Kremlin turns war in Ukraine into systemic abuse of its own people

Liubov Tsybulska is a head of Join Ukraine — an organization that has studied Russian regional communities for four years — from Telegram to VKontakte, from Tatarstan to Khakassia,

She explained why this shift is happening — but still does not change anything.

Blood money

Russia’s war is paid for by its own population, says Alexandra Prokopenko of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in her 2025 analysis. She concluded that the Russian government stabilizes public finances not through economic growth, but through higher taxes.

The Kremlin needs money. As of Reuters estimates, Russia’s combined spending on “defense and national security” in 2025 reached 17 trillion rubles ($221 billion) — 41% of total state expenditures.

Yet despite record spending, Russia is unable to create new weapons systems and relies almost entirely on Soviet-era stockpiles. The UK think tank Chatham House has described Russia’s defense industry as being in a state of “innovative stagnation.”

Meanwhile, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reported in early 2025 that Russia lost 1,400 tanks in 2024 alone and is struggling to replace them. Senior IISS analyst Ben Barry noted that Russian forces are increasingly “trading quality for quantity,” pulling equipment out of Soviet warehouses.

Human fuel

The Kremlin also needs people — and Russians pay for Putin’s war with their lives.

The contract recruitment system is collapsing. Pavel Luzin of the Center for European Policy Analysis said Moscow kept raising payments, but money is running out faster than volunteers. Those who joined for ideology are mostly dead or incapacitated. Those who joined for money are fewer and fewer.

Now Russia’s army increasingly relies on coercion. This, in turn, devastates the psychological state of soldiers and their families.

“There is an accumulation of exhaustion and fear,” Tsybulska concluded.

Her team monitors online communities across all Russian Oblasts and Republics, tracking changes in language, mood, and attitudes toward the authorities.

The fear is no longer mainly of the enemy — but of their own commanders and system.

“We see unreal levels of brutality inside the Russian military machine. Mass ‘zeroing out.’ A level of internal brutalization that was once unimaginable,” Tsybulska explained.

The economy of death

The official monthly salary of a Russian contract soldier is 210,000 rubles ($2,730). Bonuses vary by region and can reach 1–2 million rubles ($13,000–$26,000) as a one-time payment.

On paper, this looks attractive — especially for rural Russia. In reality, it is a trap.

“A huge part of this money goes to survival needs — gear, fuel, sometimes food and drones,” Tsybulska said.

“If you don’t pay — which is 50–80% of the income — you are quickly sent on an assault mission.”

In other words: either you spend almost everything to stay alive, or you die.

Corruption added another layer. Commanders take money for everything: avoiding assaults, transfers, even basic protection.

“If a soldier wants to transfer from assault units to drone operators, he pays about 200,000 rubles ($2,500) to his commander,” she said.

Russian command increasingly sends foreign fighters — primarily Africans — into assaults. Their treatment is horrific. It is another way for Russians to survive: let someone else die.

Russian soldiers have developed their own vocabulary. African mercenaries are called “disposable.” Commanders are “cannibals.” Words like “meat grinder” and “genocide” are used by soldiers themselves.

Cruelty toward their own has become systemic. There were cases when commanders tied soldiers to vehicles and dragged them across fields until they died. Mobilized troops are regularly beaten and raped.

“Some days, 15 to 17 people commit suicide in a single unit,” Tsybulska said.

“That tells you how much human life is worth there.”

The burden pushed outward

The Kremlin still has to pay — but revenues are falling. SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) added that Russia’s budget also covers occupied Ukrainian territories and its own border oblasts.

Moscow shifts the burden onto the periphery.

In Khakassia, for example, public sector salaries are delayed, and debts are piling up.

Regional budget deficits have tripled in recent years, hitting the poorest territories first.

“The poorest regions provide the most soldiers,” Tsybulska said. “Wealthier regions resist quotas.”

Per-capita losses confirm this. In Tuva Republic, losses per 100,000 people are 19 times higher than in Moscow. In neighboring Buryatia — 15 times higher. In Zabaykalsky Krai — 12 times higher.

Why no rebellion?

So why no mass protests?

Because Russians lack horizontal ties.

“To start a revolt even within one unit, you need to unite with others. That requires a culture — and it doesn’t exist,” Tsybulska said.

“They lack brotherhood. They lack a shoulder to lean on.”

Ironically, propaganda has preached “brotherhood” for years.

In reality, even soldiers’ mothers — once a protest force in the Chechen wars — are silent today.

“Russian wives don’t protest even when they lose their husbands,” Tsybulska said.

“They fight only for money compensation.”

The Kremlin negotiates with each family individually — through money, gifts, or privileges.

Fear of repression dominates.

“But when discomfort exceeds fear, something may happen,” she added.

Cracks in the silence

Change is still happening.

“We see how language changes. And we see how attitudes toward Putin change,” she added.

Public criticism remains dangerous, but irony is spreading. “Bunker Putin” is becoming normalized. Even callers on pro-Kremlin radio say that “Putin has overstayed.”

Analysts differ. RUSI’s Richard Connolly warns against expecting a fast economic collapse. But Bruegel’s Marek Dabrowski says Russia’s resilience is fading: military spending slows growth, locks in inflation, and deepens structural vulnerabilities.

At the same time, Russia is running out of soldiers.

Two doors into 2026

Tsybulska outlined two Kremlin scenarios for 2026.

Scenario one: hidden mobilization in rural areas — about 230,000 soldiers. Enough to maintain current frontlines.

Scenario two: open mobilization of up to 500,000 men — requiring big cities, risking resistance. The 2022 attempt triggered mass emigration and protests.

Most likely, Moscow will choose the first.

“Russia can continue at roughly this pace for another year,” Tsybulska said.

“But it cannot scale up.”

For Ukraine, another year will be unbearably painful. But it will not bring Russia victory.

“One more year of stagnation, massive losses, sanctions, and exhaustion of willing fighters is already too much for Russia,” she concluded.