How stealth infantry, ground robots, and Russian lies fueled Ukraine's 277-sq-km Lyman offensive
Soldiers from the Third Army Corps 60th Separate Mechanized Brigade that took part in Vivaldi operation and Kolodiazi village near Lyman (Photo: 60th Separate Mechanized Brigade)
A Third Army Corps officer detailed previously undisclosed tactics behind Ukraine’s successful Operation Vivaldi counteroffensive and explained why Russia’s ongoing counterattacks near Lyman are doomed to fail.
Since early November 2026, Russian troops have tried to retaliate against the Ukrainian Defense Forces' most successful recent counteroffensive — Operation Vivaldi, executed jointly by the Third Army Corps and Operational Grouping Center — by attempting to recapture positions lost near Lyman in northern Donetsk Oblast.
On Nov. 7 alone, AFU General Staff reported five Russian assaults in the sector, targeting Lyman and the vicinity of Kolodiazi, a village roughly 11 kilometers to the north. In its evening briefing on Nov. 10, the General Staff again listed Kolodiazi among the targets of two separate Russian attempts to advance.
That same day, Vasyl Denysiuk, spokesperson for the 66th Separate Mechanized Brigade, stated on Suspilne television that Russian forces were ferrying infantry across to the western bank of the Chornyi Zherebets River, which flows near the administrative border between Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. The enemy has also been massing artillery and setting up drone launch positions. According to Denysiuk, while Russian troops still maintain several river crossings, every single one remains under tight Ukrainian fire control.
According to assessments by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russian forces attacked north and northeast of Lyman in early November but failed to make any territorial gains, remaining stuck at their starting positions.
The enemy will continue trying to recover its lost ground, an officer with the callsign "Atlet," deputy commander of a mechanized battalion in the 60th Separate Mechanized Inhulets Brigade, told NV. Operating as part of the Third Army Corps, the 60th Brigade liberated Kolodiazi alongside adjacent units during Operation Vivaldi.
Atlet predicts that Russia's counterattacks will fail and force enemy troops back onto the defensive. Over the winter, he noted, both sides will largely focus on holding established lines: once the leaves fall, infantry loses natural concealment, making offensive movement significantly harder.
Why are the consequences of Operation Vivaldi — which the Third Army Corps recently concluded — stinging the Russians so acutely? Across its four phases, Ukrainian command announced the liberation of 16 settlements totaling 277 square kilometers. In turn, the offensive eliminated the Russian threat of enveloping the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk urban agglomeration from the north.
Silent Marches and Small Groups
Success of Operation Vivaldi rested on several pillars clearly illustrated by the 60th Mechanized Brigade’s advance. The unit fought through all four stages of Vivaldi and liberated the second-largest area of territory after the Third Assault Brigade. This was disclosed to reporters on Oct. 19 by Dmytro Rohoziuk, who commanded the 60th Brigade for a year before taking over leadership of the Third Army Corps from Andrii Biletskyi when Biletskyi assumed command of Operational Grouping Center.
It was the 60th Brigade that liberated Kolodiazi on Oct. 14 — a settlement Russian forces had turned into a fortified staging hub to mass infantry, anchor defenses, and infiltrate further forward.
Ukrainian infantry reached the village entirely on foot. Armored vehicles were held back in the rear while soldiers moved in pairs and small fireteams, striving to remain undetected for as long as possible.
"We have a running joke among the soldiers who directly took part in the operation: the hardest part was walking — covering all that distance, all those kilometers," deputy battalion commander Atlet told NV.
The backbone of the Ukrainian offensive was infiltration tactics — covertly slipping small groups deep into enemy dispositions. Ukrainian infantry reached Russian rear logistics corridors and severed supply routes carrying ammunition, rations, and reinforcements.
"We tried for as long as possible to keep the enemy from realizing we were there," Atlet explained.
Once Russian commanders finally grasped what was unfolding, they threw reserves into the fight. Ukrainian units responded by bypassing and enveloping enemy strongpoints to preserve personnel and maintain momentum. Some squads stayed behind to lock down the encirclement while the rest pushed forward.
