Do Russian drones film Kyiv from above? Do they guide missiles and check strike results? Myths and facts about enemy reconnaissance UAVs

3 October, 12:40 PM

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The Gerbera drone with foreign components (Photo: HUR / Facebook)

NV journalist Serhii Okunev examined what is actually known about Russian reconnaissance UAVs and their capabilities, and spoke with one of Ukraine’s leading experts on enemy drones and communications systems — military radiotechnology specialist Serhii Beskrestnov, better known as Serhii Flash. Together, they addressed the most common questions about the enemy’s reconnaissance UAVs, their real abilities, and how they are used.

Are reconnaissance drones really used to find targets and confirm strikes?

Russian forces have a wide range of reconnaissance UAVs equipped with high-quality cameras, capable of recording and transmitting video to command posts even in bad weather or at night. The main families include Orlan, Supercam, and ZALA drones.

All of these are operator-controlled and transmit video via radio channels, which sharply limits their operating range. One of the most common, the ZALA, has several models that can stream live video up to 100 kilometers. In practice, however, effective reconnaissance at such a distance is difficult due to interference, terrain, and radio line-of-sight. One of Russia’s most effective drones, the Orlan, can transmit video at ranges of 100 to 120 kilometers.

As a result, about 90% of reconnaissance UAV operations involve gathering intelligence directly over the battlefield or in shallow rear areas near the border or frontline.

But what about the videos of strikes on Ukrainian airfields, training sites, and factories?

Yes, those are real. Russia has published reconnaissance and strike-adjustment footage since 2022. Recently, it released drone video over a facility in Zaporizhzhya that was later hit. Earlier, footage showed a strike on a military training center in Chernihiv Oblast. In another case, Russia itself confirmed — by posting drone video — that it had hit members of an international humanitarian demining mission with a ballistic missile.

But all of those examples were filmed at locations no more than 100 to 130 kilometers from Russian positions. This means reconnaissance UAVs can indeed operate effectively over Zaporizhzhya, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv Oblast, and other areas close to the border or frontline.

Do Russian drones film targets or strike results in Kyiv?

Lately, drones acting as scouts have indeed been spotted more frequently over Kyiv. But these are not Orlans or other advanced UAVs. Instead, they are cheap drones of the Geran type.

What’s the difference? Unlike Orlan or Supercam models, which are expensive and equipped with high-grade cameras, Gerans — commonly labeled “reconnaissance drones” when flying over Kyiv and other rear cities — are primitive craft made of plywood and foam. They do not have operators steering them in real time. Once launched, they simply follow a preprogrammed route. The enemy cannot redirect or control them mid-flight. Their cost ranges from $2,000 to $10,000 depending on the equipment installed.

“These drones were initially built as decoys to generate stress among civilians,” explained military radiotechnology expert Serhii Flash. “They’re very cheap, with poor navigation systems, but they distract mobile fire teams and air defense units. That’s because we can’t immediately know whether it’s just a decoy or a fully armed Shahed-type strike drone.”

Later, some Gerans did start carrying cameras, which was publicly reported. Flash himself was among the first to point it out on his platforms. He noted that such drones began using Chinese radio modems with two channels, each transmitting at 10 watts.

“This is fairly expensive equipment — around $6,000 to $7,000 per unit. It can transmit both video and control signals at ranges of 70 to 80 kilometers, and in some cases up to 100 kilometers, depending on conditions,” Flash said.

For that reason, Gerans cannot broadcast live footage from Kyiv or even its immediate outskirts. The evidence is straightforward: Russia has never released a single frame of video from over the capital, even though it regularly publishes footage from frontline cities for propaganda purposes. If Moscow truly had steady video reconnaissance over Kyiv, it would almost certainly have publicized it to intimidate civilians and tout its technology. To date, no such footage has ever been released.

Is it possible to somehow extend a drone’s transmission range to reach Kyiv?

It’s extremely difficult, and whether it’s possible in practice is unknown. Increasing range generally can be done by using relays. The principle is simple — one drone transmits to another drone, which relays the signal to the operator, creating an intermediate link that extends the reconnaissance distance. Flash says the Chinese modem used in Russian Gerberas has that capability.

