Russia has ‘dangerously’ upgraded Shahed drones: what’s changed — Katkov from Defense Express
Nation2 November 2024, 12:42 PM
— How are the Shaheds changing? Enemy aerial attacks have
intensified again, and drones are, unfortunately, an integral part of this. The
Kyiv Scientific Research Institute studied the remnants of drones that recently
fell in Kyiv and reported that they contained a thermobaric warhead. What makes
such a drone more dangerous?
— It should be noted that the thermobaric warhead on the
Shaheds did not appear yesterday, the day before yesterday, or even a month
ago. As far as I remember, this information surfaced in the summer of last
year. It was then that certain experiments began in Russia to modify the
warheads on the Shaheds, as variations were initiated to equip the Shahed not
only with the Iranian warhead, which was rather dubious in effectiveness.
There was a certain “creation,” so to speak, of Iranian
scientific thought—quite questionable in terms of efficacy. Russia almost
immediately replaced it during the release of its versions of the Shahed with a
robust Soviet warhead. They began experimenting, adding a thermobaric effect to
the shrapnel-explosive and cumulative types, thus combining different versions.
They even attempted projects to increase the size of the warhead to one hundred
kilograms. Now, we are talking about an exclusively thermobaric warhead.
What is thermobaric? This is the correct name for such a
weapon, which is also referred to in the media as a “vacuum bomb”—a term that
is quite widespread but has nothing to do with reality. It is an explosive
volume detonation munition. This refers to the usage of a thermobaric mixture
that has a very high burning temperature and a rapid ability to carry the shock
wave around corners.
This is very dangerous in terms of affecting residential
buildings. For example, when it strikes a room, the shock wave spreads
throughout the apartment, so to speak. This is extremely dangerous. Considering
that Russia uses Shaheds for terror against the local population, it aims to
kill Ukrainians more quickly and effectively. Unfortunately, this is the reality
of our current lives.
Finally, regarding the modernization, it should be noted
that Russia is also making the Shaheds cheaper. This is not about running out
of money. It’s about having more Shaheds for the available financial resources.
For example, they are reducing the costs of the engine, which is already
low-cost and produced in China, by eliminating the starter and flywheel. This
means that special orders were made for Chinese manufacturers to create a
lighter version of the engine, which is cheaper due to the absence of these
systems. Engines can be launched without a starter—it is not a problem. The
absence of a flywheel is also not critical for such systems, considering they
are for aviation single-use drones with only one flight.
This is about reducing costs and scaling production.
It is important to understand that once Russia obtained the
technologies to produce the Shahed 136, they immediately began to make changes.
They even altered the material of the fuselage. They opted for simplifying and
speeding up the production technology, which is why they achieve such enormous
numbers in drone utilization.
Moreover, when reviewing the overall statistics regarding
the number of Shaheds launched by the enemy, it should be interpreted
correctly. The figures include Shaheds and drones of other types.
The enemy massively uses false targets—drones like the
Gerber. The Gerber is very cheap because it is made of foam and plywood. The
entire electronics probably costs a total of $100-200. The engine there is
simpler than in other drones. But in general, the most expensive component is
the engine. Everything is held together with screws and thermal glue.
And we are talking about the usage of numerous such drones.
— Does the simplification of these drones help us, for
instance, to better stop them or make them lose their direction? I’m now
referring to electronic warfare, which seems to be working actively in several
cities. Does this simplification allow us to knock them off course more easily?
— In any case, electronic warfare (EW) means in Ukraine is
developing. We are probably already talking about the creation of entire fields
of electronic warfare. This indeed leads to a large number of drones being lost
geographically.
The Air Force command has already repeatedly explained that
they have disappeared from radar (radar stations) due to simply getting so lost
that they ran out of fuel and just fell somewhere. Or even returned to Belarus
or Russia. This is purely conjecture. It is more likely that in conditions
where these drones are under the influence of electronic warfare for a long
time, they can lose satellite navigation; after some time, their inertial and
primitive navigation orientation system accumulates so much error that they
simply align to a magnetic course of 0, meaning north, so they fly either into
Russia or Belarus.
But it should be understood that it is currently challenging
to separate this overall statistic announced by the Air Force command, as they
are very accurate and precise in their formulations. They state “Shahed-type
drones,” meaning not specifically Shahed 136, and “drones of undetermined type.”
What share of all false targets, like Gerber or other variants, there are; how
many are precisely Shahed 136—let’s call it Gerań-2, as that’s becoming
increasingly accurate. The fuselage remains the same, the aerodynamic solution
remains the same, the dimensions are the same, but the electronics are
completely different now.
A lot has changed, including the material of the fuselage.
How many Shaheds fall due to electronic warfare is an open question, just as is
how many false targets that have significantly cheaper systems fall. Therefore,
in conditions where we have overall statistics combined with the share of
geographically lost drones (which could be anything), analyzing the figures
becomes meaningless.