'Fighting worse by the day': Putin unaware of Russian army's dire state, Ukrainian veteran says
Nation3 November, 11:06 AM
The intensity of fighting has remained extremely high throughout this period, while enemy losses have continued to rise. You know the saying that quantity turns into quality? Here, it's the other way around. In this case, the improved quality of our Ground Forces, resulting from the corps reform, the restructuring carried out by the Third Assault Brigade — for example, transforming the Third Brigade and a number of attached brigades into the new Third Corps — and the reforms initiated by [Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo] Drapatyi, including the changes in commanders he has made throughout the chain of command and continues to make, is translating into higher enemy losses.
At the same intensity of fighting, our defenders have learned how to kill more enemy troops and have gained the means to do so. This is extremely important because that is what matters most in war. War is not about square kilometers or arrows on a map. War is about who kills whom. And by this terrible but ultimately decisive measure, we have now pulled so far ahead of our enemies that, as they say, knock on wood. Some people cross their fingers, others light candles.
But to put it briefly, if the trend we are seeing continues — and we have been observing it for several months now, so this is not some random surge in our activity or an isolated success on a particular front — it means that systemic changes have taken place both on our side and on the enemy's.
On our side, there have been systemic improvements in troop command and control, operational planning, the use of available resources and even the production of those resources. On the enemy's side, the opposite is happening.
Their losses, particularly among officers, sergeants and junior commanders, are causing their army to suffer increasingly heavy casualties. As a result, its ability to fight is steadily deteriorating. They are not yet on the verge of losing command and control, but they have effectively lost the ability to conduct complex operations. They are simply trying to crawl forward wherever they can, and even those attempts now result in losses several times greater than they did six months ago.
What is happening is essentially a process of attrition. In this case, the word "disposal" is entirely appropriate. It is a process in which we and the Russians are working together. On the orders of their supreme ruler, the Russians are, frankly, stupidly grinding down their own army against our fortifications in Donbas. We, in turn, are taking advantage of this and, like a meat grinder, carefully and methodically grinding them down.
You don't have to be a great prophet to see what comes next. A little military arithmetic is enough to understand that, at this rate of losses and without large-scale mobilization, the Russian army will effectively cease to exist as a combat-capable force by spring or sometime during the spring.
That does not mean they will have no soldiers left by then. Of course not. But not every crowd of people wearing uniforms can be called an army. What can genuinely be called an army, a force capable of conducting organized combat operations, will be exhausted by spring if losses continue at this rate.
Whether that happens before spring or during spring is impossible to calculate to within two or three weeks. But within a six-month timeframe, the trend is absolutely clear.
So why is there no large-scale mobilization? Even if covert mobilization is taking place somewhere, it is not happening on that scale. We would know if there were a major covert mobilization campaign.
On the one hand, Putin hopes they can manage without it. He still does not fully understand just how catastrophic the condition of his army is. That is one factor.
Remember that all such key decisions are ultimately made by Putin himself. He probably knows things are not going particularly well, but given who reports to him and how, he is unlikely to understand just how badly things are going.
Consider how much [Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery] Gerasimov conceals from Putin. And information is also being concealed from Gerasimov himself. He receives only part of the picture because none of the generals wants to lose their position.
I believe two things are absolutely correct.
First, the Kremlin is afraid of mobilization. They are clearly receiving signals from below that, if they announce it, things will not go as smoothly as they did in 2022. Whether they will manage to recruit enough people remains an open question, but unrest is virtually certain.
The second point concerns missiles. They are hoping that missile strikes, combined with another factor I would add — pressure from Washington — will achieve their objectives.
They believe that a combination of missile and drone strikes from the east and pressure from Donald Trump from the west will accomplish what their army has completely failed to achieve and is now definitively incapable of achieving.
I think that is precisely what they are counting on. And a great deal depends on us — on whether we give in to that pressure.
I believe we can withstand it. And if we do, then by spring, even if we decide we want to negotiate with someone, we will be negotiating from a completely different position than we are today.