Serviceman names three factors behind success of strikes on Russia’s Ust-Luga port

“I would not link these things to Russian radar systems, because you cannot rely on having radar. First, radar does not equal interception — it only enables possible detection. It is never equivalent to a target being destroyed.

Therefore, to be prepared, comprehensive measures are needed.

Clearly, Russia is losing its air defenses very rapidly. This is clearly visible in the statistics. They are losing systems particularly quickly in occupied Crimea and other occupied territories, and not only there but also on Russian territory.

We see that facilities are being struck constantly and systematically. Here is an example of radar performance — the Valdai system was hit in Crimea a few days ago. This is a system that operates within what is known as short-range air defense and is designed to detect drones. It did not help — it did not protect it from being hit by a drone.

So this is not a panacea; they are capable of missing strikes.

The key issue is high-precision, effective planning. We are talking about an operation that was developed over weeks, possibly months. Various options and scenarios were calculated.

Strikes on Ust-Luga occurred earlier, but they were not as effective, unfortunately, because similar types of weapons were not used as we have seen now. This is what we must understand. First is planning and organization.

Second is focusing on those targets at the right moment. Right now, there is a window of opportunity.

Why are strikes on Ust-Luga and Primorsk important now? These are outstanding special operations that, in particular, can increase pressure that will force Vladimir Putin to come to the negotiating table not on his own terms or inflated demands for Ukrainian concessions. No — we are imposing our terms.

Novorossiysk, Ust-Luga and Primorsk account for two-thirds of Russia’s exports of petroleum products. To put it simply, Ust-Luga and Primorsk, and the refinery that was hit there, are essentially like Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 — as if the two branches of Nord Stream were currently operating via pipelines.

You understand what kind of losses this means for the Russian economy, and above all for its war machine. And, of course, from a political standpoint, particularly for the Kremlin, because Russia was counting that sanctions would ease, oil prices were rising, and it could take advantage of that. No — that did not happen.

So the timing was chosen very well. That is the second element.

The third element. This attack demonstrates that, despite everything, while we talk about the transformation and development of drones, you can see from the footage and images circulating that small aircraft — even unmanned aviation — but using heavy weapons and heavy warheads, are still in play, with proper organization and planning.

I look at what is happening now, how the United States and Israel are acting in Iran. I will tell you that under conditions where such use of aviation and long-range missiles against Russia were possible, we would end the war against the Kremlin with Russia’s defeat within six months. Without any doubt.

But unfortunately, without such support, we have to achieve the results we need on our own. And we are moving along this path.”