What weapons Trump promised Ukraine and may deliver — Defense Express chief editor Katkov

— Trump said that one country could send 17 Patriots to Ukraine. The howling has already begun in various pro-war Russian forums. And they are analyzing what it could be. Because if it is 17 launchers, then it is potentially three or more standard batteries. If it is 17 systems, then it will be something huge. How to evaluate this? Is it the fog of war? Are there any prospects at all for scraping 17 Patriot systems somewhere in the foreseeable future?

— First, it seems to me that it is time to introduce some kind of position of a specialist with the profession of a Trumpologist, so that he can somehow interpret what this person said. Because, indeed, it is difficult to understand and comprehend what is being said. Because even the Pentagon said that all questions regarding the 17 Patriots are for the White House.

The fact is that it all looks quite illogical and inconsistent. Trump has already admitted that he knew (before that he said that he didn’t know) about the second suspension of aid to Ukraine, which was a week ago. And that’s when they stopped the Patriot missiles and explained that “we need these weapons ourselves.” It’s quite strange to transfer additional Patriots if you can’t meet the need for missiles with the existing ones.

That is, everything looks as strange as possible. The only thing I wish was that it wasn’t about 17 Patriot missiles.

The next aspect. And do we have 17 additional calculations? Something tells me that it’s unlikely.

Therefore, maybe we should immediately reduce our appetites, start from more realistic positions? Which are that, for example, Germany said that it was ready to finance two batteries, and Norway said about one. This is what was heard before from official sources, if I'm not mistaken, even the Ukrainian government officially said about it, that there are two countries that are ready to buy Patriot and deliver them to Ukraine. In particular, the information about the additional two German ones has allegedly already been confirmed by Berlin.

That is, it looks more real compared to everything else.

Perhaps, when he said about 17 Patriots, he did not say the word battery. Perhaps, he means that the USA has such a reserve, conditionally, for such supplies, when someone buys Patriot, supplies it to Ukraine. Perhaps this is what is being said. I don't know.

That is, I objectively lack a professional trampologist.

— You said about the calculations. I remember that the staff of one battery is estimated at approximately 90 people in total, who are involved in its maintenance. Am I not mistaken? That is, if we talk about 17 batteries, then this is the staff — 17 times 90?

— Yes. These are not exactly operators, this is called service. That is, people who deploy the complex, who, in particular, guard it, service it. And the number of operators who sit at the consoles, of course, is smaller.

But staffing — yes, according to the American staffing. Everything can be different here. Everything can be very different from the number of launchers, in particular. Because this number of almost a hundred [employees] is for a full-fledged battery with eight launchers, with the corresponding number of support vehicles, that is, transport-loading vehicles, communication vehicles, generators... That is, each of them needs at least a driver, and people who will arrange them, connect them, communicate are also needed.

That is, this is not about those people who press the remote control to launch a rocket. Therefore, it will depend very much even on the configuration of these batteries.

Of course, this is a staffing list, it does not always correspond to the real number. I would start from the fact that the training of the Patriot crew, if I'm not mistaken, is three or four months. This is the minimum. That is, there is also such an aspect.

— That is, it definitely won’t appear in a week. The Axios publication writes that the next U.S. aid packages may include long-range missiles, offensive weapons, and these missiles are capable of reaching Moscow. CNN, citing its own sources, claims that in addition to Patriot, which is the main item on Kyiv’s wish list, the U.S. may sell short-range missiles, howitzers, medium-range missiles, and a range of other weapons. What could it be? To what extent do you believe that something that reaches Moscow could potentially be bought by one of our European partners and, accordingly, transferred to Ukraine? Previously, there were certain restrictions, and even ATACMS missiles were not allowed to hit the so-called canonical territory of the Russian Federation at first. And now Trump says: “Why don’t you hit Moscow, let alone St. Petersburg?”

— Yes, why? We probably didn’t guess somehow… Why don’t we hit Moscow and St. Petersburg. It just happened like this. We have to hit — that’s for sure.

What’s the aspect? It’s really important here how this agreement will be implemented, on what basis.

If we’re talking about an idealized option for us, how would it be absolutely best? The countries of the European Union, the European segment of NATO plus Canada, directly conclude commercial agreements for the weapons they consider necessary. Of course, taking into account our needs. Because real money has already been spent.

That is, this is no longer assistance like “we removed something from the weapons, so we’re giving it to you,” circular supplies from Germany, “they’ll compensate us for it later,” and here the U.S. will write out a voucher for us to buy new weapons… No. The business has already started.

