Ukrainian drones threaten Russian supply routes across occupied territories

Kyiv’s growing ability to hit trucks, trains, ferries and roads far from the battlefield is forcing Russia to rethink how it supplies its forces in occupied Ukraine.

The campaign marks what the analysis describes as a third major shift in the war after the arrival of HIMARS systems in 2022 and the later spread of first-person-view drones that pushed Russian trucks out of areas close to the front.

Unlike standard FPV drones, which initially created a kill zone of roughly 10 kilometers and later expanded that threat to about 35 kilometers, newer Ukrainian systems are now striking moving targets 30 to 150 kilometers behind the front lines. The number of reported attacks on Russian logistics vehicles rose sharply in 2026, from one in January to 130 geolocated strikes in May, according to the analysis.

The shift is already affecting Russian supply patterns. Russian Ural and KamAZ trucks have been hit at depths of 30 to 50 kilometers, prompting Russian commanders to ban convoy movements in some areas and require mobile fire support groups to escort logistics columns, Dmytro Putiata, a retired battle captain in the command post of the 20th Brigade “K2” of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, reported.

Some Russian warehouses have also been moved back into Russia, including sites relocated more than 100 kilometers from the front, the analysis said.

The logistics problem is simple but severe: the farther Russia moves its depots from the battlefield, the fewer delivery runs its trucks can make. A convoy traveling 50 kilometers can complete three round trips in a 12-hour shift under ideal conditions. If the distance grows by another 50 kilometers, its carrying capacity falls by about a third.

Ukraine has also expanded its campaign beyond roads. Since March, Ukrainian strikes have increasingly targeted freight trains and locomotives in occupied territories and Russian border regions. The analysis recorded 35 strikes on locomotives and freight trains over three months, including in occupied Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, as well as in Russia’s Bryansk and Kursk oblasts.

Rail traffic between Donetsk and Yasynuvata was temporarily halted in May, disrupting routes toward Debaltseve, Ilovaisk and Mariupol, the analysis said.

Russian maritime logistics have also come under pressure. Ukraine has repeatedly attacked ferries serving the Kerch crossing, one of the few remaining regular sea routes connecting Russia to occupied Crimea. Ukrainian strikes damaged the Avangard and Slavyanin cargo vessels in 2024 and 2026, while the Conro Trader ferry was destroyed and sank in August 2024 after being hit while reportedly loaded with fuel tanks.

Ports along the northern coast of the Sea of Azov have also been hit, including fuel facilities in Mariupol and cranes in Berdiansk.

The road network now appears to be the main focus. Ukrainian drones have struck Russian vehicles on several key routes, including roads leading toward Pokrovsk, the Donetsk-Debaltseve-Horlivka corridor, the N-20 road between Donetsk and Mariupol, and the E58 highway along the Sea of Azov coast.

The E58 is especially important because it forms part of Russia’s so-called Azov Ring, a planned transport network intended to connect Russia with occupied Crimea from the north and south of the Sea of Azov. The most active part of the project is the R-280 “Novorossiya” highway, which Moscow wants to use to create an uninterrupted route from Rostov-on-Don through Mariupol and Melitopol to Simferopol.

Russia is also developing alternative infrastructure to reduce its dependence on vulnerable truck convoys, including pipelines connecting Rostov-on-Don with Donetsk and Berdiansk, a rear railway between the Donetsk-Rostov line and Mariupol, and an expanded Mariupol bypass road. The bypass, one of the most ambitious parts of the Azov Ring project, is not expected to be completed before the end of 2028.

For now, the E58 and E105 highways remain Russia’s most important logistics arteries in occupied southern Ukraine. They intersect in Melitopol, making the city a major Russian logistics hub. Recent Ukrainian strikes around Melitopol have disrupted electricity and telecommunications, weakening air defense coordination and counter-drone response, according to the analysis.

Russian occupation authorities closed part of the E105 highway between Novooleksiivka and the Dzhankoi/Chonhar checkpoint to civilian traffic on May 22. The restriction underscored the vulnerability of the Chonhar area, where the isthmus near Salkove narrows to about 200 meters.

Road disruption has also been recorded in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Donetsk-Yasynuvata-Horlivka road, part of the E50 highway, was temporarily closed at least 21 times between April 16 and May 27, based on announcements by local occupation authorities.

The analysis suggests that if Ukraine can combine strikes on road and rail logistics, it could substantially weaken Russian forces in selected sectors of the front. Particularly vulnerable areas include Russian units along the left bank of the Dnipro River in occupied Kherson Oblast, where supply routes are limited.

The campaign does not immediately sever Russian logistics. But it raises the cost, slows deliveries and forces Moscow to stretch its supply system deeper into the rear — exactly the kind of pressure that can shape battlefield conditions before larger operations.