Military experts outline Russia's 2026 frontline goals in Ukraine

A thick fog descended on a 100-kilometer stretch of the front line from the settlement of Rodynske in western Donetsk Oblast to Hulyaipole in eastern Zaporizhzhya Oblast overnight on March 17. Under its cover, the Russians decided to send their infantry — in small teams — through Ukrainian positions. Dozens of assault groups infiltrated the line of contact.

But the fog lifted faster than the Russians had hoped. Ukrainian UAV operators spotted hundreds of enemies in the open — without cover or vehicles — and eliminated over a hundred of them before dawn. The next day, the Russian command sent a new wave: infantry, motorcycles, and armored vehicles. Attacks occurred simultaneously across ten directions. But Defense Forces repelled these assaults as well.

"A fog trap, or the irony of war," Robert "Madyar" Brovdi, commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' Unmanned Systems Forces, described the events.

"SBU 'Birds' packed 900+ worms into body bags within a day and a half. From Rodynske to Hulyaipole, the enemy did not push through a single sector during this time."

The massive assaults were the first manifestations of Russia's so-called spring-summer offensive.

As a result, Russian troop losses soared to record highs over a few days in March: 1,710 killed and wounded on Mar. 17-18, 1,520 the next day, and another 1,610 the following day.

The offensive actions of the Russian invaders were successfully halted in several directions, while fierce battles continue in some sectors of the front — however, the enemy is being forced to regroup, Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on March 23. He emphasized that the Ukrainian Defense Forces are disrupting the Russian occupiers' plans.

Ultimately, analysts from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) noted that the enemy has shifted to artillery and drone preparation, turning the hostilities into a war of attrition.

Due to a shortage of personnel and equipment, the Russian army is now concentrating its efforts on only two or three directions, as of HUR data obtained by NV. Over half of all enemy assault operations occur in the Kupyansk, Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Oleksandrivka directions — sectors of the front from eastern Kharkiv Oblast in the north to the intersection of the administrative borders of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhya oblasts in the south.

Russia's goals remain unchanged, according to Ukrainian intelligence assessments: completely capture Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, create a "buffer zone" along the northern border — from Chernihiv Oblast through Sumy Oblast to Kharkiv Oblast, hold the south, and advance deep into Zaporizhzhya and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Furthermore, the Russians still dream of reaching the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, but they have once again postponed their own deadline for achieving these plans — now to the second half of 2026 or early 2027. Russian General Staff is no longer even planning an offensive on Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Odesa — they simply lack the resources.

Five directions

French military OSINT analyst Clément Molin named five main directions of the Russian offensive on his social media.

The first and main one is the Donetsk "belt of fortresses": Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, Kostyantynivka, and Druzhkivka. The Russians have amassed three army groups here — "South," "Center," and "West": a total of 18 brigades and 8 divisions.

But the situation is deadlocked in the Pokrovsk direction — the southern approaches to the "belt of fortresses," according to domestic military expert Viktor Kevliuk: the Russians are stuck near Hryshyne, their logistics run through the ruins of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, and their advance is minimal. The Siversk-Kramatorsk direction further north also gives the Russians no reason for optimism — their 3rd Motorized Rifle Division and other units are stalled there.

The Zaporizhzhya direction will become the second axis of the Russian offensive, Molin believes. The "East" and "Dnipro" groups of the Russian army are operating here: 15 brigades and 6 divisions.

Military expert Kostyantyn Mashovets emphasized: the Russian 58th Army and Airborne Forces are forced to repel Ukrainian counterattacks here instead of advancing. The enemy cannot encircle Ukrainian forces because it lacks the resources, and a direct attack on the key city of Orikhiv, located southeast of Zaporizhzhya, will force them to expend all the units they would later need to storm the regional center itself.

"Better a bird in the hand in Orikhiv than two in the bush in Zaporizhzhya," Mashovets said, describing the choice the Russians face in the south.

"The only problem is that it will be very difficult for them to catch even the bird in the hand this spring."

His colleague Oleksandr Kovalenko also doubts that the Russians will be able to conduct an offensive campaign in the southern direction.