But the process is far more complex in practice. Using relays is effective when you need to boost a drone’s 5-kilometer link to, say, 8 kilometers — that’s a proven, long-standing technique. Increasing a link from 70 kilometers to roughly 300 kilometers, however, is an extremely hard task that requires many favorable conditions.

“In theory, on paper, you could launch two, three or four platforms operating in relay mode. The network’s speed would fall and it wouldn’t be very stable, but technically it’s possible. Still, you can’t say it’s guaranteed to work now,” Flash said.

At present, it’s unknown how far a relay could reliably extend a signal without losing the video quality needed for live streaming. It’s a complex technical problem: the enemy would have to keep several drones aloft in a chain, all of them avoiding electronic warfare and other interference at the same time. If even one drone in the chain fails, the whole system collapses. Theoretically feasible — yes. In practice, there is no evidence the enemy has ever achieved this, much less done it repeatedly on a weekly basis.

How do U.S. and other Western drones operate at ranges of hundreds or thousands of kilometers?

There is a family of large UAVs that can stream video over hundreds or thousands of kilometers — for example, the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper. But that’s literally “another world” of UAVs and not comparable to Gerberas or even Orlans operating over Ukraine. The MQ-9 weighs more than 2 tons and has a 20-meter wingspan — it is closer to a remotely piloted airplane than the drones we normally think of.

The key difference is the communications system. Russian reconnaissance UAVs use radio links with inherent distance limits that cannot be overcome by physics alone. MQ-9s and similar platforms use SATCOM — satellite communications. That requires a vastly different technological base, geostationary satellites and far greater expense. The airframe alone, without weapons or satellite systems, costs about $30 million — roughly 6,000 times the price of a Gerbera.

Could the Russians simply bolt an “antenna” onto their cheap foam drones and achieve communications over hundreds or thousands of kilometers? No — at present that’s not possible even theoretically.

If reconnaissance drones aren’t streaming video from Kyiv, why do they fly over the capital at all?

There are several reasons. The Gerbera drone — the craft usually called a reconnaissance drone and one that reaches Kyiv fairly often — was designed from the start as a “decoy.” A very cheap drone draws the attention of detection systems and mobile air-defense fire teams. That is its primary task.

In addition, some of these drones send telemetry. Simply put, a cheap drone can transmit its coordinates once a minute or once every few minutes. When that signal stops, analysts can infer the drone was shot down or disabled. By analyzing telemetry from many drones, specialists can map safer routes and identify gaps in air-defense coverage. That is reconnaissance, but it isn’t related to video filming.

How can a drone send telemetry if there are range limits? Video streaming requires tens or hundreds of times more bandwidth. Telemetry data is only a few bytes, while even 1 second of video carries many times more data and needs a far more stable, higher-capacity link.

What about drones with SIM cards? Why can’t they stream video over mobile internet like a phone?

Serhii Flash — one of the first to report on SIM-card drones — says the Russians abandoned that method after Ukrainian specialists effectively detected and blocked those signals. Drones no longer use LTE or 3G to stream video.

Also, city mobile antennas are configured to cover the ground — streets and buildings — not the sky. That setting is called downtilt. Ordinary urban antennas may send some signal upward, but the quality of such an uplink is much worse.

If drones aren’t filming Kyiv, why do strikes sometimes follow reconnaissance flights the next day?

Given that the enemy launches drones almost daily, coincidences are inevitable: Gerberas are recorded over Kyiv one day and a strike happens the next. But even a superficial review of open monitoring channels shows no direct link. There are dozens of cases when nothing follows Gerberas over Kyiv.

The Russians publish dozens of reconnaissance videos from various frontline regions. Are there any from Kyiv?

This is a key fact — there are none. Literally zero. If Moscow really had the ability to conduct video reconnaissance over Kyiv, it would publish dozens of frames, including footage of strike effects.

Does that mean Gerberas with cameras are completely useless to the enemy?

No. Beyond serving as decoys and overloading Ukrainian air defenses, Gerberas equipped with cameras can, in some cases, search for strike targets and even spot Ukrainian air-defense systems and mobile fire teams by their flashes and launch signatures. But given the transmission limits, that threat is, for now, confined to frontline and border oblasts.

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