Frontline situation is extremely difficult, but still possible to fix — interview with Zhorin

— I would like to discuss conceptual issues with you, because against the backdrop of the negotiation process many Ukrainians are convinced we are in a dead end on the front. There are Ukrainians who have no idea about the front, about what we have. There are assessments that Ukraine could lose Donbas in a matter of months and that our negotiating position will be even worse — that’s what U.S. President Donald Trump says. So how are things? Because recently in your Telegram channel you wrote a post saying that “in some sectors, without urgent changes, the situation will already be critical.” Which sectors are you referring to, what changes do you mean, and what is the general trend we have on the front? Is everything really as dramatic as Donald Trump presents it?

— In fact, we must acknowledge that at this moment the situation is indeed extremely difficult. However, it is not such that it cannot be corrected at all. With timely action [in response to threats]… Of course, we are already significantly late on many issues, but if we focus enough attention now, we still have the ability to improve our position, including in the negotiation process, thanks to changes on the battlefield.

I do not believe the situation is already so critical that it cannot be changed. It can be changed. For that, we need to act.

The most difficult sectors now are probably Kupiansk, Lyman, Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole — the situation there is really very serious. However, if we change the philosophy and, in general, the approach to the use of forces and resources we currently have, if we change the approach to deploying our units and, in some cases, the still manual control, then the situation can be stabilized. And of course a stabilized situation will automatically give us better terms at the negotiating table.

I don’t want anyone to think that the military [or I personally] want to fight forever and continue this story. No, absolutely not. Believe me, we, the military first and foremost, probably more than anyone else, want this war to stop. However, we must understand that there has to be some kind of cessation that provides opportunities for us, not capitulation — whether in the political, military or any other sphere.

So the situation is indeed difficult, but I do not believe it is impossible to fix.

— Maksym, specifically, what needs to be done now to fix the situation? Is it mobilization? First of all, we repeatedly hear that there is a shortage of infantry on some sectors of the front, and this all comes down to mobilization. On the other hand, we hear assessments that mobilization is moving at a fairly steady pace, but the Defense Forces clearly do not feel that. Not least, as I understand, the commander-in-chief made the decision for a fair distribution of personnel across units — so there are no exclusively priority units that get staffed while others are ignored, and we end up with situations like soldiers sitting on positions for 471 days, as was recently the case with the combat medic from the 30th Mechanized Brigade. So what needs to be done in terms of mobilization? And regarding the initiative approved at the Staff meeting on fair distribution, is it correct? Does it strengthen our position?

— It is definitely a healthy idea, logical and necessary, because a large number of units are already saying it is a problem. However, at this point, when we talk about mobilization and bringing people into the army, we need to talk about how we are using these people. It is clear that we need to recruit them, we need to replenish [the army]. But are we really using our personnel as effectively as possible along the entire front line?

So the issue is not just bringing in people, but also preserving their lives. Today the priority must be how units and commanders treat their personnel. Preserving the lives and health of the personnel must be the priority, not reporting on the completion of some task handed down from above.

This means adopting a technological approach, preparing personnel for combat missions, and equipping positions. This is a huge set of issues, and in some units they are not always approached competently and responsibly.

Next, if we talk about replenishment, mobilization today — it is no secret — some people are already categorized as “temporarily unfit” at the training centers and do not even reach combat units. They are already categorized as unfit, but they do not even know what war is, they have never seen a combat unit. This is a problem of information work and the reputation that we, as a country, as state institutions, as an army, have built in people’s minds.

You cannot just say we need more people…

First, we need to do everything to ensure they are less likely to be killed or wounded. Then we need to train them properly for service. And then they must arrive in units where they trust their commanders, and where they will see that if a drone can do a job instead of a person, then a drone will do that job, and they will not continue performing tasks on foot that no longer need to be done that way.

— Why is it that everything seems obvious, many troops have repeatedly talked about these problems publicly, but in the end we run into the issue of shamefully inaccurate information? The Southern Defense Forces posted on their Telegram channel that the 33rd Separate Assault Regiment supposedly cleared Dobropillia, everything is fine and perfect. It turned out the video published on the official sources was fake in the sense that it showed green trees that do not exist in Hulyaipole now. It was footage from summer, where the 33rd Assault Regiment was not even operating in Hulyaipole, but in Tyotkino in Kursk region. So after this, how can we trust official information? It would seem there should be more truth. I am glad there was a media wave and the video was deleted from the Southern Defense Forces channel, but we run into this basic dishonesty, and I do not know what to do about it. You tell me, Maksym, can this be overcome?

