Radio NV: Kyrylo Budanov has been actively commenting on various events and processes in domestic and foreign policy in recent weeks, or perhaps even months. On the one hand, he holds the position of head of the Office of the President. On the other hand, I think it is interesting to understand what stands behind all these statements.
For example, he said that ending the hot phase of the war by November is realistic. He announced a visit by American negotiators to Kyiv. He says he believes in negotiations no matter what. There is too much optimism and hope in these statements.
When I listen to Budanov, I get the same vibe as “coffee in Crimea” and the encouraging forecasts we heard in 2022. And I have started to wonder: is this being done somehow to encourage society? Or does Budanov perhaps know something?
Volodymyr Fesenko: No, I think no one can know when the war will end. No one. Because it does not depend on us, and not even on the United States.
As long as the Russian side does not agree to real negotiations, it is hardly possible to forecast the end of the war, especially with specific dates.
Another thing is that I can agree with both Budanov and Zelenskyy that not now, but in the fall, a window of opportunity may open. But not for ending the war — rather for the start of real negotiations, which could theoretically lead to agreements, for example, on a phased end to the war.
Pay attention to the phrase itself. It was first used by Zelenskyy when he met with MPs from Servant of the People, and then Budanov said it too — the “hot phase of the war.” But what does ending the hot phase of the war mean? It can be interpreted in different ways.
The more likely and perhaps more accurate interpretation of this term is a ceasefire. That does not mean the full end of the war, when peace agreements are signed, but a ceasefire. It could also mean de-escalation of the war, when air strikes stop and, at the same time, ground combat operations also stop — perhaps not completely, but to a significant extent. That too could be considered the end of the hot phase of the war. So there can be different interpretations.
Why do I agree that, from the point of view of a window of opportunity, this could happen in the fall? Because in the summer, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin will definitely not be negotiating. We see this from Putin’s statements and those of his spokesperson Dmitry Peskov.
We know — and unfortunately this is being confirmed — that Russia is not abandoning its plans for a summer offensive and will try to carry it out. In addition, an escalation of the air war is already underway.
If we manage to neutralize all these Russian plans, if we manage to stop, or better yet, disrupt Russia’s summer offensive, if we manage to at least partially contain Russian air attacks — there is a problem with missiles here. With drones, things are working better, but with missiles, unfortunately, there are not enough interceptor missiles. Nevertheless, if we manage to hold out — and if we survived this winter, I think we will survive this too.
If we manage to intensify strikes on Russia, on the Russian rear, as we are now seeing in St. Petersburg — this is a very loud greeting to the participants and organizers of the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, and also a prelude to Putin’s speech at that forum. If there are more such strikes, if there is a fuel shortage not only in Crimea and in certain Russian regions, but in most regions of central Russia, then there will be problems.
And then, I think, the likelihood of negotiations beginning — at least on a phased ceasefire — will become higher. It is not guaranteed that the war will stop, or that combat operations will stop. Unfortunately, no one can give guarantees here. But negotiations may begin.
But for that to happen, in addition to our actions, the situation in Russia must worsen, and the Americans must act more actively. They should not wait until both sides are ready for negotiations, but should begin actively promoting not the topic of Ukrainian troops withdrawing from Donbas, but a simple and key idea: a ceasefire, at least a phased ceasefire.
So in this sense, I do not think this is about some excessive optimism on Budanov’s part. It is more likely about the possibility that a window of opportunity may emerge. Whether it can be used or not depends on various circumstances and mainly, unfortunately, on Putin’s readiness to negotiate a ceasefire.
Budanov’s activity is connected, among other things, with his personal interests. This is his style. He likes to make statements that always contain a certain mystery, a certain understatement. And this attracts additional attention.
Besides, it seems to me — this is my assumption — that Budanov and his circle, his team, have concluded that the topic of negotiations works positively for his personal image and rating. I can confirm this: Budanov’s ratings began to grow around January.
Pay attention: not last year, but specifically from January, when he was appointed head of the Presidential Office and when he began actively participating in negotiations.
I know the assessments of colleagues who conduct research, and indeed, the rise in Budanov’s rating was directly connected to the fact that certain expectations of successful negotiations were associated with him.
Radio NV: I just want to note that if November comes and these forecasts do not come true, every such word will come back very painfully as a boomerang. It seems to me that Ukrainians have not forgotten all the government’s promises about coffee in Crimea, about the 1991 borders and so on. People still remember these loud promises, and this could become yet another unfulfilled promise.
Volodymyr Fesenko: This is the topic of promises. It is not a political statement, not a promise. There was excessive optimism. Yes, there was excessive optimism then, in 2022 and early 2023, and not only from Budanov.
Another thing is that Budanov had formed such an image by that time that after 2022 he began to be perceived as a prophet, a guru who knows what will happen and how events will develop.
Some people did perceive him as a prophet — as someone who really knows something that everyone else does not. So his words were treated in a special way.
I advised then, and I advise now, not to make such excessive promises, forecasts or assessments, and to be restrained.
It is impossible to accurately forecast the course of events, especially in war. The pendulum of war — even this term is already used quite often — swings first one way and then the other.
This is connected, among other things, with the fact that at a certain stage Ukraine may have an advantage, and then Russia compensates for it through scaling, including by scaling our own achievements. Our experience is used and then scaled very effectively. We also respond and look for answers to Russian developments. There is competition, a race, even during war.