That is, conditionally, Germany is purchasing two Patriots for Ukraine. It will obviously purchase them in its configuration, where they will work as efficiently as possible for all its money. The same goes for all other weapons.

For example, Ukraine and Europe, with the help of Ukraine, need to take out the Russian military-industrial complex. For this, long-range missiles are needed. Can they, relatively speaking, sell Tomahawks? In this position, let's put it this way, it seems to me that Berlin, London, Paris, Warsaw should say: "Yes, we need Tomahawks. And where we take them is not your [problem] anymore — you are selling them to us. The seller should not care where his goods go."

Okay, not Tomahawk, there is JASSM. Moreover, JASSM-ER with a range of 900 kilometers, which are currently in mass production. If there are any restrictions (one way or another, they are, after all, something tells me that they will be), nevertheless, this is already a commercial story. Relatively speaking, we need so many missiles for such a period, we need this, this and this. And not based on the fact that this is aid, but based on the fact that this is real money that needs to be paid.

This is another story. Perhaps it is precisely this approach that will change this… Previously, for example, Ukraine received 150-mm ammunition, but not cluster munitions, because “clusters are not allowed; and what the Russians use is Russian; and you are supposedly good, you cannot, because you are good.” And then the cluster munitions went.

And now a banal question. Cluster munition costs (conditionally, abstract figures, I don’t know for sure, because they are not produced) one and a half times more expensive than regular ones. But it is five times more effective. It seems that the money should simply be spent on more effective weapons, that is, on cluster munitions. That’s what it’s about.

— Do we have anything to use Tomahawk or JASSM in any modification? Will this also be a story about long training and, accordingly, about the carriers or launchers from which it works?

— If we are talking about the JASSM carrier, then it is the F-16; this is its base missile. Perhaps a software update will be needed. This is also not free, but a specially trained person must actually arrive, insert a special flash drive, that is, connect a laptop, and download new software to the F-16.

What is the advantage of digital weapons? Because the update is through the software version. Then — use.

Regarding training: It is necessary to train technicians, maintain, put the missile into combat readiness, and work with programming software, if this is to be carried out in Ukraine. Because the story with Storm Shadow/SCALP shows that there may be unpleasant nuances.

The Poles have JASSM. That is, they definitely know how to program it. This is for understanding who can help click the mouse in the necessary windows via TeamViewer.

As for Tomahawk, here’s the thing: there is no carrier. Tomahawk carriers are actually more ships, submarines. There are now ground-based launchers, in particular the Mk 70 or Typhon. But they still need to be manufactured. Therefore, Tomahawk, it seems to me, is the most desirable but least likely option.

In the end, there may have been some ersatz solutions (substitutes — Ed.), but it seems to me that, firstly, there are not so many Tomahawks. This is also a limitation. Secondly, it seems to me that there will be a gradual increase in our capabilities. We have seen this many times. A really gradual improvement in the nomenclature of weapons. That is, firstly, JASSM, and not ER, but ordinary ones at 370 km. And this is not the strike range; this is how far the missile can fly. It will fly along a complex route, it will not be launched from scratch, but with a retreat. And therefore, the depth of impact will be smaller.

But we really need these missiles, for example, in order to actually take out supply depots, logistics centers, transport hubs, plus airfields that are at a range, at a depth of impact of 200 km. This is already a huge list.

And this will directly affect what is happening on the ground. If there is an appropriate number of means, and they will actually work accordingly, and there will be a very large number of them, then this has every chance of repeating what happened in the summer of 2022 with the removal of depots using HIMARS.

— That is, now it needs to be done at a longer range, because at the HIMARS range the Russians are already not doing anything significant. And are there adequate targets for ATACMS? Many write in the Western press that ATACMS will still be provided.

— Yes, but, again, the numbers, which are measured in tens, are frightening. ATACMS is obviously a scarce thing. At least until they launch mass production of PrSM — this is the next generation of missiles already at 500 kilometers.

ATACMS are needed to hunt for Russian field helipads. For example, Khalino, a tactical aviation airfield near Kursk. While the Americans warned that they would transfer ATACMS, that they were transferring them by the spoonful, [the Russians] had already built concrete shelters for aircraft there. That much time has passed.

Therefore, for ATACMS, in any case, we will find suitable targets; the question is in quantity. And with quantity, obviously, there are problems.