They'll start around May 9: Russia's stalled spring offensive and its possible outcomes — NV analysis

March 2026 was supposed to be the month when the Russian army, having been preparing for a new wave of offensives since last year, will finally move to decisive action in the east.

However, it didn't work out - Ukrainian Armed Forces earlier began their counteroffensive in the south.

According to Oleksandr Komarenko, head of the General Staff Main Operational Directorate, as of early March, Defense Forces had liberated almost all previously occupied areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — it remained to "finish up" three small settlements and clear two more. Thus, the Russian Vostok (East) group was forced to go on the defensive. Moreover, according to some analysts, the enemy began to transfer its elite units from the Donbas here.

So, Putin's intention to occupy entire Donetsk Oblast once again becomes a phantom.

Putin's unfulfilled dreams

As military expert Viktor Kevlyuk noted in a conversation with NV, neither in the south (Zaporizhzhya direction) nor in the east (Slovyansk-Kramatorsk direction) did the enemy manage to create the starting conditions for an offensive. And there are no visible strategic reserves for the Russians to do so either.

"Politics in the summer campaign will prevail over common sense and the laws of military art," the expert assured.

"The enemy will be forced to start the offensive from the positions they managed to achieve. This is the worst option, but they cannot abandon their intentions."

In the Pokrovsk direction — the area south of the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk "belt of fortresses" — the enemy's advance has virtually stopped: it got stuck in the Hryshyne area. The enemy formally completed the capture of several settlements, but there is no stable control there. The invaders' logistics now pass through the ruins of two large cities — Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, and this critically slows down supplies: they cannot pull tactical reserves closer to the line of contact, deploy drone control posts, artillery, or electronic warfare systems.

General Staff indicated that the intensity of fighting in this direction has been steadily declining over the last month. Everything turns into clashes of small infantry groups — five on five, Kevlyuk explained. This is absolutely not what should happen within the framework of an offensive operation.

In the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk direction, the situation is also not simple for the enemy. The Russians captured Siversk in the east, but Ukrainian units withdrew to adjacent heights, and the enemy's further advance became purely nominal.

"In order to complete the creation of an advantageous position at the current pace, the Russians will need about two more years," Kevlyuk is convinced.

At the same time, the enemy formed the new 34th Artillery Division, which is now deploying in the Kupyansk direction. From there, from the north, the enemy is likely preparing an auxiliary strike on Slovyansk.

A map that did not match reality

Zaporizhzhya direction was supposed to be one of the key ones for the Russian spring-summer offensive. Until mid-February, everything was developing quite well for the enemy there: the Russians were forming conditions to move on Zaporizhzhya from two sides and reach the firing distance of barrel artillery to the city. But it turned out differently.

Kevlyuk tells a revealing story he learned from intelligence. A commission from the headquarters of the Russian 29th Army came to the command post of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade and asked to show the map of combat operations. And then they organized a drone flyover of the exact same territory — and it turned out that the map did not match reality: the Russians controlled a smaller area than they expected.

When Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks in the south — in the Huliaipole and Novopavlivka directions, it turned out that the enemy acted in small infiltration groups and drew the front line along their positions. And there was neither tactical connection nor command and control between these groups.

The failure in Zaporizhzhya Oblast exposed, according to Kevliuk, the main problem of the Russian occupation group — the lack of strategic reserves. Tactical and operational ones exist: each enemy army has one or two brigades and a few regiments in reserve. This is enough to cover local needs. But it is not enough for a full-fledged offensive operation.

The Kremlin is trying to find a way out by reformatting brigades into divisions. But this is a fiction.

"A brigade covers a third of the division's personnel," Kevliuk explained.

"The rest are people from civilian life after accelerated training. Formally a division, in reality — the combat capabilities do not correspond to the name."

Money is also becoming a problem for the Russian army. Formally, payments to contract soldiers remain high — 2-4 million rubles ($26-52 thousand) depending on the region. But the growth rate of these payments has already slowed down, and the difference creates fierce competition for recruits and a huge burden on local budgets. In some Russian oblasts, the rules are rewritten literally every week. The resource of the republics, where people were lured with big money, is gradually being exhausted. What remains is general mobilization — but the Kremlin cannot dare to do this, because it threatens internal instability.

"If you want to start an offensive in May, you have to complete mobilization in February, not start it," Kevlyuk said.

Therefore, the "great offensive" of the Russian troops, if it begins, will happen in late May or early June.

"Although, considering that this gathering of fatalists loves symbolic dates, I would bet on May 9, plus or minus two or three days," he predicted.

Three scenarios

The expert outlines three possible scenarios for the spring-summer campaign.

The worst for Ukraine: the Russians will manage to get unknown reserves — possibly from the Urals — and introduce them into the operation at a critical moment. In this case, the enemy may stop at the administrative borders of the Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. In the Zaporizhzhya direction, the Russians will need not one or two divisions, but a whole army to return what was lost in February and reach at least the eastern outskirts of Zaporizhzhya. But at present, these reserves are not visible.

The neutral scenario will look like this: the enemy will be able to complete the battles for Kostyantynivka and come close from the south to Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk. But these cities are well fortified, and to achieve at least tactical success here, the Russians will need 12 to 18 months.

The optimistic scenario for Ukraine is stopping the enemy at an early stage with strikes on railway infrastructure on the Russian territory. This will deprive the enemy of the ability to promptly supply resources, manpower, ammunition, and repair equipment. Then "Putin's great offensive" will turn into sluggish attacks by small groups that will quickly die.

"If Ukraine manages to keep its potential at the current level, the enemy's offensive will last a year and a half, and then their resources will finally be exhausted," Kevlyuk concluded.

"This applies to manpower, the command system, and the ability of industry to restore equipment."