Patriot missile supplies to Ukraine may fall short amid Middle East war — analyst

— Mr. Kostyantyn, it is now absolutely clear that obtaining both air defense systems and the missiles for them has turned into a kind of frantic hunt. I imagine that countries in the Persian Gulf, which have far greater financial resources — practically unlimited — will compete for all of this. Have you considered what to do in this situation?

— Of course, I have. It was not unexpected. There was an understanding even when Trump had only begun concentrating troops around the Persian Gulf that if a conflict started there, it would involve a serious confrontation specifically in terms of ballistic weapons.

Why do I say that? The Americans and all the participants in this situation understood it as well. The United States has eight THAAD systems worldwide. These provide long-range interception in near space, at distances of about 150–200 kilometers, intercepting ballistic missiles before they reach their targets — unlike Patriot systems, which intercept missiles closer to the target area.

One THAAD system is in Taiwan, one, if I’m not mistaken, in South Korea, and the remaining six were moved here. These six countries — Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia — each received a THAAD system.

The UAE already had two of its own systems, and the Americans deployed another one there, bringing the total to three. In Saudi Arabia, there is a contract for seven systems, but so far only one has been implemented. As a result, Saudi Arabia currently has two THAAD systems. In addition, eight Patriot systems were deployed to these six countries. They armed themselves and prepared for a serious ballistic confrontation.

As for the global balance between ballistic missiles and interceptors, the real interceptor systems are THAAD and Patriot. The Patriot system — which concerns us greatly right now — uses PAC-3 MSE missiles. These missiles began production around 2016, with full serial production starting in 2017. Last year, the Lockheed Martin facility — the Raytheon division — produced 620 of these missiles.

If we look at the total number produced so far, the figure is around 3,000 to 3,500, possibly up to 4,000 missiles over the entire production period. Remember this number — it is key: 3,000–4,000.

At the same time, if we look at the number of ballistic missiles Iran had as of 2024, the figure is roughly three thousand. That includes older, newer and modern systems.

There are missiles tested in 2023, others from 2019 — they have plenty. If we look at North Korea, the number of ballistic missiles is also roughly 3,000–4,000.

If we speak about Russian ballistic weapons, first of all there is the Iskander-M. In addition, there are aeroballistic missiles such as the Kinzhal, and one could probably also include the Kh-22, Kh-32 and a small number of Zircon missiles. Even if we count only the Iskander-M, the figure reaches around 3,000–3,500 missiles.

This means that authoritarian regimes worldwide have between nine and 12 thousand ballistic missiles in their arsenals. Meanwhile, the democratic world — which wants to intercept these missiles and prepared for that task — had only about three to four thousand interceptor missiles.

And considering that to achieve roughly an 80% probability of interception, you generally need two interceptor missiles per ballistic missile, two attempts per target.

So we end up with a strange situation in which it turns out that the world was not prepared to intercept the ballistic weapons possessed by authoritarian regimes such as Iran, North Korea and Russia. There is also a significant number in China, but they behave in a way that makes me think they would not simply use such weapons. They may rattle them as a show of force, but I doubt they intend to use them. That is the arithmetic of the situation.

— Mr. Kostyantyn, regarding that arithmetic. I will cite information I have. I spoke with Ukrainian MP Serhii Rakhmanin, who is a member of the parliamentary committee on national security, defense and intelligence. He says the number of ballistic missiles attributed to Iran is significantly exaggerated — that they do not have three thousand missiles, not even two and a half thousand. He used what I would call a moderate, perhaps even optimistic scenario, estimating about 500 ballistic missiles in Iran’s arsenal. Like you, he says two interceptor missiles are needed per ballistic target. But even these figures show how quickly the Western coalition’s missile stocks could be depleted. The United States plans to increase production somewhat, but as I understand it, not dramatically — simply because it is physically impossible to do so. I have heard a figure of about 700 per year, perhaps slightly more, which still does not cover the deficit. What should be done about this?

— There is another aspect here. I am not a member of the intelligence committee, so I cannot say whether that is good or bad. But by now Iran has already launched between 500 and 600 ballistic missiles at all these countries. Of those, about 150 to 220 were launched at Israel alone, depending on the estimate.

— And all of this is ballistic missiles, right?

— I am talking only about ballistic missiles, nothing else. Iran does not have other types of missiles — only ballistic ones.

