‘Russia does not want to negotiate’: Ukraine begins drafting political war plan — lawmaker Kostenko
A serviceman from the 141st Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces scans the sky for Russian drones near the front line (Photo: REUTERS/Stringer)
Ukrainian lawmaker Roman Kostenko told Radio NV about lawmakers calling for deals with Russia, the need for a political war plan and the disconnect between battlefield achievements and a sense of decline on the home front on Oct. 7.
— A so-called “party of capitulation” is reportedly taking shape. Danylo Hetmantsev, a member of the Servant of the People parliamentary faction, and Oleksii Honcharenko, who has been expelled from the European Solidarity faction, have said Ukraine needs to immediately seek a peace agreement with Russia. In your view, what are your parliamentary colleagues seeing or sensing that is prompting them to make such statements? They are talking about making concessions to Russia, negotiating, and bringing together people in Ukraine who support peace to give the government grounds for making difficult decisions. What do they see and understand?
— These are just words. We need to understand one thing: There are currently no grounds for reaching an agreement. Reaching an agreement with Russia would be tantamount to giving it an opportunity to advance further later.
What does Russia mean when it talks about “reaching an agreement”? It means meeting all of its demands. First of all, Russia does not even want to negotiate. We have repeatedly heard from our government that it wants negotiations. The United States has also spoken about negotiations many times.
There have even been some talks, but the Russians sent people of such a low level that they probably not only failed to convey Russia’s position but did not even know what it was. It looked as though they had simply come to stall for time. We have already seen 28 or 29 points that supposedly outlined specific proposals from the Russian Federation, and once again, they led nowhere.
Russia wants Ukraine to be defeated. That is what we need to understand when we hear: “Let’s reach some kind of agreement.” Russia has no intention of stopping. I have said repeatedly that if we want to force Russia to negotiate, we need to create the conditions for it. Unfortunately, those conditions do not exist right now.
Russia sees that it cannot achieve much on the battlefield, but it has an advantage in the air. It understands that it can use that advantage to put pressure on the Ukrainian people and civilians. And people like those you mentioned will gradually pick up on this and try to push for some kind of solution.
Just look at this plan. There is nothing in it that has not already been proposed. But, of course, no one had proposed giving up territory or anything like that. So I think this is their personal opinion and purely political grandstanding.
They understand that many people are tired of the war and are simply trying to exploit that politically. But all reasonable people — and you have seen what they have said on social media — understand that this is unrealistic.
Does anyone want the war to continue? I am sure there are no such people, with the possible exception of those who profit from it. But most people, of course, want it to end. I do, too. But the war must not end with Ukraine’s defeat. At the very least, it must end on terms that are acceptable to us.
— You said the only people who might oppose peace are those who profit from the war. I can see some parallels here with what Hetmantsev has written, in the sense that there are people who benefit from this war. Who are they? Who are you referring to?
— You would have to ask Hetmantsev whom exactly he means. Perhaps he is referring to some of those who have been implicated in scandals.
I know one thing: Even in light of this, we must understand that the Ukrainian people have fundamental goals. One of them is to prevent the Russian Federation from occupying these territories.
If anyone thinks that giving up Donbas or another Oblast would make Russia stop, they are deeply mistaken. Look at history, including recent history, and at other countries where Russia has been involved and agreements have been reached. Russia never abides by them. Just look at the ceasefires we have had since 2014. So I will say it again: We need to create the conditions.
Those conditions are created on many fronts, both military and diplomatic.
We can also look at the United States, which is stronger than the Russian Federation and is making every possible effort at its level and in the way the current president can. Remember his statements about ending the war in three days or a month? Look at how many times he has tried to do that. But the Russians have their own objectives, and they have no intention of stopping.
It is important to understand that we need to unite to create the necessary conditions. Of course, if part of the country starts blaming the Armed Forces or others for fighting the war, we will be doomed to defeat.
Right now, we need to hold the government accountable, point out its mistakes and demand more transparent procurement and greater transparency in policymaking overall. At the same time, everyone must understand that we did not start this war. We are defending ourselves and doing everything we can to prevent the Russians from seizing our territory.
