Ukraine’s rationale for retaking Bakhmut — expert interview

NV: The New York Times wrote, “President Volodymyr Zelenskyy predicted that the Ukrainian Armed Forces would liberate Bakhmut by the end of the year.” He also spoke about two more cities. “These plans, announced by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, demonstrate a gulf between Kyiv and American war planners, who believe Ukraine should focus more on the south.” How should we interpret this analysis?

Kostenko: I wouldn't underestimate our partners just because they are far away; they know what's going on. I have seen how planning takes place, the presence of our partners, and what information they have. So they know the situation at hand. They know how the counter-offensive is going, how our defensive actions are going, how their weapons are used, down to each shell.

They all know this very well. Therefore, they have the right to voice their point of view, and in particular to give us advice.

Regarding our statements on the liberation of cities – I think this is a priority. President Zelenskyy sees what is happening on the battlefield through the prism of the generals who report to him, namely generals [Commander of Ground Forces Oleksandr] Syrskyi and [Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Valerii] Zaluzhnyi. And perhaps they see some prospects in this direction.

From a military point of view, given our resources, planning, and expenditures, do we need to specifically focus on Bakhmut, what strategic benefit would we get [from capturing the city] and what price will we pay for it? This is a separate question, in particular for the planning of our military-political leadership.

As for the other two cities. I think one of them is Tokmak. It really is very important to us because it hosts a railway junction through which Russian supplies to the south pass – meaning the Zaporizhzhya region and the Kherson front. Cutting off [logistics] and taking control of [the city] would be a great achievement in this war.

Of course, we planned for [advancing all the way to] the Sea of ​​Azov, and now Tokmak. I think this is what he meant.

But from my point of view, this is a complex plan. And of course, I would like for this to be [implemented], as it will greatly reduce the capacity of Russian logistics in these areas, and it could of course change (in a tactical and operational-tactical sense) the course of hostilities. The main thing is that these are not forecasts, like “Crimea by May” or “victory by 2023.” You need to be very careful here.

And those with whom I have spoken on the battlefield are quite cautious about forecasts, because they have seen what these forecasts are worth.

NV: I would like to ask you to comment on one more point from the NYT piece: “According to journalists, some American officials say that the battle in Bakhmut has become something of an obsession for Mr. Zelenskyy and his military leaders.” We remember how Ukrainian authorities spoke of “fortress Bakhmut,” and presented it as a city that would not fall. Do you see any signs that the Ukrainian army will liberate Bakhmut in the near future? Is this even the city we need to focus our efforts on right now?

Kostenko: Plans are constantly changing; they are constantly redrawn. When we talk about goals, we can talk about them for the near future. Goals may have already been developed, redeployments may be carried out, and there may be readiness for some kind of attack, for defensive or offensive actions. The enemy will take some counteractions, and we understand that everything needs to be redone, everything can go differently. Therefore, planning is ongoing.

If we talk about Bakhmut as a direction, from my point of view, from what we see when communicating with the military, then we have more dangerous sectors that we need to focus on now. Bakhmut, from my point of view, is a more tactical direction in terms of scope.

When Bakhmut was ours, we held it, but strategically, this did not solve much. We saw how the enemy bypassed us from the north, in the Soledar, Kupyansk, and Lyman sectors. The enemy has the ability and mission to break through [our defenses] there, and to create such an environment where a large part of Donetsk Oblast could be under threat.

If we liberate Bakhmut (exclusively my point of view), we will fit even deeper into this bag. And from my point of view, we need to concentrate more on defense on the eastern front, so that the enemy does not achieve their strategic goal, so that they do not reach Slovyansk from the south, do not push through Kupyansk, and then develop a strategic success.

Therefore, does [Bakhmut] have strategic significance? From my point of view, no. You need to concentrate on other directions where the enemy is trying to attack and create a threat on a larger scale.

And regarding the fact that the NYT wrote that Bakhmut is [Zelenskyy’s] personal obsession, I will say that I don't know this for sure. But even high-ranking military officers at that time [charged with defending Bakhmut] suggested withdraw troops out of there and take more advantageous positions. Positions like the ones which we are holding now, for example. And we see that the enemy is not moving further, because we have taken the best positions, and these positions are prepared on elevated terrain. Forces and means change, but the principle of war – that holding the high ground gives one an advantage – is also applicable in this war. Therefore, the question here is that this [capturing Bakhmut] was very important for Russia. Perhaps this has become important for our leadership.

General Syrskyi is in command there. And after the Defense Forces under his leadership, under the leadership of Zaluzhnyi, liberated Kharkiv Oblast, Zelenskyy sometimes gives them this sort of carte blanche and trusts their judgement.

And [in Bakhmut] the interests of the Russians converged: before that, Russia suffered only losses. We remember the Kherson operation, where they withdrew their troops quite skillfully, but under pressure from our Armed Forces, because our Armed Forces created the conditions for this exodus. Same with the Kharkiv operation. And in fact, Russia did not have any victories. And in order to continue communicating with the West, to show that the enemy cannot move us, of course, I think, from a political point of view, we have chosen this plan to stay here.