— It can. But I think everyone understands that most likely this was a requirement from above that such content appear somewhere in the information space. And this is what is really frightening, this is what really drives us into the abyss. This is where the example comes from, this is where we get commanders who report things that are not true, who report what the senior leadership wants to hear.

Unfortunately, this problem still exists. Unfortunately, we can still see how initiative is crushed, while a beautiful report may even earn someone praise or favor.

Unfortunately, this example from above is seen as a norm of behavior, a norm of interaction and work. So in this regard, we definitely need to change the overall approach to what is happening.

We need to speak frankly and soberly with the Ukrainian public, and with each other — including along the vertical and horizontal chains of command that we have.

— Then another question about fixing the situation. You also wrote a post saying we now need to reconsider how we build engineering and fortification structures. Essentially, what I’ve been hearing for a year already is this: if the war continues in the format it has now, when drones destroy everything and everyone on the battlefield, then we need to start digging underground routes now if we expect to maintain resilience and defense. I recently spoke with the commander of the NRK battalion of the 93rd Mechanized Brigade, “Elektrik,” who said that we can now, in fact, use people only to support robotic systems — the same NRK — but today we need to prepare engineering and fortification structures where we will place automated turrets underground, building passageways so a person can come in and change ammunition. Does this even exist in the thinking of our command?

— It definitely exists in the sectors of responsibility of some units and is absolutely absent in the sectors of others. So today this is mostly about what I mentioned earlier: the commander’s approach to combat missions and to his personnel. Where the commander supports initiative, where he really looks for solutions to preserve lives and carry out the mission as effectively as possible, it will happen. And yes, the reality is that there is no manual now for how to build fortifications — it simply does not exist. But there are current realities, and based on those you can think through and prepare the shelters.

And yes, today we have to dig an entire network of tunnels underground to ensure supplies, logistics and evacuation.

The defensive line as such no longer exists. A line as a system of trenches is no longer working. On the contrary, it is a disadvantage. Positions on the front line are established differently now. They are dug differently, camouflaged differently, positioned differently. Protection of supply routes — all of this has changed. Camouflage, engineering, fortifications — everything has changed. But it requires daily work.

Indeed, we can shift the majority of infantry tasks to robotic systems — logistics, evacuation. Even now, in the 3rd Army Corps, we already have experience performing direct combat missions, striking the enemy, destroying positions, even taking prisoners, without involving a single servicemember of the 3rd Army Corps. So we already have that experience.

But for that to happen, the commander — in our case Andriy Biletskyi — must always support that approach, and he truly drives it. And it brings results.

We have an NRK school, we have NRK experience that we spread across all units in the corps. And it produces results. It leads to lower casualties and more effective performance of assigned missions.

— Regarding the experience of using NRK. As far as I know, the 3rd Army Corps already has a strike NRK company, so this is another level. In 2025, the logistics and evacuation component evolved, as did the engineering component of ground robotic systems. But the strike component — how mature is it?

— It is still evolving, just like all drones. They all keep moving forward and developing, even those flying ones. It seemed we had reached the horizon in that field, but no — there are always new solutions, new possibilities, new tools.

The same applies to NRK. Indeed, there are several types of strike NRK. There are those that carry different modules — small arms, grenade launchers — there are those that carry out mining, those that demine. All of this works in a system, controlled by operators and commanders, and without risking the lives and health of servicemembers. Operators remain relatively safe and distant from the combat task. And that is the future.

I do not believe we can completely remove the human from the battlefield — I have heard such ideas. Unfortunately, I do not see us fully eliminating the soldier from the battlefield. But we can minimize his direct participation in combat.

Yes, we can absolutely shift most combat and logistics tasks to robotic systems — both aerial and ground — and move in that direction. And the 3rd Army Corps is trying to evolve and move forward in that area. As I said, we have experience and application, we have experience conducting ambushes on enemy territory and so on.

The only thing I would add is air defense, which will also strongly shift — and is already shifting — toward drones and missiles, increasing the involvement of artificial intelligence. And this applies to everything: drones that strike, AI-powered FPV drones, AI-controlled NRK, missiles and so on. This is the near future we will be moving into.