If we look at the distribution, roughly 400 ballistic missiles were launched at the other countries besides Israel. Israel has its own system and its own calculations, so it can be excluded from this comparison for now because we are not competing with it for PAC-3 MSE missiles.

If we consider the stockpiles and what preparations were made: about 400 missiles were launched. That could mean roughly 800 Patriot interceptor missiles were used — or perhaps fewer. That is because about 150 missiles are believed to have been intercepted by the THAAD system. THAAD missiles are much more expensive — almost three times more costly than Patriot missiles — so they are used sparingly. If interception is possible with Patriot, Patriot is used.

About 150 missiles were intercepted with THAAD. If we take the most conservative estimate, that leaves about 250 missiles intercepted by Patriot systems. That means roughly 500 interceptor missiles were launched.

What stockpiles did those countries have? The UAE had about 400 missiles, plus or minus 100, under contracts. Kuwait had about 150, plus or minus 50. Saudi Arabia had the largest number — about 730 missiles in storage. Bahrain had around 70, plus or minus 25, and Qatar about 150, plus or minus 50.

So for now there were enough missiles to intercept the attack, and nearly the same level of reserves remains. But I am not sure Kuwait would transfer its missiles, or that the UAE would give theirs to neighboring countries. The reality now is that this weaponry will soon become insufficient.

You are absolutely right — these missiles will be pulled away from us with large sums of money. We are raising concerns in Europe, and it has already begun to think about what it will do and what reserves exist. But that is a different issue.

For example, we are told: let’s take systems now. The Germans propose giving five missiles, and another 25 could be collected from partners. Ukraine might receive 30 missiles. Thirty missiles mean 15 interceptions. Fifteen interceptions mean just one attack repelled. That is the scale of the numbers.

Therefore I believe there is only one serious option for our defense — destroying missiles where they are produced. No matter what stockpiles we have, we will still lack interceptor missiles on our territory. That will be the situation this year. It will be very difficult for us to obtain these missiles for our systems. At that point, it will no longer matter how many launchers or Patriot systems we have — the critical factor will be the number of missiles.

— You once proposed striking the Votkinsk plant, where Russia manufactures missiles.

— Well, they eventually did strike the Votkinsk plant.

— Given that there will likely be a shortage of PAC-3 Patriot missiles globally, could there be modifications — possibly with the participation of our partners, perhaps even the Americans — to Ukrainian Buk systems?

— That is a completely different system. Buk is designed to intercept aerodynamic targets — aircraft and cruise missiles. There are options there: FrankenSAM configurations using AIM-9 missiles or even older versions of AIM-120 missiles. But that is not for intercepting ballistic missiles. You cannot shoot down ballistic missiles with those systems.

— Then what about SAMP/T, the European option?

— There is SAMP/T, but even if the SAMP/T NG missile becomes available — which the French and Italians are promising us — production would reach only about 10 missiles per month at best, after all testing is completed. Ten missiles per month is their maximum capacity.

— What about NASAMS systems? I have information that these systems are being used in the Persian Gulf. You mentioned AIM-120 missiles, which Ukraine uses both from ground platforms and from F-16 aircraft to shoot down Russian cruise missiles and Shahed drones. How widely might these systems be used now, and where will the missiles come from?

— The situation with AIM-120 missiles is somewhat better. I am generally not very concerned about cruise missiles, because we have ways to shoot them down. We have NASAMS systems with AIM-120 missiles, and AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles can also be used. That is sufficient for intercepting cruise missiles.

We also have aircraft armed with AIM-120 missiles, although I believe using them against cruise missiles is almost an honor for the cruise missile — AIM-9 missiles are much cheaper and can be used for that purpose. We are already doing this quite effectively. I do not see major problems there.

In addition, we have various air defense systems capable of intercepting them — Buk systems, FrankenSAM configurations and others.

So regarding cruise missiles, unless something unexpected happens or Russia develops something new, I am not particularly worried. But ballistic weapons are a serious concern. That is where the focus must be now: intelligence to determine where they may be used, where Iskander-M systems are located, where Kinzhal stockpiles are stored, and which factories produce the missiles or their components. The engines are produced at the Votkinsk plant, and assembly also takes place there.

We need to work on targets inside Russia to ensure our defense against ballistic weapons.