We should also talk about the people who have lost their homes and loved ones. This is already a pressing issue, and we need to take into account what has happened and prevent it from happening again in other oblasts.
— We have been living through nearly five years of full-scale war. We have witnessed horrific things: entire villages and cities being wiped out and civilians killed in their homes. I may be wrong, but the strikes on our warehouses, businesses, economy and bridges seem to have marked a turning point. Several drones striking two bridges in Kyiv may have prompted lawmakers Hetmantsev and Honcharenko to start talking about peace plans. Do you understand why this has come as such a shock, particularly for Ukraine’s home front?
— Of course, it has a cumulative effect. Many people are growing tired after enduring these attacks, watching drones fly overhead every day and living under constant air raid alerts. We need to understand that and certainly take it into account.
But what do we mean by the home front — the military rear or the civilian home front? The home front needs to unite, but it must be united around the people who are working toward victory.
First and foremost, we need to talk about what we can do on the home front to make things easier for our soldiers on the front line. Our people here are also risking their lives — drones fly over Kyiv, Dnipro, Odesa and other cities every day — but no one faces danger every second the way our soldiers do as they hold back the enemy. They are the barrier we have put in place, and they are the reason Ukraine still exists.
Russia can attack us with missiles and drones, but we continue to live our lives here, criticize the government and influence it. We still have democracy, or at least elements of it, and people can still exert influence. But that, too, is thanks to our soldiers.
So what we need here is unity among everyone working toward victory.
If, separately, people unite around the idea of saying, “Let’s surrender Ukraine’s interests, let’s give Russia part of the Donbas,” they should ask themselves whether they are prepared to give up part of the territory where they live in exchange for peace.
They should not think of the Donbas as some distant place where fighting is taking place and which, in their view, can simply be sacrificed. Everyone should think about their own home. That is what unity means: We are all responsible for the entire country, rather than each person caring only about one part of it.
— Can we say that the so-called peace plan published by Honcharenko ...
— Why are we even calling what he published a plan? It is his personal opinion. Any lawmaker can publish their own peace plan. And we have seen how many people have already spoken out about it.
If you read the text, it essentially proposes, “Let’s negotiate.” It comes across as, “Let’s stop shooting.” We have heard statements like that before.
Simple solutions may, of course, exist. Who does not want a ceasefire at sea? Who does not want a ceasefire in the air? We have already tried to involve our partners in this. Unfortunately, the necessary capabilities simply do not exist right now. Of course, the government bears some responsibility for that, but it does not mean we should capitulate.
— One point on which there seems to be some consensus is that, at the state level, we do not appear to have a clear plan explaining where we are going, why we are going there, what constitutes victory and what constitutes defeat. Do you agree that, as of October 2026, Ukraine still lacks such a clearly defined strategy?
— I agree. Of course, there are separate visions.
Some people have started talking about a plan by [Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo] Drapatyi. But there is no such thing as a Drapatyi plan, a plan by [former Defense Minister Mykhailo] Fedorov or a plan by [Defense Minister Yevhenii] Khmara. There are different plans and different areas of responsibility for each institution.
At the foundation of everything should be a political plan, which, as far as I know, is now being developed by the Defense Ministry. I know who is involved, and that is the right approach. A political plan is a strategy that incorporates plans for military operations, diplomacy, domestic policy and other areas.
Wars are not won through military operations alone. Our war has demonstrated that clearly. We can see how many countries are supporting us financially, militarily and diplomatically. Bringing them on board to help us reach a certain objective is also part of the plan.
So a political plan is now being developed. The problem is that we have never seen one before. As I understand it, for several years no one knew what to do. Now we have suddenly woken up and are asking what we should do: hold the line or go and negotiate with someone. There simply was no political plan as such.
The Defense Ministry is now working on it, effectively doing the job both for the political leadership and for itself. From there, plans are developed for other ministries and different areas of responsibility.
The military component is only one part of this broader plan. It receives its objectives based on the existing strategy and carries them out. For example, if we do not have enough resources to conduct combat operations along all 800 kilometers of the front, we focus on deep operations and holding the Donbas. We conduct offensive operations in Zaporizhzhia and concentrate our available resources there because we do not have the capacity to do more. That is the Armed Forces carrying out their part of the plan.
