign has often featured images of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, usually in a supplicant’s pose, asking for handouts from the European Commission.

In February 2026 Orban referred to Ukraine as an “enemy,” according to “index.hu,” a news outlet aligned with the Hungarian government. The sentiment is consistent with Orban’s moves towards radicalization and turning towards Russia as the principal guiding force in international relations, both political and economic.

Close economic ties

While most of Europe has moved away from energy dependence on Moscow, Hungary continues to receive over 80% of its oil and gas, and 100% of its nuclear fuel from Russia, contributing $5 billion annually to the Russian budget.

Orban’s government has continued to pursue a pro-Russian economic policy. FM Szijjártó visited Moscow on December 9, 2025, to co-chair the 16th session of the Russian-Hungarian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation. In this visit he was accompanied by a large Hungarian business delegation, with the aim of strengthening economic ties with Russia, particularly in energy. The negotiations included the construction of the Paks II Nuclear Power.

The Paks II expansion project in central Hungary is to be built by Russia’s Rosatom. Most of the cost of the project is supposed to be covered by a Russian state loan of EUR10 billion.

A major Russian financial institution, the International Investment Bank (IIB), was moved from Moscow to Budapest in 2019. Established in 1970 by the Warsaw Pact countries, it ostensibly resembles the EBRD but is also used to provide cover to Russian intelligence gathering operations. As a Western businessperson with a long history of doing business in Hungary said the following: “Close relations have been established [by Hungary] with the Russian special services, together they have also gone into business. This especially applies to government orders; I witnessed how the Russians came to the relevant tenders although they had nothing to do with the topic.”

A base of operations for Russian spies

In late 2025, Alexandru Bălan, former Deputy Director of the Intelligence and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova, was arrested in Romania and charged with treason. Romania's Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism later stated that Bălan's handlers from Belarus' secret service, the KGB, met with their agent in Budapest in 2024 and 2025.

Around the same time, a scandal broke out over accusations that Hungarian intelligence officers were running a spy ring in Brussels and attempted to recruit EU officials between 2012 and 2018. “Hungarian officials working in EU institutions described the network to POLITICO as an open secret in the Belgian capital.”

A senior European security source noted the growing problem of Russian intelligence penetration into Hungary:

“The Russians have penetrated very deeply into all the IT systems [of Hungary].

Countering Russian cyberwarfare has practically disappeared [under Orban]. Then the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was completely infiltrated by the Russians, I fear that through this ministry the Russians have infiltrated other ministries, state departments. For a long time now, the Russians have been receiving a huge amount of information about almost everything that is happening in Hungary.”

The source noted close public cooperation between Hungarian officials and media and Russian secret services, referring to an incident last fall when Russian intelligence accused Ukraine of preparing a “false-flag operation” to frame Moscow for attacking Poland.

“Various Hungarian media picked up on these claims. Then Putin’s spokesperson Maria Zakharova spoke about it. Then many Hungarians began spoking about it. Followed also by TASS, more Hungarian media, Russian Telegram channels and bloggers. This [media and intelligence cooperation] works like an ‘echo chamber.”

“Hungary serves as a free and open space for Russia’s intelligence services.”