The report noted that the Kremlin has been streamlining administrative procedures related to mobilization since 2025. Specifically, in November 2025, Putin signed a law altering the administrative process for army conscription, shifting it to a continuous, year-round cycle rather than previous semi-annual drafts.
At the same time, the ISW continues to assess mobilization as a "very personal decision" for Putin, dependent on his perception of battlefield conditions and Kremlin regime integrity.
According to available data, Kremlin officials are evaluating a broad spectrum of options to facilitate potential future mobilization efforts, while Putin likely continues to weigh all alternatives.
Mobilization in Russia
In November 2025, Putin signed legislation allowing reservists to be deployed to combat operations without a formal mobilization declaration. According to ISW assessments, the Kremlin likely utilizes this specific mechanism to execute gradual, partial call-ups. Analysts emphasized that the final choice regarding mobilization remains Putin's personal decision, shaped by frontline dynamics and domestic regime stability.
On July 26, Ukraine's president stated that Putin plans to launch a new mobilization drive this fall. According to Zelenskyy, Russian Ministry of Defense recruited 221,000 contract soldiers since the beginning of the year; however, this proved insufficient as casualties over the same period reached 225,500 personnel, including 131,000 killed in action. Zelenskyy believes Putin will announce mobilization following State Duma elections on Sept. 20, potentially sending between 300,000 and 500,000 troops to the front lines.
"He wants to step up mobilization. Not openly, because he fears his own society, but he will do so in early October unless we create problems for him regarding logistics, weapons, gasoline, and diesel, and unless our partners impose total sanctions for his aggression," the Ukrainian president emphasized, adding that Putin will only stop fighting if defeated.