That exact playbook was executed in Kolodiazi. According to the chief of staff of the 60th Brigade’s "Fatum" Unmanned Systems Battalion, callsign "Krash," the 3rd Mechanized Battalion surrounded the village and cut off incoming Russian reinforcements while drone operators provided overhead cover for the infantry. This maneuver allowed Ukrainian troops to capture the settlement without costly street-by-street urban combat, Krash told Suspilne.
"We expected stiffer resistance from the enemy. But the moment we applied a bit of pressure, they crumbled — Russians started surrendering," Atlet explained to NV.
Some Russian soldiers laid down their arms mid-battle; others abandoned their positions on their own as soon as supplies stopped reaching their trenches.
Advancing Ukrainian infantry required continuous forward relocation of fire support. Atlet identified this as a critical task: artillery batteries and drone crews had to keep pace with the advancing troops so the enemy could not regroup or organize a coherent defense.
Before infantry stepped off, Ukrainian forces struck Russian dugouts, drone launch sites, and command posts. Enemy UAVs were suppressed using electronic warfare systems and shot down by interceptor drones.
"We tried to make the infantry's job as manageable as possible so he would have minimal direct firefight contact with the enemy," Atlet explained.
According to Krash, during the fourth stage of Operation Vivaldi alone, the Fatum Battalion killed or wounded roughly 500 Russian soldiers.
Unmanned systems worked on the ground as well: unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) hauled rations and ammunition forward to Ukrainian positions and evacuated the wounded and fallen. By Atlet's estimate, robotic platforms handled roughly 80% of that logistical workload in his unit.
The Offensive the Russians Missed
The widening disconnect between rosy media narratives pushed by Russia's military-political leadership and the harsh reality on the ground worked directly in Ukraine's favor.
Russian regiments and brigades held internal reserves, but the deputy battalion commander noted their capacity ran out quickly. Enemy field commanders failed to request reinforcements from division and army headquarters in time because admitting they needed help would have contradicted their own fabricated reports of battlefield success.
Biletskyi has similarly linked Operation Vivaldi's success to distorted Russian reporting. According to him, Russian commanders falsely claimed control over Sviatohirsk — and those fabricated dispatches helped the Third Army Corps conceal its offensive preparations for four months.
Operational surprise was further preserved because the corps attacked using forces that had already been defending roughly 160 kilometers of front line. No separate shock grouping was assembled, Biletskyi noted.
"By the textbook, you have forces sitting in defense and fresh forces brought in to assault. In our case, the storming and clearing operations were carried out by the exact same forces that had been holding the defense," Atlet confirmed. Moving fresh units into the sector, he added, would have telegraphed Ukrainian intentions to enemy reconnaissance.
Decisions on the Ground
Small-unit warfare depends heavily on how fast junior commanders can react to shifting battlefield conditions. In the 60th Brigade, command culture began evolving after Major Dmytro Rohoziuk took command in October of last year.
As Atlet explained, company and platoon commanders were granted far greater autonomy and responsibility. Under the principle of mission command, senior leadership defines the objective and overall operational intent, while subordinate leaders retain freedom of action in deciding how to execute it.
"It was vital for us that company commanders didn't just receive orders mechanically, but understood the overarching intent and the capabilities of their own unit — its strengths and weaknesses," the officer told NV.
In the Russian army, by contrast, he sees a weak non-commissioned officer corps and rigid over-reliance on senior brass. According to the Ukrainian officer, Russian commanders frequently micromanage even localized tactical actions at the division and army levels.
Combining junior leader initiative, covert infiltration, and synchronized fire support dramatically reduced Ukrainian casualties. During certain weeks, Atlet stated, enemy losses outpaced his unit's casualties by a factor of twenty to one.
Overall, according to Biletskyi, Ukrainian losses during Operation Vivaldi were seven times lower than Russian casualties, which exceeded 8k killed and wounded, alongside 270 enemy soldiers captured.
Atlet ties the primary strategic value of the operation to securing the flanks and supply lines of the Ukrainian grouping. Summing up Operation Vivaldi, Biletskyi likewise highlighted the thwarting of Russia's bid to envelop the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the flanks as its decisive achievement.
At the same time, completing the fourth stage has left room for further Ukrainian advances: unveiling the operation's results, Biletskyi declared that the corps' offensive will continue.
"As Commander Biletskyi said, the operation is complete, but we keep moving. So sooner or later, I think, there will be more good news," Atlet added.
The military war may be swinging in our favor, but the information war continues.
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