The Security Service of Ukraine carries out its part of the plan.
So to say that Drapatyi has “presented his plan” is misleading. He has a plan, but we understand that a plan for the Armed Forces is not created by one person, whether the commander-in-chief or the chief of the General Staff. Entire departments and directorates within the General Staff and the Defense Ministry work on it. You cannot develop a viable plan without resources.
If I were told to draw up a plan, I could come up with the perfect plan for defeating Russia. But if I submitted it to the Defense Ministry and said I needed 500 aircraft, 10,000 drones a day, a certain amount of fuel and equipment and a certain number of mobilized personnel, they would probably tell me: “Sorry, this plan goes in the trash. Come up with something new based on the resources we actually have and what our partners can provide.”
Our plans are generally developed around the resources available. And as you can see, we often do not even have enough resources for our existing capabilities.
Of course, there needs to be a political plan, and I hope the Defense Ministry completes it quickly. The General Staff will then work from that plan. It cannot develop a separate strategy without an overarching political plan. It will be given its part of the plan and tasked with implementing it.
The General Staff will then pass those tasks down to brigades and effective corps. We have the 3rd Corps, Azov, the 7th and 8th Air Assault Corps and other infantry corps. They operate very effectively within the framework of the plan handed down by the General Staff. They then develop their own plans within their assigned areas and pass them down to the brigades.
This entire chain of command must operate clearly within Ukraine’s overall concept, plan and strategy for conducting the war, coordinated by the National Security and Defense Council and the Defense Ministry.
— You said such a plan is being developed directly by the Defense Ministry. Does that mean all previous war plans developed under earlier defense ministers are being discarded and a new plan is being written from scratch? How effective can this process be?
— Of course not. There are overarching principles at the highest political level. When the planning system works properly, certain fundamentals remain unchanged.
There are basic principles on which overall planning is built, taking into account the resources available.
I am sure that some of what is happening now is based on plans originally developed by [former Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Valerii] Zaluzhnyi, then refined by [former Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr] Syrskyi and now to be further developed by Drapatyi. But again, all of this must be done within the framework of an overall strategy.
You cannot have the political leadership moving in one direction — seeking an agreement, for example, or wanting to seize part of Russian territory to later exchange it for part of Ukrainian territory — while the Armed Forces say, “No, we would rather fight in Zaporizhzhia.” This is just a hypothetical example, but overall, there needs to be a clear chain of command.
I hope that structure will now be put in place because, until now, much of it largely existed in people’s heads. Some people generally understood how it worked, while others did not. But the planning process itself is laid out in numerous documents at the Defense Ministry, the General Staff and the state level.
We know that there is a National Security Strategy that has not been updated since 2020, even though many aspects of it need to be revised. There is also the Military Security Strategy, whose latest approved version dates to March 2021. These are ostensibly public documents, but they are the documents that guide those planning the future course of the war. They need to understand what the state expects of them.
That is why the General Staff’s plan and the military plan must be clearly based on the political strategy set by the president, then passed through the Cabinet of Ministers and subsequently down to the ministries, defining what each institution must do to achieve the country’s objectives in the war.
— How did we end up with such a disconnect between what our defenders are achieving on the front line, where there have been many successes, and the deeply pessimistic mood we are seeing on the home front among ordinary Ukrainian civilians?
— I think it is primarily fatigue. Ordinary people are tired, but if we want to succeed, we cannot divide ourselves into those who are tired and those who are not. Everyone is tired. I think our soldiers on the front line are the most exhausted of all.
Everyone needs to do something to help them. Some people need to step in and replace them, some need to provide support, and others need to work on the home front. When you feel that you are contributing to the effort, I think those negative attitudes will gradually begin to change.
Of course, we do not need people destabilizing the situation with simplistic and unnecessary ideas such as “just stop shooting.” That does not work. We are not fighting an enemy with whom such an approach would work, and we have already seen that.
We need to create the conditions that would allow us to genuinely demand something from Russia. Unfortunately, for now, Russia has created conditions in which it sees no reason to enter negotiations.
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