— Moscow has once again managed to push nuclear scare tactics back into the information agenda. I’m not saying the entire West should react to Belarus’ nuclear program, but it seems unacceptable to simply observe what Putin and Lukashenko are saying. What do you think?
— Mr. Dmytro, this concept of “exercises on the tactical use of nuclear weapons” is essentially synonymous with “command-and-staff simulations on decision-making regarding the use of nuclear weapons.”
When are such exercises conducted and what do they signal?
Usually, these command-and-staff simulations are held ahead of a planned operation, and they answer the question of whether the command leadership has the will to make decisions and manage the operation. This is not only about the use of nuclear weapons, but about managing operations on foreign territory in general. It could involve a large-scale invasion operation in a particular sector, extensive sabotage activity, or some critically important external decision involving kinetic force — meaning troop deployments, landings or incursions into territory.
If we look at previous experience, such command-and-staff exercises involving nuclear scenarios were conducted before the operation against Georgia. Similar drills were also held during the Zapad exercises before the attacks on Ukraine in both 2014 and 2022, when the so-called “special military operation” began.
On the one hand, it is important to understand that these drills do not involve the actual use of nuclear weapons — no transportation, loading or, God forbid, launches. These are simulated scenarios. But those simulations determine the willingness of senior and mid-level command personnel to make decisions under such circumstances.
According to standards that exist both in NATO countries and in Russia, there are certain benchmarks and scoring systems that determine whether a particular command structure is capable of managing such an operation and making adequate decisions.
As for how the situation may develop further, we will be able to say more once information about the results of these command-and-staff exercises begins to leak out.
— There seem to be at least two possible scenarios here. The escalation of information hysteria may be aimed at distracting Ukraine’s Defense Forces toward the northern direction. Ukraine already faces a difficult situation on the eastern front, and perhaps our enemies expect Kyiv to redeploy forces to the Belarusian border. On the other hand, if Ukraine does not react, it could encourage some kind of provocative forceful action. Are you currently seeing any indicators of preparations for possible provocations or even an invasion of Ukraine? We have already been through this in 2022. Are Lukashenko and Putin bluffing?
— First, regarding any large-scale operation or a repeat of 2022, Belarus itself does not have the forces for such operations, and there is currently no movement of Russian contingents into Belarus.
As for the exercises now taking place in Belarus, they are annual in nature and involve calling up a certain category of citizens referred to as reservists. Although, by current standards, it is difficult to call them reservists. Around 2,000 officers are mobilized to oversee the process. Most of this is essentially civil defense activity.
At present, Belarus has around 46,000 conscripts in its army. There is a huge shortage of ammunition and equipment, especially armored vehicles, because most stockpiles have been emptied and sent to the Russian-Ukrainian front. Much of the equipment, particularly armored vehicles, has already been destroyed there.
What is actually happening is the continued development of infrastructure, something that has been ongoing for years. Airfield infrastructure and support facilities are being restored and adapted to Russian military standards.
As is known, Belarus hosts airfields for both tactical and strategic aviation. Their primary purpose historically has been directed toward Northern and Central Europe.
It cannot be ruled out that plans are being developed to use those capabilities in the southern direction as well. However, at this moment, apart from the use of antenna networks to support and guide Russian drone flights and the involvement of Belarusian technical infrastructure, along with isolated sabotage activity along the border, nothing more has been observed.
It has already been repeatedly emphasized that the Ukraine-Belarus border has been heavily fortified and that the terrain and infrastructure are highly unsuitable for crossing. Only the Chernihiv and Rivne directions are somewhat viable. But for any operation there, a concentration of forces would immediately be noticed.
So yes, some technical work is ongoing, but it has been ongoing constantly and never stopped. Plans are being developed, and information about them continues to leak out and be recorded.
Right now, I would focus on what I see as the main epicenter of activity: sabotage operations conducted by Russia from Belarusian territory against Central and Northern European countries, including the Baltic and Scandinavian states. In my view, that is currently the main direction of activity.
