How Moscow drone attacks affect the war

Opinion

27 July 2023, 08:48 PM

Oleksandr Kovalenko

Military and political columnist of the Information Resistance group

A new record for the number of destroyed Russian air defense systems - 63 units

The current drone attacks on Moscow raise the question of who exactly is launching them. This is very interesting. The closest distance between the border with Ukraine and Russia to Moscow is 700-800 kilometers. So the question arises: how can a UAV with a cruising speed of about 150 km/h get from the Ukrainian border to Moscow without being detected by Russian air defense systems?

We know that the Russian Federation has one of the best air defenses in the world, the so-called echelon air defense system. It is almost impossible for a UAV to avoid detection over these hundreds of kilometers, these hours of flight; it is a fantasy. Then these UAVs fly to the center of Moscow and hit some objects there? Either they hit the Kremlin or create a turbulent situation for the oligarchs over Rublevka. Now, again, they hit a business center, and something exploded near the building of the Ministry of Defense.

It seems to me that the Russian FSB should start looking into local aeromodelling clubs (especially in the Moscow region). Maybe they have something to do with this.

I have another question - the Pantsyr-S1 short-range anti-aircraft missile and gun systems that were installed on the roofs of administrative buildings to increase effectiveness – why did they not work?

The Pantsyr-S1 is supposed to counter small-sized aerial targets such as drones and UAVs effectively, but something went wrong.

Therefore, the biggest question is not so much where this or that drone hit, but what is going on in Russia, given everything with their air defense system? Where did it go? Was it not in Ukraine that it was destroyed and significantly weakened on the territory of the Russian Federation itself?

In the temporarily occupied territories, there is a process of regular and constant destruction of Russian air defense systems. Where do they come from? Well, of course, they are transferred from Russia to Ukraine to compensate for the loss of systems that domestic production cannot offset very quickly. But June set the record for the number of Russian air defense systems destroyed – 56. July is not over yet, but we have already set a new record for the number of destroyed Russian air defense systems – 63 units, and I am sure their number will increase exponentially.

Here is the damage to the ammunition depots in Crimea. There are many photos and videos in open sources of how this happened. It was noticeable from many, many tens of kilometers away that something was happening at this ammunition depot. Now I can say this: on the territory of the temporarily occupied Crimean Peninsula, work is underway to prepare and create conditions for the liberation of not only the mainland. Although the Russian propaganda constantly calls Crimea an "unsinkable aircraft carrier," a bastion (which is more like the Bastille), it is primarily a transit hub for the supply of logistics from the Russian mainland to the south of Ukraine, where the fiercest fighting is taking place. Therefore, Crimea should be treated as a transit hub. Some supplies are sent from there to the south of Ukraine, and some remain there. These reserves are gathered in a large number of warehouses. Accordingly, there will be a lot of work. So the second half of the summer will be very hot in Crimea.

To liberate Crimea, it is necessary to liberate not only the Left Bank of Kherson region, but also the Zaporizhzhia region. Because the full-scale scenario for the liberation of Crimea, as I see it, requires the peninsula's isolation. Isolation is impossible without liberating Zaporizhzhia and the Left Bank Kherson regions. Control of the Black Sea, control of the Sea of Azov, and the destruction of the Crimean bridge itself - all are integral parts of the strategy for the liberation of Crimea.

What is the situation now? There is no need to rush to any outstanding changes in the combat zone, especially in the Zaporizhzhia region, because the territories in the process of being liberated are very difficult. They are complicated because of the minefields concentrated there by the Russian occupiers, as well as the forces and means they have deployed there.

In general, I will say this: what is happening in southern Ukraine should be compared to the Right Bank Kherson region when it was being liberated. For some reason, many people criticize the pace of the liberation of the Zaporizhzhia region. However, I don't see any reason to do so.

Let's remember how the armed forces liberated the Right Bank Kherson region. When did the full-fledged counteroffensive actions of the Ukrainian defense forces begin? They began in May 2022. When did they liberate Kherson? It was early November. So, the process of liberating the Right Bank Kherson region took almost six months. The events currently taking place in the Zaporizhzhia region are on a similar scale. The primary locations now are Pyatikhatki, Orikhove, and Robotyno, as well as Mokry Yaly and Staromlynivka. These are the main areas of advancement of our Ukrainian defense forces, step by step.

We are now aligning our flanks, liberating new territories, and covering settlements from which the Russians will only have to flee. The most important thing is that we are not using the tactic of a frontal assault on settlements. Thus, completely different tactical decisions reduce personnel losses and allow us to use the resources of units with limited functionality less quickly but more efficiently. This is very important. Because today we have yet to start using our main strike groups. Units with limited functionality continue to play a significant role in the Zaporizhzhia region.

Інші новини

Все новости