From losing Chasiv Yar and Slovyansk under threat, to robust defense and sapping of Russian momentum—this is the range of options we’ve examined. NV turned to three Ukrainian military experts, Kevlyuk, Oleksandr Kovalenko, and Mykhailo Samus, to offer their insight on how the battlefield might look by the end of the year.
The overarching conclusion is that Ukrainian forces will remain on the defensive until 2025.
Fall of Chasiv Yar, Slovyansk under pressure—the negative scenario
The
Russians will have significant chances to advance towards Pokrovsk, northwest
of Donetsk, in the coming month, according to Kevlyuk. In Ukraine’s worst case,
the enemy will cut the Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka-Bakhmut
route (highway 0504), thus encircling the entire grouping of Ukrainian forces
west of Bakhmut and in the Kramatorsk-Slovyansk area from the south.
The
Russian army will put pressure on this region from the east—from occupied
Lysychansk to Siversk. And, according to experts’ estimates, under this
scenario, the Russians will cover half of this way by the end of the year,
having captured Bilohorivka.
All this will most likely lead to the fall of Chasiv
Yar, which is located between Bakhmut and Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian troops near
Toretsk will face the threat of a complete encirclement, so they’ll have to
retreat.
As
a result, the enemy will have created conditions for a future offensive on
Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, making progress towards their main goal: the complete
occupation of Donetsk Oblast.
Moreover,
in case of success in the Pokrovsk area, the Russians will redouble their
efforts to try to bypass the Ukrainian grouping from the north and south in the
Vuhledar area, southwest of Donetsk.
At
the same time, in the south, according to the negative scenario, the enemy would
be
able to erase the results of Ukraine’s
2023 counteroffensive, cutting off the salient near Robotyne (south of Orikhiv)
in Zaporizhzhya Oblast and taking full control of Staromayorske (western part
of Donetsk Oblast).
An
offensive with such a wide front will force Russia to expend huge resources and
forces. However, using these advantages by late 2024, Moscow will begin to
exert diplomatic pressure not only on Kyiv, but also on Washington. The Kremlin
will bet that after the upcoming U.S. presidential elections in November, they’ll
be able to convince the United States to stop helping Ukraine and force Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to accede to Russian demands. The likelihood
of this negative scenario is around 25%.
Success in the south—a positive scenario
This war scenario provides that the Armed Forces of Ukraine won’t launch a counteroffensive in the east and south but will seize the initiative from the enemy.
First, this will happen in northern Kharkiv Oblast, where Ukrainian units will manage to push enemy troops back behind the international border.
Secondly, in the south, the Defense Forces will expand the bridgehead opposite Kherson, liberating Korsunka and Kozachi Laheri. Due to this, those Russian units holding defenses downstream of the Dnipro River, near Hola Prystan, will find themselves in a difficult situation. All the more so if Ukraine captures another bridgehead, closer to the Kinburn Spit.
Thirdly, further east, in Zaporizhzhya Oblast, Ukrainian units will hold the Robotyne salient and their positions near Staromayorske.
Experts believe this scenario also presumes that Ukraine will continue to strike Crimea with missiles and drones, as well as reducing the utility of the Crimean Bridge or even destroy it by the end of the year. After that, the entire southern Russian grouping in Kherson Oblast and in the occupied areas of Zaporizhzhya Oblast will experience an acute shortage of weapons and supplies.
In addition, Ukrainians will see good news in the east. The Defense Forces will prevent the Russians from advancing between Maryinka and Vuhledar, as well as in the Pokrovsk area (on the border of the Vovcha River). Thus, the already mentioned highway 0504 will continue to be under Ukrainian control. Therefore, Chasiv Yar will remain a close but unattainable prize for the enemy.
But since the Russian army is determined fulfill Russian dictator Vladimir Putin’s task of occupying Donbas entire, the relentless assaults will continue.
In addition, the positive scenario provides that Ukraine will gain an advantage in the air thanks to Patriot air defense systems and F-16 fighter jets. The gradual scouring of occupied Crimea from enemy air defense, aviation, and navy will be the first consequence of this shift in air power.
Therefore, at the end of the year, Ukraine’s General Staff will seriously begin planning an operation to de-occupy the peninsula.
In the international arena, Ukraine will retain great support from the West, and Washington’s position regarding the supply of weapons to Kyiv won’t change after the U.S. elections, while the European Union will even increase its aid. The probability of this scenario is 10%.
Resilient defense—the basis scenario
The third forecast is very similar to the current status quo. It envisages some Ukrainian military successes in the north and south, and Russia’s creeping and unsystematic advance in several eastern areas. The latter will take place in Donetsk Oblast and in the Lyman-Kupyansk area. At the same time, Moscow will continue sustaining major losses.
F-16 fighter jets and Patriot air defense systems will play a significant role in this scenario, as in the previous one. Thanks to this equipment, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will force the enemy air force to drastically reduce the number of daily sorties dropping glide bombs, which currently underpin Russia’s advance.
The permission granted by the United States and other Western countries to use their weapons to strike Russian territory will also play a positive role, says Samus. After all, this will allow targeting the full depth of enemy operational structure, destroying their reserves and forcing them to abandon the Kharkiv offensive.
So, under this scenario, Ukraine will lose some ground in the next six months but will prevent the enemy from completely capturing Donetsk and Zaporizhzhya oblasts and will retain its positions near the Dnipro River.
The war will completely transform into an attrition-based trial of endurance, where the Russians’ chances of success will seem quite small. After all, new Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, as predicted by Kovalenko, will most likely fail to optimize and ramp up the production of weapons and other necessary military products. First of all, this will concern air defense and artillery. The Kremlin will eventually start looking for shells and missiles not only in North Korea, but all over the world, with little success.
A major shortage of arms will force Russia’s General Staff to abandon major offensives by the end of the year. Afterwards, 2025 will be the time when the Armed Forces of Ukraine could go on the offensive. The probability of the basis scenario is 65%.