"Ukrainian counterattacks have completely nullified their plans," he explained.

A separate topic is the events in the Hulyaipole direction: in early February, Ukrainian troops launched a counterattack there, on the border of the Zaporizhzhya and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. During the first week, the 95th Air Assault Brigade cleared several villages of Russian groups and advanced several kilometers deep into enemy territory. The success was made possible by the element of surprise, Russian communication problems, and dense fog. Now the Russians are forced to redeploy reinforcements from Pokrovsk — the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade.

In Kharkiv Oblast, near Kupyansk and the Oskil River, where the aforementioned French analyst believes the Russians also plan to attack, the occupiers will likely just try to distract some Ukrainian forces.

"From there, from the north, the enemy is preparing an auxiliary strike on Slovyansk," Kevliuk believes.

In the north — in the Sumy, Kharkiv, and partly Chernihiv oblasts — the Russian grouping will conduct raids and shell the positions of Ukrainian border covering forces. But the enemy will not dare to launch a full-scale offensive there due to a lack of capabilities, according to the experts interviewed by NV.

The Pavlohrad area — the direction from occupied Donetsk toward Zaporizhzhya — will become the fifth focus of Russia's spring-summer attacks, according to Molin. But here, the French expert believes, the enemy's logistics are the weakest, and Ukrainian counterstrikes will pose a real threat to the advancing Russian units.

Overall, as of HUR estimates, the occupiers will continue to adhere to the tactic of infiltrating small groups deep into Ukrainian positions, with subsequent support for these advances from operational-tactical aviation, robotic systems, strike drones, and FPV drones. There will be no large tank columns — they would be destroyed in a matter of minutes.

But this "infiltration" operations require infantry. And the occupiers have a problem with this. Putin claimed that 700,000 military personnel are involved in the war, according to the AP. Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi outlined Russian plans: to add another 409,000 throughout 2026. But overall, the Russian army's human resources are being depleted. And the Kremlin still has not dared to announce even a partial mobilization.

Three scenarios

When should we expect "Putin's grand offensive"?

If Russia plans a massive strike in May, mobilization should have been announced back in February, Kevliuk believes. This did not happen — so there will be no great leap forward.

The most likely date for an attempted intensification of the Russian offensive will be May 9, plus or minus two or three days, the expert believes: a political date that the Kremlin will try to "celebrate" with at least some tactical success.

Next, three possible scenarios could unfold, according to Kevliuk.

The worst-case scenario for the Armed Forces of Ukraine is if Russia finds previously unknown reserves, possibly from the Ural regions or through covert mobilization, and reaches the administrative borders of Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts by the end of the year. But this would be a "Pyrrhic victory" — coming at the cost of months of heavy fighting with massive losses. And even that would not mean prospects for further Russian successes.

The optimistic scenario: Ukraine launches systemic strikes on Russia's railway infrastructure, and the enemy's logistics collapse. Without the supply of ammunition, fuel, and reinforcements, the major offensive turns into fragmented attacks by small groups that quickly die under drone strikes. Russia loses the initiative without achieving anything significant.

The most realistic scenario, according to Kevliuk, is that the Russians capture Kostyantynivka and approach Druzhkivka over the course of a year at the cost of colossal losses, but the Ukrainian Armed Forces hold Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. That is, the "belt of fortresses" remains with Ukraine, and the war transitions into a positional phase with no advantage for either side.

Kovalenko has his own view of the optimistic scenario: Russian losses grow faster than their gains, the enemy's offensive drowns in blood, and the Kremlin will be forced to look for a way out. The worst-case scenario, in his opinion, is if Russia reaches the eastern suburbs of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk by the end of 2026. Then the battles for the "belt of fortresses" will not begin until at least 2027. Kovalenko assessed the chances of both scenarios as 50-50.

"If Ukraine maintains its current potential, the Russian offensive will last a year and a half," Kevliuk concludes.

"And then the enemy's resources will be exhausted. The only question is whether we will have enough strength to hold the enemy back."