As for whether a kinetic strike could occur — for example, scenarios recently practiced by Sweden involving the island of Gotland, or discussions concerning Iceland or parts of Estonia — such possibilities cannot be ruled out. The issue here is not so much about occupation and holding territory, but about testing Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and seeing what reaction follows.
If the response is united — from Washington to all 32 NATO member states — then there would obviously be an immediate response and a rapid reversal. But if the reaction is passive, such an operation could be escalated. European and U.S. media are actively discussing these scenarios and exploring various possibilities.
As for the Ukrainian direction, I can say definitively that I currently see neither a buildup of forces nor relevant intelligence. I also have the ability to receive information directly from the ground. There is no unusual activity there aside from routine road repairs. No new road construction is underway.
And in those swampy conditions, with forest trails instead of real roads, it is impossible to effectively use armored vehicles or heavy transport. The main routes are either mined or blocked with serious fortifications.
— If Putin attempts to use Belarus or the Belarusian army — whether for provocations or to open a second front against NATO countries in order to test them — could that ultimately lead to the collapse of Lukashenko’s regime through internal protests?
— That is precisely the issue. If Putin and Alexander Lukashenko fully controlled the situation, I see no obstacle to them using even unprepared conscripts in such operations. However, there is a major concern.
According to polling in Belarus, more than 80% of Belarusians oppose Belarusian participation in this war. That is why Belarus is being used more as a staging ground for sabotage operations and technical support for Shahed drone guidance. It is also used for training sabotage groups and sending them westward disguised as migrants, or as a training ground for rehearsing operations.
I am convinced that if Russia carries out any kinetic operation against a Western country under current conditions, it would likely be limited in scope and conducted under a false flag. Most likely, it would indeed use a Belarusian flag, but direct involvement of Belarusian forces is unlikely.
Conscripts lack the necessary level of training, while the 16,000-strong special units and gendarmerie are primarily focused on suppressing their own population. Belarus also has special operations forces, but their numbers are too small to conduct serious operations. Officially, there are said to be around 4,000 personnel, but according to more reliable data, the actual number is closer to 1,500-2,000.
Meanwhile, European countries are not asleep. They are prepared. It is well known that British, German and Italian troops are stationed in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. NATO has effectively deployed multinational units there. I am not even mentioning the two U.S. divisions currently stationed in Poland and Romania.
Under these conditions, it is unlikely anyone would risk a reckless move. However, as a test or provocation, such kinetic actions are possible. That is why there is discussion about the so-called Suwalki corridor toward Kaliningrad from Belarusian territory. Similar scenarios are discussed regarding Estonia, particularly near Narva. The situation must be monitored closely.
— Is Lukashenko cunning enough to maneuver and avoid being a complete executor of Putin’s will? Or is he so deeply tied into the Russia-Belarus union state that he no longer has room to maneuver?
— Mr. Dmytro, everything has its limits. Previously, Lukashenko could play the role of a “talking head.” But recently, when he engaged to some extent with Washington, it created tensions between Minsk and Moscow, even though he was simultaneously helping solve some Russian problems.
For example, lifting sanctions on Belavia could have opened opportunities for Aeroflot to obtain spare parts and other resources. There were also discussions about using Belavia’s Boeing fleet for repairs and operations. Many such plans existed.
However, as we can see, political prisoners were released, but the United States has not rushed to lift sanctions, so the situation remains unresolved.
If you ask me where all this current noise from Lukashenko and Putin comes from, it serves several functions.
Strategically, first and foremost, it signals the strengthening of the so-called axis of evil. One cannot discuss this without mentioning Tehran, Beijing, Moscow, North Korea and Belarus. All these messages reinforce that bloc.
Second, there are tactical issues directly related to operations carried out by Russian forces in Ukraine. That also plays a role and should not be forgotten.
At the same time, it is important to understand that Belarus currently lacks the potential, and there is no Russian force present there capable of conducting operations in the southern direction.
As for future developments, it is true that such scenarios are being discussed and planned. Even Lukashenko occasionally speaks about them. But this is not necessarily because he personally wants them — rather because he is tasked with amplifying such narratives in order to shake the situation through information and psychological pressure against both Ukraine and Western countries.