From a military point of view, we crushed a large number of troops there, in particular Wagner mercenaries. This was important for [Russian dictator Vladimir] Putin – he needed some kind of victory after the surrender of Kherson and Kharkiv Oblast. They concentrated a fairly large number of troops there; and they had to win something. This was important to [former Wagner boss, now deceased Yevgeny] Prigozhin: the Russian army was only retreating, and here “the great Wagner”, under his leadership, was achieving results – sparing neither blood not treasure.

We saw how at this point politics had begun to interfere in this war. According to our intelligence information, it was suggested to Prigozhin at the end that Russian troops should enter Bakhmut, so that this would be a victory for the Russian army. He did not agree to this, and then these first conflicts began both with the [Russian] Defense Ministry and their General Staff.

Therefore, [Bakhmut] was important for both sides.

NV: A few days ago, it became clear that authorities are investigating the so-called “surrender of the south,” examining if certain military officers were responsible for negligent or even treasonous defense of southern Ukraine against invading Russian troops in February 2022. What do you think of this story?

Kostenko: We definitely need to understand that this is a complex story, and answers to these questions from our society must be found. The main thing is for this story not to become politicized, so that it does not become a means for the political leadership to put pressure, for example, on the military leadership.

You need to understand that the enemy’s rapid advance through and capture of our southern territories was a process that did not begin on Feb. 24, 2022. Here we need to compare everything: the work of the political leadership, and the [actions] of the military on the ground, what orders they had, and what they had to carry out. This is a matter of how we prepared for the war.

In 2020, if I’m not mistaken, the question arose that Crimea was poorly protected from the isthmuses. And we even held an off-site meeting of the Committee. Judging by the forces and means that were available at that time, it was objectively clear that this was so.

There was, if I’m not mistaken, just one battalion, tasked with defending a 100-odd kilometer stretch of the border with occupied Crimea.

From my point of view, the administrative border with Crimea should have been like the one between North and South Korea. Trained troops had to be posted there, on fortified positions. The positions that were dug were objectively weak. But this was in 2020, when there was no such accumulation of the Russian army [near the border].

My understanding is almost nothing had changed by 2022.

NV: And the political rhetoric was also different at the time.

Kostenko: Yes. But we understand that political rhetoric is important.

Why has Russia lost and not achieved its goals? Because they did their planning for the invasion of Ukraine incorrectly. Because with the troops with which they entered our state, if they understood our forces and means, if they were counting specifically on a military clash, they would have understood that it was impossible to do this. And I said this even before the war. They would have needed at least twice or three times as many troops in order to achieve the goals they wanted.

And we understood that it would be difficult for them to achieve [those goals]. Yes, they may achieve some success, but not the one they planned for.

As I understand it, this was also reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief [Zelenskyy]. We saw that before the start of hostilities, the rhetoric of the authorities was that there would be no war, everything would be fine.

And now here's the question. I talked with those who were directly on the line of contact, on the Chonhar isthmuses. In public they said, for example, that the bridges were not mined. They were mined, and our guys will confirm this. I wasn't there personally. But those who were there are now blamed for not holding the line. But they told me about the chaos that occurred on the front line.

I met these guys, who are marines, during the capture of the Davydiv Brid bridgehead, when we were liberating Kherson. And of course, we sat and talked with them. They laid it out for me in detail how everything happened. Of course, control was lost during the [Russian] offensive and the units acted separately. Many of them were surrounded.

At that time, there really weren’t enough military personnel there to hold back the tide of Russian invasion.

Were all the measures carried out correctly during the [first stage of repelling] aggression? Were all units ready to repel this aggression and were they in battle formations? Did the tanks have crews? Were all the artillery crews present? Have the brigades undergone combat coordination? These questions must be answered by the investigation.

The question is, why did this happen? For example, perhaps the political leadership did everything, and the military leadership did everything, but on the ground they did not do enough. Or was it the other way around — there were no commands from the political leadership, so the military did nothing; of course?

I believe that this definitely needs to be clarified so that the people who were in command there are not in charge again. Or those people should be punished. But it all has to be done right. We must understand who gave what commands, starting from preparation and ending with the actual conduct of hostilities.

The problem lies deeper – from the beginning of defense plans, the preparation of the defense, and conduct of the defense itself. And these are questions that need to be answered.

But the most important thing: we now must not turn this into some kind of opportunity for political reprisals or reprisals against the military. I believe that this is an important issue that should be exclusively dealt with by an investigation.

NV: Journalists contacted the SBU and the State Bureau of Investigation, but did not receive any comments from the investigators.

Kostenko: If I appeal to them now as an MP, I can only get answers to those cases that are closed and have already been completed. And if I ask who is involved in a case, this is kept secret as part of the investigation. They have no right to provide any information.

It is necessary to investigate and understand so that such mistakes are not made in the future. So that those who really made these mistakes understand that these are people’s lives, these are territories that are now occupied. Many conclusions are to be drawn from this.

If this was a mistake of a person whom the state has entrusted with responsibility, this person must be punished. But once again: this should not interfere with our victory and our fight. And this should not become some kind of opportunity to put political pressure on the military or vice versa.