The spy war behind the front line: How a U.S. volunteer flipped a Kremlin honeypot

If Russia’s army has failed to live up to its own mythology, its intelligence and influence operations remain dangerous and adaptive. The legacy of Soviet KGB tradecraft did not disappear with the USSR. It evolved. Today, Russian security services operate across borders, targeting officials, infiltrating opposition networks, cultivating personal relationships, and weaponizing information in ways that extend far beyond Ukraine.

Sarah Ashton-Cirillo’s story sits precisely at that intersection.

An American who arrived in Ukraine at the start of the full-scale invasion as a traveler, she chose to stay, later joining the Territorial Defense Forces and becoming deeply involved in countering Russian information operations. In this interview, she speaks in detail about Russian “honeypot” tactics in the United States, her relationship with Russian operative Noma Zarubina — who has since pleaded guilty in a U.S. court and is awaiting sentencing this summer — and how the operation ultimately unfolded.

With Zarubina’s conviction bringing legal clarity to the case, Ashton-Cirillo is now able to share operational details, including private messages, screenshots, and previously unreleased videos. What follows is a rare look inside the real-world mechanics of modern intelligence warfare — a reminder that in this war, the fight for territory is only part of the struggle. The battle for influence, perception, and control of narratives may prove just as decisive.

Our conversation was long — but it is worth reading in full, and worth every minute of your attention.

Demian Shevko:

Sarah, you’ve become a well-known American figure in Ukraine. Let’s start from the beginning. Four years ago, you arrived simply as a travel blogger — a traveler curious about different countries. Then you found yourself in the middle of a full-scale war. You began volunteering, later joined active military service, and now, as recent reports suggest, you’ve been described as an agent connected to the United Front, the Russian Liberation Front.

Can you tell us about your background? What motivated you? How did this transformation happen — from your previous life to who you are now?

Sarah Ashton Cirillo:

After about six months of working here as a journalist, I joined the Ukrainian Defense Forces, specifically the Territorial Defense Forces out of Kharkiv — the 209th Battalion of the 113th Brigade. During that time, I began working on some projects in the realm of information operations. At one point, we fabricated the story that I was a spokesperson — completely made up — and that effort resulted in Russia officially designating me a terrorist because of our work in that space.

From there, I became known within Russia’s sphere of influence — not only among the enemy, but also among Russian liberation forces, both inside and outside Russia.

That exposure allowed me to establish contact with Russians inside Russia who had formed a group called the United Front of Resistance. Later, when I transferred from the Territorial Defense Forces to the Main Intelligence Directorate, or HUR, I was able to significantly expand those relationships with Russian influencers, operatives, and assets.

Beginning in 2024, I developed deep ties within the Russian expatriate community, as well as with individuals inside Russia who were willing to assist in Ukraine’s liberation — and in their own liberation — by working toward victory against the Russian regime, overthrowing Putin, and freeing the Russian people.

When my military service concluded in February 2025, I shifted my focus full-time to working with the Russian resistance, particularly the United Front of Resistance. We began building something much larger. As has been reported, I assisted them on multiple occasions across Europe and in the United States.

Demian Shevko:

It’s striking that on one hand, you were fighting Russia directly as a military medic on the front lines, participating in operations — and on the other hand, you were cooperating with Russians opposed to the regime, helping them in different ways.

What, in your view, is the real potential of the Russian opposition? How many people are truly willing to confront the regime actively?

Sarah Ashton Cirillo:

I don’t have exact numbers, and I wouldn’t want to speculate. What I can say is that I’m in communication with enough people to see tangible results inside Russia and across the globe.

We’ve seen generals killed, creating leadership vacuums that our military can then exploit. We’ve seen propagandists removed. We’ve seen figures such as Darya Dugina eliminated. These actions are being carried out by Russians against Russians.

One of the Kremlin’s greatest lies is the claim that Ukrainians are responsible for all of this. That’s not true. Russians inside Russia want to be free. They understand that Putin represents a destructive force within their society. They believe the only path forward is a mutual victory — for Russians who have been oppressed under Putin’s regime and for Ukrainians who have endured four years of full-scale invasion and centuries of conflict with this adversary.

Demian Shevko:

Recently, the Free Russia Forum took place in Vilnius. It appears that figures such as Garry Kasparov, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and other exiled Russian opinion leaders — scientists, journalists, public intellectuals — are increasingly shifting toward the idea that overthrowing the regime may ultimately require armed resistance.

You work with the United Front of Resistance. Even the name suggests something broad and unified. We also see formations such as the Russian Volunteer Corps and other units fighting on Ukraine’s side.

How close are we to a point where these different opposition figures and armed groups could unite under a single idea or common platform? And how does the Russian regime attempt to disrupt and fragment the opposition movement?

Sarah Ashton Cirillo:

I believe the single idea is already clear: the overthrow of Putin and the dismantling of his cabal.

Putin is a gangster. Gangsters belong either in prison or six feet underground. When his death comes — and it will come — it will come at the hands of another Russian. He can surround himself with security and external protections, but he cannot protect himself from those who know him best. And those people are Russians.