As for the impact on image and ratings, there is an interesting paradox. This unfulfilled promise, as you called it, did not particularly affect Budanov’s ratings.
And I will draw attention to this again. Budanov’s ratings began to grow when, in the perception of many people — not officially, not by position — he became the chief negotiator.
Although formally the chief negotiator is Rustem Umerov, and Budanov is only a member of the delegation. But people associate him with the negotiations, and he felt that himself.
Pay attention: since February, the key idea in his interviews has been negotiations. He is an ardent supporter of negotiations and of finding a way out of the war through negotiations.
I know one version of events. I can neither confirm nor deny it, because this is a very delicate topic. And I think very few people know the real information on this issue.
The point is that Budanov has his own personal contacts with the American side. He is betting on active contacts with the American side, which is also interested in ending the war. Another matter is that sometimes this may be through concessions to Russia.
Budanov understands that this option will not work in Ukraine. It is unacceptable for Zelenskyy, and it is unacceptable for the majority of Ukrainians. So I think he will not play along with precisely this strategy for ending the war — through concessions to Russia.
But there is no doubt that negotiations are a key element of Budanov’s new image. And he is feeding it. In the current structure of Ukrainian power, he is indeed the most active supporter of a negotiated path to ending the war.
Radio NV: Do you think Budanov’s ratings are growing in a controlled way? Is someone allowing them to grow and supporting him in this — for example, in the Presidential Office? Or is this his personal game? Has he already become a subject of the political process, and it is now impossible to stop or control this?
Could the president’s team perhaps begin to question whether Budanov might somehow negatively affect the president’s own trust and distrust ratings? And could some kind of competition arise between them?
Volodymyr Fesenko: This is not about Budanov’s ratings affecting Zelenskyy’s ratings. From what I know, their electoral bases, their supporters, are largely the same people. That is, a significant share of people support both Zelenskyy and Budanov at the same time.
By the way, there was a similar story in 2022–2023 with the trust ratings of Zelenskyy and Valerii Zaluzhnyi, then commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and now ambassador to the United Kingdom. It was a very similar story.
Most people supported both Zelenskyy and Zaluzhnyi at the same time back then. Later, when tensions emerged between them, and when Valerii Fedorovych was removed from the post of commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, changes began.
Even now, some people trust both Zelenskyy and Zaluzhnyi at the same time — I am speaking specifically about trust ratings.
But when we talk about electoral ratings, you have to choose only one person. And that is a different story. Zaluzhnyi is supported more by those who want change, who want the current president replaced, and vice versa.
With Budanov, the story is somewhat different. In presidential ratings, for example, Budanov is significantly behind both Zaluzhnyi and Zelenskyy. And for now, he has no chance of making it into the second round of a presidential election if both Zelenskyy and Zaluzhnyi take part.
At least, that was the data in February and March. Perhaps new polls will appear now. Then we will see how recent events connected to the new wave of anti-corruption investigations, Mindichgate, and the cases involving former Presidential Office head Andriy Yermak have affected Zelenskyy’s ratings.
But at this point, Zelenskyy’s and Budanov’s ratings are, I would say, related. They are linked to each other. They are not in competition with each other.
Another thing is that I mentioned Zaluzhnyi. Why did tensions arise between them at one time? Because at first, people in the Presidential Office — they say it was Yermak, and then Zelenskyy himself — began to view Zaluzhnyi as the main competitor.
There was a certain jealousy because Zaluzhnyi’s ratings were higher than Zelenskyy’s. This caused a certain jealousy. And then, after the failures of the summer offensive in 2023, Zelenskyy began to take an increasingly critical view of Zaluzhnyi.
Then there was the conflict story around Zaluzhnyi’s article in The Economist. And in the end, he had to leave the post of commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.
And what is interesting is that some sources say such a story may repeat itself with Budanov.
In any case, not now, but sometime in March and April, I remember there were questions from some foreign journalists — and our media also wrote about this — that Zelenskyy was allegedly unhappy that Budanov was too active, that he often takes part in various public forums, speaks publicly and sometimes makes statements that are not entirely identical to President Zelenskyy’s statements, and sometimes even slightly contradict them.
There were such leaks — I can neither confirm nor deny them — that Zelenskyy was allegedly dissatisfied with Budanov’s excessive media activity. There were also claims that Zelenskyy and his inner circle did not like the fact that Budanov’s trust ratings had begun to overtake Zelenskyy’s own.
Zaluzhnyi remains the leader in trust ratings and in electoral ratings, especially in a hypothetical second round of a presidential election. Nevertheless, in terms of trust ratings specifically, Budanov overtook Zelenskyy.
After that, Budanov’s rhetoric changed. This is an interesting point. I remember his speech at the Kyiv Security Forum, which is organized by Arseniy Yatsenyuk and his foundation. Budanov surprised many people there.
He said that we need to unite around President Zelenskyy’s vertical of power. Pay attention: not simply around President Zelenskyy, but around the vertical. And in this vertical, at least formally, Budanov is in second place after the president himself.
One may think or speculate where Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko, National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov, Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk, Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov and others stand in this system. But still, the phrase was “around the president’s vertical.”
And his latest statements, these forecasts for the fall — how did Budanov present them? As a political directive, not as a forecast.
“The president has given the instruction to negotiate peace by winter, and I will carry it out,” Budanov said. That is, he is demonstrating loyalty to the president.
Nevertheless, he is perceived as a relatively independent figure. And here there is a basis for certain contradictions between Zelenskyy and Budanov in the future.