The provision of multi-role fighters F-16 would not significantly affect the offensive operation which is being planned. However, the logic of our partners is clear: let's talk about today’s priorities.
What are those priorities? The first is strengthening the air defense system. Aviation is also a component of the air defense system, of course. But, let's think logically: adding new aircraft will not close the gaps in the air defense system fast enough. Therefore, we do what we can to find the opportunities that exist right now.
What is an air defense system? It is the complex of defensive weaponry that fills different roles to protect from air threats, including long-range and modern systems such as Patriot or SAMP/T, aviation (even old MiG-29s), and large-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns for use against unmanned aerial vehicles such as Shahed-136.
What new tools are needed to fill existing gaps?
The immediate task is to deploy the long-range modern systems such as Patriot and SAMP/T and immediately have them active on combat duty.
As far as I understand from their tactical and technical characteristics, their developers claim they can intercept ballistic missiles. They would therefore be needed to intercept ballistic missiles like the Iskander. Unfortunately, we do not presently have tools that can work on them. These systems can shoot down supersonic cruise missiles, such as the X-22 - they fly very fast, and our systems do not detect them in time.
Western air defense systems can operate against modern Russian aircraft such as the Su-34 and Su-35. The Russians have largely held off on deploying them for fear of losses, but that has changed recently: with their help, they hit Ukrainian objects - both military and civilian infrastructure. So we need countermeasures against them asap.
Regarding missiles, we need the higher-tech SAMP/T and Patriots, which can strike at a long distance and intercept ballistic missiles. But, we also need to look for as many S-300 missiles as possible as soon as possible, which are the backbone of the Ukrainian air defense system.
So these are the two most urgent issues regarding protecting Ukraine’s skies. They provide defense for not only large cities, but also cover offensive operations. If you have gaps in the air defense system, your supply lines to the troops are vulnerable.
Aviation is a question for tomorrow. But, to solve it tomorrow, we must talk about it today. It's a very long story. So long that even experts are arguing among themselves. But the Americans claim that high-quality pilot training for the F-16 will take 18 months. Let it be less than a year.
They cannot be placed on our existing airfield runways for technical reasons and because of the high risk of injury. Therefore, to protect these planes from missile fire and possible sabotage, it is necessary to prepare the infrastructure for them. We must build or upgrade specific runways, hangars s, and airfields. How long will it take? I don’t know. I'm sure this issue is under consideration, but in any case, I don't think there is a clear time frame that we will do it in three to five months. This is a crucial, complex issue. And no one is working towards a direct solution, because there is no political solution.
This question doesn’t affect today's problems, today's offensive, or today's defense of the sky. It's a matter of perspective.
On the other hand, there are indeed some political concerns. For example, suppose you allocate such a costly, complex, precious thing as airplanes to Ukraine. In that case, you should be completely positive that it will be accepted by the country's population that provides these airplanes. Because they can ask a natural question: "We have a lot of problems, but you are throwing billions of dollars to transfer jets to Ukrainians."
They should be absolutely sure that the Ukrainian military will quickly master these platforms and will have the necessary infrastructure to support them.
But there is another political issue. Some countries are delaying aid deliveries due to fears of so-called “escalation.” These questions are unrelated.
If the offensive actions of the Armed Forces are effective, then this, from a psychological point of view, will facilitate the process of providing Ukraine with aviation. However, today, from the point of view of almost all countries, this issue is not a priority. And they do not consider it necessary to be distracted by it when there are more urgent needs. So it's a parallel track to what is immediately happening, but it will take some time.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's visit to Kyiv would have been more powerful if it had taken place earlier. The person who heads what claims to be the most critical player in the European security system only found the time to visit Kyiv when the war had already been going on for more than a year. As for me, this is at least surprising. I speak frankly and as delicately as possible.
I think it was necessary not only to provide Ukraine with certain political and information support, but also to discuss directly with the Ukrainian leadership the issues that may be raised at the next NATO summit.
It is not a secret for anyone (from the president to the minister of foreign affairs) that Ukraine expects NATO to invite Ukraine to its Alliance officially. Everyone is waiting for it.
However, if we analyze the speeches of specific politicians, especially the heads of NATO states, NATO is not yet ready to take any drastic steps. I understand they were simply looking for a formula that would satisfy everyone - both Ukraine in its expectations and NATO, which today doesn’t want and can’t take drastic steps.
Stoltenberg is conservative with language; he is constantly looking for a new delicate formula that means some half-step forward but doesn’t contain any significant substantive content.
So I don't think there will be any breakthrough solutions. I think there will be some formula that will allow Ukraine to get a little closer to NATO.
Will there be an invitation? Maybe. But in what form will it be done? This is theoretically possible because it will be a political step that sends an important signal to Ukraine and its people, as well as a signal to Russia. Perhaps it will psychologically impact those countries that still don’t see Ukraine in NATO.
On the other hand, it is possible to say with a hundred percent guarantee that no specific dates will be discussed.
They will invent a new formula: "We opened not only the doors, but also the windows." Of course, I'm joking, but they will invent something like this as political messaging.
Now they are working hard on how to neither offend nor scare anyone. So there will be some further cooperation of Ukraine with NATO, but no significant changes.
In fact, not only for me but for many politicians, regardless of their position about Ukraine, Russia, or NATO, the position of NATO during this war was not a disappointment, but rather a surprise.
As an institution in Europe, NATO has not played much of a role in the war. Yes, our Western partners provide us with aid, but it is not about the aid of NATO as a whole but from its member countries and not necessarily connected to anything to do with NATO itself. The Rammstein format turned out to be a substitute for NATO in a way.
Rammstein was probably created because NATO did not want to take direct responsibility. So it was created outside of NATO from the very beginning. What is happening now is an excellent chance for renewal. I think this war is precisely the push for NATO that it must change.
But, apparently, NATO still doesn't quite understand how to change. And precisely the problems that arose in Finland and still exist in Sweden regarding inclusion in NATO are a confirmation that NATO is weak as a tool for persuading even its own members. This is about, more than anything else, Hungary and Turkey. If a NATO country is interested, especially now, in a significant effective expansion and is met with resistance from even a single participant, it creates a crisis in NATO.
This crisis, unfortunately, is still ongoing. It may be resolved with new leadership. Stoltenberg is, after all, leaving his post. But so far, it is surprisingly difficult to talk about the important, key, systemic role of NATO in the collective security system.