Putin’s ‘peace terms’ mask broader territorial ambitions — ISW

This statement comes after analysts reviewed the May 28 Reuters article in which three Russian sources familiar with the negotiations outlined Vladimir Putin’s conditions to cease hostilities:

• a written guarantee from Western countries that NATO will not expand eastward;
• Ukrainian neutrality;
• easing of sanctions;
• unfreezing of Russian assets in the West;
• and a vague demand for “protection of Russian-speaking people in Ukraine.”

ISW noted that the Kremlin has long used false narratives about alleged discrimination against Russian speakers in Ukraine to justify its calls for regime change and the installation of a pro-Kremlin puppet government. The demands now being resurfaced — NATO rollback, Ukrainian neutrality, and regime change — are the same ones Russia made before its full-scale invasion in 2021 and in the war’s early days.

ISW assessed these demands as part of a broader Kremlin effort to pressure the West into forcing Ukraine to capitulate and to fracture NATO.

Reuters also reported that Putin insisted Ukraine must cede all territory within the four illegally annexed oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhya, and Kherson), including areas not under Russian occupation. One of the Reuters sources said Putin is now less willing to compromise on territory and is pushing for full control of these oblasts.

ISW recalled that Putin first demanded Ukraine surrender these four oblasts entirely in June 2024. Russian officials have repeated this demand frequently since. According to The Washington Post on May 27, Ukrainian Military Intelligence estimated that Russia deployed 125,000 troops near the borders of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts — regions not even formally annexed by Russia. Since May 2024, Russia also launched offensive operations aimed at creating so-called “buffer zones” in Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts. Russian officials have even openly called for the capture of the city of Sumy — suggesting plans for a future annexation of the entire oblast.

ISW assessed that Russia likely lacks the military capacity to fully occupy all four oblasts — especially given the fortified cities in Donetsk (like Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, Slovyansk) and the challenge of crossing the Dnipro River in Kherson. If Putin’s ambitions were truly limited to these oblasts, Russia would likely focus all efforts there. However, its troop build-up in Kharkiv and Sumy suggests broader aims.

ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin seeks to expand control across eastern and southern Ukraine. Russian officials close to Putin have even called for seizing most of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Putin shows no signs of abandoning his military strategy of grinding attritional warfare. According to a Reuters source, the Russian dictator plans to use battlefield gains to pressure Ukraine and the West into harsher terms later — signaling that “tomorrow’s peace will be even more painful.” Putin reportedly believes Russia can sustain a years-long war despite sanctions.

ISW assessed that Russia can likely maintain its slow advance as long as it replaces battlefield losses. Russian Security Council deputy chair Dmitry Medvedev claimed on May 28 that 175,000 troops have joined the military since January 2025, along with 14,000 members of “volunteer formations,” averaging 1,285 new troops daily.

Putin also claimed in mid-May that 50,000–60,000 people join the army each month. ISW cannot independently verify these numbers. However, Ukrainian General Staff reports estimate average Russian losses at:

• 1,550 daily in January;
• 1,261 in February;
• 1,312 in March;
• 1,219 in April;
• 1,140 from May 1 to May 28.

These figures suggest that Russia is replacing its losses roughly one-for-one. ISW believes that Ukraine, with continued Western support, can inflict even greater losses — possibly forcing Putin into a position where he must seriously negotiate peace.

Finally, ISW underscored that the Kremlin continues pushing the false narrative that NATO expansion triggered the invasion. Recent statements by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defense Minister Andrey Belousov echo this line. But ISW reiterates: Putin didn’t invade because he feared NATO, but because he believed the alliance was weak and ripe for dismantling.