Many people in Ukraine have recently seen some hint of peace talks in almost every news item from abroad. For some, these expectations are driven by the hope for a quick peace (well, if there is no quick victory). Ukrainians are deeply concerned that “peace” will be imposed on us on unfavorable terms. It seems to me that there is even some obsession with the topic of negotiations.
So will there be peace talks?
I will disappoint those who hope for quick peace and those who fear a disadvantageous peace will be imposed on us. There will be no quick peace, but peace talks (or attempts to negotiate them) are inevitable. Not now, but later, in about six months, but not earlier than 3-4 months, and possibly not earlier than the end of 2024. At the same time, reaching any agreements will take a long time, even just a ceasefire. The upcoming negotiation process may drag on for many months, and even more than one year.
When it comes to statements about peace, we should pay attention not to the words of a NATO official who does not make decisions, has little knowledge of the situation, and is forced to make excuses and apologize; but to more serious people who have real power and direct influence on us and the international situation.
unless the situation inside Russia changes dramatically.
For example, the US President said: "Russia has already lost the war.” This is not the first such statement from Biden. According to this logic, if Russia has already lost, it is time to end the war and negotiate. But it is unlikely that Russia agrees that they have lost. They are unlikely to negotiate on the terms of the United States and Ukraine.
Lukashenko also seems to hint at the need for peace in the context of Russia's victory, which allegedly "achieved the goals of the SMO." The Belarusian dictator does not provide any serious arguments in favor of this thesis, but he clearly favors ending the war and sends his hints toward the Kremlin.
The Kremlin is talking not so much about peace as about the possibility of a new wave of mobilization (the legal framework is already in place) and preparing a major offensive next spring. Let me remind you that in the spring of 2024, there will be presidential elections in Russia, and the scenario of an attempted offensive by Russian troops in Ukraine during Putin's election (as a military and political PR campaign) looks entirely plausible. It is also clear that Russia intends to drag out the war against Ukraine at least until the US presidential election, hoping for Trump's victory and the depletion of Ukraine's military potential.
It is unacceptable for Ukraine to negotiate on Russia's terms. It is also unacceptable for the West because it will look like a political defeat. And such a scenario will only push Russia to further military expansion and increase pressure on the West.
Therefore, in the political sense, the potential negotiation situation remains a dead end.
There is constant talk in the West about peace talks to end the war in Ukraine. At the same time, the West continues to say that it is up to Ukraine to decide when and on what terms to start negotiations with Russia. This is nothing new. And delays in arms deliveries are far from a new trend. Instead, it is a regular practice. We are already experiencing a shortage of certain types of weapons and ammunition that were previously in Western arsenals but have already been used in the war against Russia. At the same time, I would like to draw attention to the decision to supply Ukraine with F-16s after the training of our pilots is completed and to the negotiations on providing Ukraine with long-range missiles. These are preventive signals from the West to Russia that in the event of an escalation of the war, military and technical support for Ukraine will not only continue, but can be strengthened.
Therefore, as far as trends are concerned, I would pay attention primarily to movements in the military situation. And these trends are very contradictory. On the one hand, hostilities are escalating on both sides. Meanwhile, the military situation looks like an approximate balance ("equilibrium") in the military potential of both sides.
We see two directly opposite reactions in the West to this "military equilibrium" in Ukraine. Some statesmen, politicians, and experts advocate for a qualitative strengthening of military and technical support for Ukraine so that we can turn the military situation in our favor. On the other hand, the so-called "party of peace" has become more active, and its supporters are convinced that the military situation in Ukraine will not change significantly, that we will not be able to defeat Russia by military means, and that we should gradually start negotiations with Russia. The debate between these two camps has intensified, but the West's strategy regarding the war between Russia and Ukraine has remained the same.
So far, Russia has relied on dragging out the war with elements of escalation. However, it has its own hidden "peace party" as well. There is a very high risk that in the coming months or next year, we will see a qualitatively new round of warfare - the war of drones (massive use of drones in air and sea attacks on a much larger scale than now).
The criterion for Russia's readiness for peace talks will be the situation with the possibility of resuming the grain deal. If Russia comes to a mutually acceptable compromise on resuming the grain deal, it will be a prelude to future peace talks. If not, it will mean that Putin has set a course to prolong the war, and there will be no real peace talks until the end of 2024.
Only after the current stage of escalation of the war, and possibly the upcoming "drone war," will real peace talks begin. These negotiations will not be about “peace,” but rather about ending hostilities on a certain front line. The domestic political situation will influence the readiness for these negotiations in Russia, the United States (presidential elections and their results), Ukraine, and the EU. This is not about today but about "tomorrow" - next year, perhaps even 2025, unless the situation inside Russia changes dramatically.