But regime is still strong. Recently you covered Russian honeypot spy Nomma Zarubina's case. She was my lover. We had an intimate relationship for about eight months. As The New Voice of Ukraine reported, I entered into that relationship to extract significant information from her. She has since pleaded guilty — to acting as an FSB asset and to engaging in prostitution and human trafficking.

What I learned during my time with her is that many Russians will do almost anything to escape what they see as a sinking ship. She provided me with extensive information in the hope of escaping her own dire situation.

At one point, we recorded a video — you’ve seen it — in which she praised Russian fighters opposing Putin’s regime. She specifically mentioned those from the Russian Volunteer Corps and other units who have shown the courage to fight back. While her words may not have been sincere, the message itself was correct.

If Russians are willing to take up arms against the regime, those are the individuals who must be supported and unified.

The partisans I work with inside Russia through the United Front of Resistance are prepared to take up arms. The Russian Volunteer Corps has demonstrated the same resolve. In March 2025, while I was on assignment in Berlin, we identified an individual spying against those fighters and were able to link that person directly to Putin’s regime. That showed us that these movements are being taken seriously — and that they are having an impact.

These armed groups are operating effectively on the front lines. They are sowing fear inside Russia, just as the United Front of Resistance is doing through partisan actions.

The question now is how to prevent fragmentation. There are opposition figures who divide rather than unite. The partisans within the United Front of Resistance want to cooperate with intellectual leaders such as Kasparov and others, while also working alongside those prepared to fight militarily.

When individuals like Zarubina provide information and publicly acknowledge the legitimacy of Russian fighters opposing Putin, it signals something deeper: even elements within the FSB understand that change is coming.

What is coming is the defeat of Putin’s regime. Russians within the Kremlin will ultimately face the consequences of the system they built. And Putin himself will not escape that reckoning.

Demian Shevko:

Sarah, I’d like to return to Zarubina in more detail. Now that she has pleaded guilty, many of the claims that once seemed questionable have been confirmed.

She was presented as a Russian operative — a relatively young woman, well-educated, fluent in English. According to the charges, she used personal relationships, including sex, as a tool to gather information. And it appears she was ultimately caught in a similar dynamic.

How did this begin? How did you first learn about her? Can you walk us through how you came to the decision to engage with her and how it unfolded?

Sarah Ashton Cirillo:

In 2024, I was on active-duty assignment in the United States during the NATO conference. I met Noma at an intimate dinner at the home of a Russian opposition leader based in the United States who also had ties to Ukraine.

During that dinner, her behavior raised suspicions. I reported my concerns to my superiors in Ukraine, stating that she and her associates were most likely operating as agents. An investigation began in July 2024.

The United States announced her arrest in November 2024. She was arrested and released on bail. During that period, we learned that she had begun targeting me. If you look at her social media, I was one of the very few accounts she followed. The timing was notable.

Shortly after I stepped down from active-duty status and began working as a foreign recruitment volunteer for the Russian resistance, she contacted me in early spring 2025 and asked to connect. By April, she was expressing romantic interest and proposing that we meet in person.

After consulting with colleagues in the United Front of Resistance, I traveled to New York to see her. What began as her attempt to target me evolved into a relationship in which I was able to extract significant information.

She demonstrated what I consider a common trait among operatives within the Russian system: a willingness to negotiate with anyone if it benefits their personal survival. There was no visible loyalty to the Kremlin — not even among someone acting on behalf of the FSB.

From early spring 2025 until just days before her arrest, we maintained what appeared to be a relationship. That included the period after I returned to active duty in the Armed Forces in late November 2025. She was jailed in the first week of December 2025. The sequence of events speaks for itself.

Demian Shevko:

Given that you had already become a prominent target of Russian state propaganda during your service in the Territorial Defense, can we reasonably assume that Zarubina did not act independently — that she was tasked by Russian authorities to target you?

Sarah Ashton Cirillo:

We know that for certain.

I was designated a terrorist by Russia in 2024 and placed under sanctions the same year. In early spring 2025, Russian authorities announced that I was under criminal investigation. That is precisely when she initiated contact.

In June 2025 — around the time she was professing her love and I was making plans to see her — I was sentenced in absentia by a Russian court to 20 years in prison on terrorism-related charges. Despite that, this FSB agent was still permitted to meet with me and invite me into her home. It was clearly an attempt to target me directly.

However, because of my training in Ukraine and guidance from members of the United Front of Resistance on how to counter FSB operations, we were able to turn the situation to our advantage.

There were personal dimensions to that decision. To maintain the credibility of the relationship and fully commit to the operation, I made personal sacrifices. I temporarily discontinued my hormone treatment in order to sustain the relationship as part of the broader effort.

It was not a decision made lightly. But we understood that if we were going to see the operation through, it required complete commitment.

Demian Shevko:

You mentioned that you first met her at the home of a Russian opposition figure in the United States. If possible, can you clarify who that was and whether she may have been targeting him as well?

Sarah Ashton Cirillo:

The dinner took place at the home of Ilya Ponomarev. I can’t speculate on her exact purpose for being there. It’s possible she was targeting him, but I don’t want to make assumptions beyond what I know. Andrei Illarionov, a Russian economist and former chief economic advisor of Putin was also there. 

