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What recent Russian-Belarusian nuclear exercises mean for Ukraine

Nation

28 May, 04:13 PM

Recent Russian-Belarusian nuclear drills near Ukraine appear aimed more at intimidation and political signaling than at preparing an imminent nuclear strike, according to Ukrainian officials and analysts cited by NV on May 28.

NV assessed whether the threat of Moscow using nuclear weapons against Ukraine has grown after recent joint exercises in which the Kremlin showcased what it described as its full “deterrence triad.”

In mid-May, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko held joint exercises on the “combat use of nuclear weapons,” involving land-, air- and submarine-based delivery systems. Russia even moved some munitions to storage sites in Belarus for the drills.

The two leaders also publicly gave launch commands.

The exercises took place against the backdrop of increasingly frequent statements from Kyiv that Moscow is trying to draw Minsk more directly into the war against Ukraine.

Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry called the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and the joint drills by the two authoritarian governments an unprecedented challenge to the global security architecture and urged international partners to respond firmly.

“By turning Belarus into its nuclear staging ground near NATO borders, the Kremlin is de facto legitimizing the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide and setting a dangerous precedent for other authoritarian regimes,” the ministry said.

At nearly the same time, Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Presidential Office and former military intelligence chief, told The Times that Russia has the ability to launch a nuclear strike at any moment and at any range. “But this is, first and foremost, a question of political will,” he said. “I have not seen any indicators of preparation for a nuclear strike.”

So what do the recent nuclear drills by Russia and Belarus really mean, and has the risk of a nuclear strike on Ukraine actually increased?

Kremlin desperation

Concern about possible Russian use of nuclear weapons has indeed risen in recent years. At the end of April, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi said at a conference in New York that the threat of nuclear catastrophe has “risen to levels not seen since the height of the Cold War.”

“War has returned to Europe and the Middle East,” Grossi said. “In today's nuclear sphere, we face a fragile standoff, with more actors, greater risks, and less clarity.”

Still, Hanna Shelest, director of international security programs at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”, said nuclear weapons in current politics still serve primarily as a deterrent. In her view, the Kremlin’s repeated threats are part of a strategy.

“As long as everyone else believes that Putin may use it, he will keep raising the temperature, threatening with it, holding exercises and changing doctrines,” Shelest said.

She noted that in November 2024, Putin changed Russia’s national nuclear doctrine, expanding the conditions under which Moscow says it reserves the right to use weapons of mass destruction. Under that updated doctrine, Russia now says grounds for a nuclear strike could include aggression against Russia or its allies by any nonnuclear state backed by a nuclear power, as well as a massive air attack using nonnuclear means, including drones.

But Shelest stressed that actual use of nuclear weapons would be a political breaking point for the Kremlin with unpredictable consequences. In that case, Putin would have no stronger instruments left.

“And there would immediately be a completely different reaction from the United States, a completely different reaction from China,” she said. “All partners would clearly turn away from him. Is he ready for that?”

Oleksandr Merezhko, chair of parliament’s foreign affairs committee, said the Russian-Belarusian nuclear drills were primarily demonstrative in nature.

“This is most likely a provocation aimed at diverting our attention and forces,” he said. “By and large, when Putin resorts to hidden nuclear threats, it is a sign of weakness and even desperation.”

Merezhko also said Putin no longer makes such threats openly because they provoke major dissatisfaction from Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and the Kremlin leader cannot afford to lose his support.

China indeed appears to be one of the few countries to which Putin is willing to listen on nuclear issues. In an interview with the Financial Times in January 2025, former U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Russia had considered using nuclear weapons during the war in Ukraine, but Beijing’s position helped prevent that.

“We have reason to believe that China engaged Russia and said, ‘Don’t go there,’” Blinken said.

Part of a broader pattern

Fedir Venislavskyi, a member of parliament’s national security committee, also assessed the risk of nuclear use as low.

“This is another round of intimidation and saber-rattling,” he said. “Sarmats, Oreshniks, Poseidons, which are periodically said to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons — these are all links in one chain aimed at frightening us and our partners, showing that Russia will not stop even before the potential use of this kind of weapon.”

Venislavskyi also did not rule out that the nuclear drills were partly a Kremlin response to a recent meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Xi in Beijing. He also pointed to statements by European partners that they are ready to support Ukraine for as long as it takes, suggesting Russia wants to demonstrate that it too is “ready” for such an extreme scenario.

“But I think the probability of such a scenario is very low,” he added. “Although we cannot rule it out, given the disorder in the minds of the Kremlin dictators and the Kremlin regime. Even so, I think the probability is very small.”

The Baltic scenario

The main purpose of the nuclear drills may be tied more to a possible scenario involving the Baltic states, according to Yehor Cherniev, another member of the national security committee and the ruling party faction.

Under Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine, an attack on Belarus is treated as an attack on Russia. Cherniev said the Kremlin could try to attack from Belarusian territory and, if Belarus then comes under return fire, claim it has grounds to respond with weapons of mass destruction.

“Holding such exercises is an attempt to intimidate EU and NATO countries and keep them from entering a war against Russia and Belarus if the Kremlin attacks the Baltic states,” Cherniev added.

At the same time, he suggested Minsk could claim it was not participating in such a war, even if Russia attacked the Baltics from Belarusian territory. That, he said, could create a trap for Europe, which might be unable to strike Belarus and instead would have to hit Russian territory, even though the invasion formally did not come from Russia.

“In both cases, Putin gets the opportunity to effectively threaten Europe with nuclear weapons, because it would be considered an attack on him, not defense,” Cherniev said, describing the Kremlin’s logic.

He also assessed the risk of Russia using either tactical or strategic nuclear weapons against Ukraine as low.

Cherniev said tactical nuclear weapons did not prove their effectiveness in Soviet-era testing.

“There was some destruction at a distance of up to a kilometer from the epicenter, even in some bunker scenarios, but beyond a kilometer bunkers generally hold up,” he said. “Tactical nuclear strikes do not cause major damage on the front line if it is sufficiently fortified. So on the battlefield there would be no critical threat specifically from the use of tactical nuclear weapons.”

At the same time, he added, such a move would clearly cross a red line even for China, making it unlikely that Putin would risk falling into total isolation.

“As for going all in and using strategic nuclear weapons against large Ukrainian cities with hundreds of thousands of victims, I also do not think that is the scenario Putin would choose, understanding that it could effectively start World War III,” Cherniev said. “At that point, a response from NATO and other countries could come into play.”

For now, despite recurring threats and high-profile drills, most Ukrainian experts cited by NV agree on one point: nuclear escalation by Russia remains unlikely, even as nuclear threats continue to serve as one of Moscow’s main tools of pressure on Ukraine and its allies.

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