What I can say is that she managed to insert herself into the circles of many influential individuals — on multiple sides. At one point, she had a relationship with Russia’s deputy ambassador to the United Nations, Dmitry Polyanskiy. After that, she entered into a relationship with me.

I can’t fully assess the motivations behind her interactions with different individuals, but she was clearly skilled at building personal connections and gaining trust.

Demian Shevko:

It certainly sounds like something out of a spy novel.

Sarah Ashton Cirillo:

What I want to emphasize is that within the United Front of Resistance, we do not operate out of fear of the Russian state.

After I became involved with Zarubina, I even sent a message to Polyanskiy. The point was symbolic — to demonstrate that no matter what operations they attempt, we intend to stay ahead.

Demian Shevko:

Figures like Maria Butina, Zarubina — and likely others — suggest a pattern. Can we reasonably assume there are more operatives like her active in the United States and Europe, using similar methods?

Sarah Ashton Cirillo:

As The New Voice of Ukraine reported, she provided information about various assets operating in the United States.

Zarubina seemed particularly focused on Butina. It felt almost competitive, as though she was measuring herself against her. But in the end, these individuals are instruments of the Kremlin — tools within a larger system.

There is nothing uniquely exceptional about them. They are selected, deployed, and, if necessary, discarded. If there has been a Butina and a Zarubina, there will likely be others who believe they are playing a decisive role in history — and we will be prepared for that.

Demian Shevko:

I interviewed Zarubina briefly myself — about 15 minutes. She denied the allegations at the time, and it was clear she was cautious with her words.

You spent far more time with her. When you say she was intelligent but “Russian to the core,” what do you mean by that? What did you observe? What motivates someone like her? Is it ideology, ambition, arrogance — something else?

Sarah Ashton Cirillo:

There were a couple of moments that stood out to me.

I met her parents virtually over video calls.

Demian Shevko:

Wow.

Sarah Ashton Cirillo:

She believed — or at least tried to convince herself — that we would eventually marry. So one evening I spoke with her mother, and on another occasion I spoke with her father.

What struck me was their reaction to her arrest. It was as though it meant nothing. They were simply waiting for her to return home. They genuinely seemed to believe that this American — a Ukrainian noncommissioned officer — would marry their daughter. They accepted that narrative completely.

There was also a remark she once made about the Ukrainian language that I’ll never forget. She said, “I don’t have a problem with the Ukrainian language. It’s actually more pure. It’s like our little country cousins are speaking a language that Russian was built off of.”

That comment reflected something deeper.

I spent time in her home. I saw how she spoke to her child about the Soviet Union — about its so-called greatness. Even while she was recording videos for us criticizing Putin and praising Russian fighters opposing him, she maintained certain core assumptions.

At one point she said, in her view, Putin didn’t need to start a war — because Ukraine would eventually join Russia anyway.

That’s what I mean when I say she was Russian at her core. It wasn’t just political loyalty. It was a worldview — an ingrained belief about hierarchy, entitlement, and inevitability.

Demian Shevko:

That argument echoes something I’ve heard before. Ilya Ponomarev once told Russian media that he voted against the annexation of Crimea not because he believed it was fundamentally wrong, but because he believed the method was wrong. It’s a similar line of thinking.

Sarah Ashton Cirillo:

You’ve seen the videos. I’d be glad for The New Voice of Ukraine to publish them in whatever format you consider appropriate.

What was extraordinary is that even when she repeated the words I asked her to say, the underlying mentality remained visible. There was no recognition that Ukraine is an independent nation — that Ukraine is Europe. Russia, by contrast, remains Russia.

That distinction — that Ukraine stands on its own — is something she never fully grasped.

Demian Shevko:

After everything you’ve experienced over these years — the military service, the intelligence work, the personal risks — how has this changed your worldview? And how do you see the war developing in the near future?

Sarah Ashton Cirillo:

I want to answer that in two parts, because the journey matters.

Entering the mindset of an FSB operative was, in many ways, more psychologically difficult than serving on the front line. I’m currently stationed in the east, as you know, and those are two entirely different types of conflict.

On the battlefield, you’re engaged in conventional warfare. You understand the immediate risks. You see the enemy in front of you.

But when dealing with Russian intelligence services — with asymmetric warfare and soft power operations — you’re confronting something far more insidious. It’s psychological. It’s manipulative. It requires entering a space where deception and moral flexibility are normalized.

Trying to understand that mindset felt like descending into a very dark place. That experience changed me.

Over the past four years, I’ve come to believe that Russia’s greatest strategic advantage is its ability to present itself as a normal participant in the international order. In reality, the system operates with a fundamentally different objective — to undermine that order and reshape it in its own image.

On the front line, we fight soldiers. In the intelligence sphere, we confront narratives, manipulation, and influence networks. Both battles matter. But the latter is often less visible — and in many ways, more corrosive.

Author'’s note: This op-ed was originally published on my Substack, Words and War — a space where I explore Russia’s ideological collapse, Ukraine’s resistance, and the shifting narratives shaping our time. You can read more essays and subscribe here: https://substack.com/@demianshevko